STUDY ON INTERGENERATIONAL FAIRNESS

Annex to the final report

Written by: Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and the European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research

involving the following experts:
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Contents

Annex to Chapter 1

A1.1 Distribution of household equivalised income by head of household's age class

Mean equivalised incomes by age class of the head of household

Finally, we computed some indicators of the equivalised income distribution dividing individuals by the age class of the head of household instead of by the individual's age. Since very few individuals aged 15-24 are the head of household– i.e. they are the richest income recipient in the household – we split the population into 3 age classes: <35, 35-65 and >65.

In 2017 in 13 countries individuals living in households with the highest earner aged below 35 earn on average a lower equivalised disposable income than those living in households headed by an over-65 (Table A1.20). Likely, this evidence might be due, on the one hand, on employment difficulties experienced by some groups of younger individuals in some countries, coupled with a possible larger household size when minors are in the households which contributes to reduce equivalised income. On the other hand, a better relative conditions for older households may be also associated with increasing wage-experience patterns over the career (the aforementioned "age-effects") that, matched with a relatively generous pension system (e.g., a system that computes pensions according to final wages obtained in the working career), allow older individuals to obtain a relatively adequate economic living standard. Noteworthy, the relative conditions of the elderly have improved in almost all countries from 2006 to 2017, as concerns both gross and disposable incomes (Table A1.20 and Figure A1.1).

Fig. A1.1: Mean disposable income of households headed by individuals aged under-35. Index number: Household head over-65=100



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

AROP by age class of the household head

Figures about the incidence of AROP also change when the age of the household head is taken into account instead of the individual's age (Tables A1.21 and A1.22, where we show the AROP computed on equivalised labour, market, gross or disposable income).

Furthermore, Figure A1.2 shows that, as concerns gross incomes, poverty risks are higher for households headed by older individuals than by under-35 individuals in 18 out of 28 countries, while the same comparison carried out by looking at disposable incomes shows that households headed by older individuals have higher poverty risks than those headed by under-35 individuals in 12 out of 28 countries (Figure A1.3).

Fig. A1.2: Incidence of AROP according to equivalised gross income by household's head age in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.3: Incidence of AROP according to equivalised disposable income by household's head age in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Between and within inequality according to the age of the head of the household

Finally, the Theil decomposition of equivalised income by three subgroups distinguished according to the age of the head of household confirm that age classes mean income differences explain a relatively high share of total inequality when one focuses on income dimensions that, by definition, disadvantage the elderly (i.e. labour incomes), while at most around 10% of total inequality is explained by the mere mean age class divide when the focus is on gross or disposable income (Table A1.1). In the latter cases, in some countries more than 98% of total inequality is attributable to income differences within each subgroup defined according to the age of the household head.

Tab. A1.1: Theil decomposition of equivalised incomes in 2017. Between components by household head's age class

	Labour income	Market income	Gross income	Disposable income
AT	28.6	25.6	4.0	2.8
BE	32.4	27.9	5.5	3.4
BG	16.9	15.4	5.6	3.4
CY	23.0	20.3	4.1	3.2
CZ	36.9	34.9	10.8	7.8
DE	23.2	20.3	4.2	2.1
DK	28.6	21.3	7.2	6.8
EE	24.9	24.4	11.2	10.1
EL	23.6	20.7	2.3	0.8
ES	25.3	21.7	2.4	1.3
FI	32.2	26.9	7.0	5.6
FR	30.2	13.9	1.6	1.8
HR	27.9	26.6	5.7	4.2
HU	23.0	22.6	2.1	0.2
IE	16.3	15.5	4.3	1.8
IT	24.5	20.9	2.0	1.5
LT	20.2	19.0	6.7	4.6
LU	24.6	19.2	0.3	0.5
LV	22.4	21.9	9.3	8.2
MT	3.8	3.6	0.2	4.3
NL	33.7	28.4	4.4	3.3
PL	24.5	24.1	3.6	2.1
PT	26.8	23.1	1.3	0.7
RO	27.0	27.0	5.7	3.3
SE	33.7	26.0	8.0	6.4
SI	34.5	31.1	7.6	2.8
SK	27.7	27.5	5.6	2.2
UK	22.3	19.5	4.1	2.2

(*) Individuals with zero equivalised incomes are included in the computation. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Additional Tables and Figures commented in the main text

Tab. A1.2: OLS estimates of the number of months in unemployment for active workers in 2017. Coefficients of age classes (reference age class: 35-44)

	15-24		25-34		45-54		55-65		N
AT	0.263***	[0.094]	0.248***	[0.071]	0.062	[0.065]	0.567***	[0.082]	13003
BE	1.340***	[0.149]	0.125	[0.088]	-0.063	[0.086]	1.873***	[0.100]	11690
BG	2.536***	[0.149]	0.524***	[0.102]	-0.011	[0.100]	0.323***	[0.115]	12764
CY	1.812***	[0.134]	0.501***	[0.086]	-0.034	[0.092]	0.120	[0.107]	9364
CZ	1.224***	[0.095]	0.077	[0.057]	-0.152***	[0.056]	0.006	[0.067]	18090
DE	-0.125	[0.096]	0.295***	[0.061]	0.065	[0.054]	0.527***	[0.061]	24893
DK	0.343***	[0.104]	0.322***	[0.062]	-0.030	[0.056]	0.217***	[0.061]	12348
EE	0.533***	[0.094]	-0.071	[0.060]	0.041	[0.059]	0.021	[0.064]	12541
EL	3.218***	[0.115]	0.950***	[0.068]	-0.231***	[0.068]	0.028	[0.084]	27856
ES	1.487***	[0.094]	0.243***	[0.059]	0.095	[0.060]	0.483***	[0.072]	31050
FI	0.803***	[0.097]	0.301***	[0.062]	0.168***	[0.057]	0.546***	[0.063]	22691
FR	1.351***	[0.088]	0.501***	[0.061]	-0.087	[0.062]	0.413***	[0.074]	21149
HR	2.805***	[0.162]	0.490***	[0.109]	0.098	[0.110]	0.861***	[0.131]	12664
HU	0.989***	[0.094]	0.111*	[0.062]	-0.083	[0.058]	-0.001	[0.070]	14888
IE	1.743***	[0.128]	0.278***	[0.099]	-0.167*	[0.098]	-0.038	[0.112]	9795
IT	4.083***	[0.078]	1.223***	[0.052]	-0.312***	[0.050]	-0.169***	[0.060]	41622
LT	0.496***	[0.127]	0.045	[0.082]	0.175**	[0.079]	0.235***	[0.089]	10764
LU	1.686***	[0.117]	0.274***	[0.066]	0.209***	[0.065]	0.244***	[0.091]	9176
LV	0.370***	[0.125]	0.117	[0.085]	0.294***	[0.083]	0.396***	[0.092]	10225
MT	1.088***	[0.069]	0.062	[0.052]	-0.058	[0.058]	-0.210***	[0.070]	11756
NL	-0.076	[0.093]	0.005	[0.053]	0.072	[0.051]	0.572***	[0.058]	22710
PL	1.702***	[0.087]	0.387***	[0.054]	-0.081	[0.055]	-0.017	[0.070]	30502
PT	1.581***	[0.107]	0.387***	[0.069]	0.113*	[0.068]	0.500***	[0.080]	20947
RO	1.297***	[0.074]	0.241***	[0.050]	-0.030	[0.052]	-0.121*	[0.069]	15136
SE	0.695***	[0.072]	0.181***	[0.046]	0.021	[0.045]	0.017	[0.047]	14664
SI	0.750***	[0.102]	0.314***	[0.051]	0.141***	[0.049]	1.191***	[0.067]	24284
SK	1.126***	[0.102]	0.236***	[0.071]	-0.117*	[0.068]	-0.129	[0.088]	14610
UK	0.709***	[0.060]	0.062	[0.045]	0.004	[0.043]	-0.096*	[0.049]	14867

(*) Control variables: dummies on gender, citizenship, educational attainments, being enrolled in an education programme. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.3: Annual gross labour income of active workers by age class. Index number: workers 55-65=100

	2006				2017			
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54
AT	51.2	78.8	90.2	92.1	41.7	66.8	79.7	90.8
BE	83.3	127.2	147.3	150.3	54.9	84.0	105.1	105.7
BG	55.4	100.9	120.0	113.1	54.7	102.5	130.3	121.8
CY	44.6	78.5	96.3	103.7	31.8	58.7	92.7	93.7
CZ	64.2	104.3	109.3	105.9	75.8	109.4	120.0	111.6
DE	40.4	92.6	113.0	114.5	46.1	91.0	107.3	112.4
DK	56.4	88.0	104.5	105.8	38.2	76.2	100.1	113.2
EE	111.1	167.4	145.6	122.9	74.3	119.2	128.6	118.7
EL	36.6	65.0	97.4	106.4	26.3	60.4	87.6	101.9
ES	53.2	83.7	96.9	108.1	32.0	65.1	90.5	97.5
FI	55.9	93.0	108.9	110.3	55.6	85.4	108.9	111.8
FR	52.9	78.4	93.6	99.7	49.0	73.3	92.1	99.4
HR	48.8	91.7	99.3	96.9	56.8	89.7	109.2	103.0
HU	54.1	85.9	92.5	89.9	79.3	108.3	112.3	110.8
IE	49.2	94.1	115.8	117.5	37.8	81.7	111.7	130.1
IT	31.9	56.9	75.1	86.0	28.0	54.7	79.3	91.6
LT	98.7	116.8	106.9	107.0	68.8	117.4	138.8	112.7
LU	29.2	51.8	66.8	77.6	33.9	70.1	82.3	95.3
LV	105.9	136.1	129.3	110.8	82.4	134.3	142.6	116.3
MT	58.7	88.1	98.4	93.9	69.5	104.0	111.7	108.4
NL	50.8	80.4	92.6	99.2	52.3	88.0	107.5	109.5
PL	44.7	86.5	103.3	93.8	67.2	104.0	114.4	104.0
PT	48.0	81.8	99.1	113.8	45.0	74.8	98.8	99.2
RO	64.3	116.1	122.0	125.2	66.3	112.3	115.1	107.3
SE	45.3	81.0	100.9	103.8	52.3	78.0	98.6	104.9
SI	53.0	75.2	86.8	89.3	67.7	86.9	114.6	113.4
SK	67.1	89.4	96.8	95.5	81.1	107.6	112.4	106.7
UK	46.8	104.7	122.5	119.3	53.5	96.1	124.5	127.6

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.4: Annual net labour income of active workers by age class. Index number: workers 55-65=100

	2006				2017			
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54
AT	58.4	84.6	95.7	95.9	48.9	72.6	83.9	93.5
BE	91.0	131.2	150.4	152.8	59.6	89.0	107.3	107.4
BG	56.0	98.9	119.0	112.3	53.1	100.7	129.3	122.3
EE	109.3	155.5	141.5	127.2	75.5	119.2	128.2	118.4
EL	41.9	69.6	94.9	103.1	27.0	61.2	88.3	101.0
ES	57.2	86.7	98.3	108.6	36.6	70.8	95.2	100.2
FR	52.7	78.0	92.7	99.3	48.5	72.6	91.8	99.1
HR	51.6	92.1	101.1	97.6	59.8	92.1	111.1	105.7
HU	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	76.7	106.0	110.5	109.4
IE	56.5	98.5	117.7	117.0	47.5	86.8	110.2	130.3
IT	36.0	61.2	79.5	88.5	32.2	60.9	84.6	94.7
LT	92.2	116.6	109.7	109.9	70.7	116.5	140.4	113.3
LU	30.7	52.9	67.5	78.2	39.6	79.0	90.5	102.4
LV	118.1	143.7	135.7	112.0	85.3	135.3	145.0	116.3
PL	44.3	85.6	101.7	92.2	67.9	103.2	114.4	104.0
PT	55.3	87.7	102.5	113.7	52.7	82.4	104.6	102.5
RO	67.9	115.4	121.1	124.0	68.4	110.3	114.3	106.7
SE	49.0	83.9	101.6	104.3	57.9	83.4	100.8	106.3
SI	61.1	81.6	93.3	93.6	73.4	91.4	116.0	114.9

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.5: Annual net labour income plus net unemployment benefits of active workers by age class. Index number: workers 55-65=100

	2006				2017			
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54
AT	56.2	81.5	91.1	91.9	49.5	72.7	83.6	92.7
BE	69.6	97.1	111.4	112.9	58.9	85.6	103.5	104.5
BG	55.7	98.2	118.3	111.7	52.7	100.7	129.0	122.1
EE	109.1	155.4	141.5	127.3	75.4	118.7	127.6	117.8
EL	42.1	70.0	95.2	103.3	27.4	61.7	88.7	101.2
ES	56.2	85.6	97.3	107.1	35.3	70.1	93.4	98.0
FR	50.9	75.2	88.5	94.4	50.0	72.8	90.6	97.5
HR	50.3	89.8	98.5	96.0	59.4	91.3	110.3	104.8
HU	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	76.0	104.8	109.4	108.4
IE	57.4	96.1	116.8	116.0	48.1	87.6	109.7	130.0
IT	36.8	63.1	81.5	90.2	33.2	63.1	86.4	95.8
LT	92.0	116.3	109.6	109.7	70.7	116.3	139.6	113.0
LU	31.4	52.9	67.2	78.3	41.0	77.9	89.6	101.6
LV	117.9	144.5	136.4	112.8	85.4	135.8	144.9	116.4
PL	43.6	84.2	99.8	91.1	67.6	102.8	114.0	103.6
PT	53.2	85.1	98.5	110.7	50.7	80.3	101.7	100.1
RO	67.9	114.9	120.8	124.1	68.4	110.3	114.4	106.8
SE	50.2	84.4	101.5	104.0	57.7	83.0	100.3	106.0
SI	60.3	80.4	92.1	92.7	72.0	89.5	113.1	112.3

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.6: OLS estimates of annual net log labour incomes of active workers in 2017. Coefficients of age classes (reference age class: 35-44)

	15-24		25-34		45-54		55-65		N
AT	-0.390***	[0.045]	-0.081**	[0.032]	0.167***	[0.029]	0.181***	[0.035]	5527
BE	-0.260***	[0.055]	-0.134***	[0.028]	0.055**	[0.027]	-0.027	[0.031]	4838
BG	-0.518***	[0.056]	-0.152***	[0.030]	0.021	[0.029]	-0.096***	[0.032]	6727
EE	-0.294***	[0.049]	-0.049*	[0.027]	-0.031	[0.027]	-0.201***	[0.028]	6270
EL	-0.602***	[0.035]	-0.260***	[0.017]	0.111***	[0.015]	0.099***	[0.018]	17057
ES	-0.980***	[0.047]	-0.341***	[0.027]	0.028	[0.025]	0.125***	[0.030]	14138
FR	-0.534***	[0.037]	-0.208***	[0.024]	0.110***	[0.024]	0.152***	[0.027]	9727
HR	-0.485***	[0.036]	-0.223***	[0.023]	0.046**	[0.023]	0.005	[0.026]	7418
HU	-0.259***	[0.049]	-0.062**	[0.031]	0.011	[0.027]	-0.056*	[0.030]	6239
IE	-0.624***	[0.046]	-0.193***	[0.032]	0.127***	[0.031]	-0.064*	[0.035]	4374
IT	-0.741***	[0.029]	-0.287***	[0.017]	0.112***	[0.015]	0.113***	[0.017]	18631
LT	-0.591***	[0.057]	-0.251***	[0.035]	-0.053	[0.035]	-0.195***	[0.037]	4840
LU	-0.522***	[0.088]	-0.058	[0.047]	0.072	[0.046]	0.004	[0.062]	4420
LV	-0.305***	[0.058]	-0.097***	[0.032]	-0.177***	[0.032]	-0.281***	[0.034]	5108
PL	-0.268***	[0.033]	-0.116***	[0.017]	0.018	[0.018]	-0.017	[0.020]	12230
PT	-0.552***	[0.025]	-0.218***	[0.015]	0.097***	[0.014]	0.131***	[0.016]	13557
RO	-0.299***	[0.041]	-0.046*	[0.024]	-0.004	[0.023]	-0.079***	[0.029]	6884
SE	-0.519***	[0.052]	-0.172***	[0.030]	0.046	[0.029]	-0.034	[0.031]	6045
SI	-0.291***	[0.042]	-0.228***	[0.020]	0.041**	[0.019]	-0.129***	[0.024]	11130

(*) Control variables: dummies on gender, citizenship, educational attainments, being enrolled in an education programme. Individuals with zero incomes are not considered. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.7: OLS estimates of annual net log labour incomes plus unemployment benefits of active workers in 2017. Coefficients of age classes (reference age class: 35-44)

	15-24		25-34		45-54		55-65		N
AT	-0.367***	[0.041]	-0.063**	[0.029]	0.129***	[0.027]	0.120***	[0.031]	5676
BE	-0.259***	[0.051]	-0.133***	[0.026]	0.045*	[0.026]	-0.054*	[0.029]	5171
BG	-0.561***	[0.055]	-0.149***	[0.029]	0.024	[0.028]	-0.085***	[0.031]	6753
EE	-0.277***	[0.049]	-0.040	[0.027]	-0.029	[0.027]	-0.194***	[0.028]	6298
EL	-0.604***	[0.034]	-0.261***	[0.016]	0.109***	[0.014]	0.089***	[0.018]	17216
ES	-1.009***	[0.043]	-0.305***	[0.025]	0.002	[0.023]	0.079***	[0.027]	14721
FR	-0.530***	[0.032]	-0.186***	[0.021]	0.098***	[0.020]	0.114***	[0.023]	9930
HR	-0.477***	[0.037]	-0.220***	[0.023]	0.047**	[0.023]	-0.023	[0.026]	7485
HU	-0.249***	[0.047]	-0.058**	[0.029]	0.018	[0.025]	-0.042	[0.029]	6285
IE	-0.690***	[0.041]	-0.161***	[0.029]	0.143***	[0.028]	-0.024	[0.032]	4640
IT	-0.735***	[0.028]	-0.277***	[0.017]	0.104***	[0.015]	0.092***	[0.017]	18933
LT	-0.629***	[0.055]	-0.207***	[0.035]	-0.041	[0.034]	-0.173***	[0.036]	4896
LU	-0.514***	[0.084]	-0.054	[0.045]	0.071	[0.044]	0.026	[0.060]	4474
LV	-0.357***	[0.058]	-0.094***	[0.032]	-0.180***	[0.032]	-0.287***	[0.034]	5145
PL	-0.268***	[0.033]	-0.118***	[0.017]	0.017	[0.018]	-0.019	[0.020]	12298
PT	-0.553***	[0.024]	-0.207***	[0.014]	0.094***	[0.013]	0.117***	[0.015]	13916
RO	-0.300***	[0.041]	-0.048**	[0.024]	-0.004	[0.023]	-0.077***	[0.029]	6896
SE	-0.529***	[0.049]	-0.186***	[0.029]	0.045*	[0.027]	-0.021	[0.029]	6087
SI	-0.341***	[0.040]	-0.229***	[0.019]	0.047***	[0.018]	-0.089***	[0.023]	11219

(*) Control variables: dummies on gender, citizenship, educational attainments, being enrolled in an education programme. Individuals with zero incomes are not considered. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.8: Share of individuals in unemployment at least one month in the year who received an unemployment benefit (% values)

2006

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	75.2	56.2	0.6	10.5	28.2	65.3	56.9	7.1	6.6	14.7	64.8	38.4	5.6	47.5	36.6	19.7	6.8	25.8	10.2	14.6	39.5	9.0	14.3	10.4	19.1	15.4	11.4	32.4
25-34	91.5	88.7	2.7	30.6	42.6	87.4	90.3	9.1	22.4	42.2	86.8	65.8	13.7	70.2	49.7	28.3	5.0	43.0	37.7	59.6	48.2	14.1	39.1	12.8	49.4	29.0	18.0	28.2
35-44	91.8	95.7	5.6	48.6	37.1	85.4	85.2	16.4	41.2	50.0	90.1	68.1	17.2	75.3	53.5	33.7	18.5	46.8	34.0	58.8	46.5	14.0	39.1	26.0	50.9	36.6	27.9	28.5
45-54	91.8	93.5	4.1	57.5	35.5	85.0	83.2	16.0	33.1	46.0	88.9	70.7	24.3	72.6	56.2	35.4	9.1	59.0	21.1	71.9	41.4	15.4	61.4	39.0	58.0	49.0	23.9	33.5
55-65	92.0	96.8	7.0	70.1	57.3	86.1	85.2	17.7	33.0	55.7	92.9	87.2	25.2	76.8	47.6	20.5	14.2	69.0	19.1	17.5	44.3	20.7	71.5	43.4	63.0	48.8	20.4	25.5

2017

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	59.6	36.3	5.2	8.8	8.8	60.1	100.0	21.2	4.4	12.5	54.5	48.2	2.8	14.2	51.8	24.1	36.5	28.9	17.0	3.0	32.2	4.1	3.0	5.1	6.3	23.0	7.7	12.4
25-34	82.5	66.8	21.1	32.3	26.3	89.5	99.9	36.4	10.9	41.9	86.6	68.4	6.2	28.5	65.2	35.5	26.8	46.0	41.4	21.2	38.4	12.7	24.1	4.4	27.1	34.0	10.8	17.5
35-44	80.0	89.7	21.5	40.3	38.4	92.4	98.5	40.5	15.0	46.9	90.8	70.3	7.4	48.3	58.1	39.2	37.4	59.1	40.8	19.5	44.3	13.5	36.0	13.0	55.9	30.4	13.1	19.2
45-54	89.8	86.9	26.8	35.5	27.1	95.3	100.0	36.0	15.6	53.5	92.6	73.2	6.3	39.1	68.4	36.7	32.3	61.1	34.3	44.9	44.7	10.1	28.1	12.2	59.4	33.9	15.8	29.7
55-65	88.1	93.9	20.1	32.7	46.1	91.2	98.2	48.5	10.6	61.1	95.0	77.6	13.3	65.5	52.4	32.7	33.5	69.1	31.7	50.3	52.8	19.9	41.8	2.0	75.9	48.8	12.4	41.7

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.9: Predicted probabilities of being a working poor, according to annual gross labour incomes

	2006					2017				
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65
AT	31.8	22.7	22.6	22.6	22.4	38.7	25.2	25.9	20.5	22.5
BE	26.8	18.7	14.3	15.3	20.2	24.0	17.3	13.3	13.1	18.4
BG	23.7	19.7	18.3	15.9	25.2	41.3	28.1	21.6	23.1	23.1
CY	48.4	18.9	16.5	18.4	20.9	49.9	29.1	15.5	15.0	13.7
CZ	25.8	15.8	14.8	16.7	18.7	24.9	12.5	13.5	15.6	18.0
DE	62.0	29.0	27.0	25.7	29.7	50.0	24.9	24.0	23.5	27.3
DK	29.9	13.3	12.4	11.6	15.4	58.5	21.4	15.1	12.3	15.4
EE	16.8	12.4	17.4	22.7	27.1	31.7	22.4	20.9	23.0	28.3
EL	45.6	30.0	19.4	20.8	24.2	56.2	34.7	21.8	18.1	20.1
ES	37.1	22.5	21.5	16.7	18.7	63.4	39.0	25.0	23.8	22.2
FI	37.5	19.0	15.6	15.6	19.4	33.0	15.9	14.2	14.3	17.4
FR	35.0	19.9	16.8	13.7	14.5	42.4	23.5	18.8	16.0	18.9
HR	37.0	20.7	16.6	13.5	13.9	35.7	23.5	15.5	13.2	15.6
HU	30.9	20.4	17.6	16.0	17.1	20.8	16.2	17.6	15.2	17.3
IE	40.1	21.3	23.8	24.1	26.7	59.6	27.3	23.1	18.5	29.3
IT	48.0	24.7	17.3	13.2	12.3	59.7	35.9	22.1	19.2	18.2
LT	27.4	23.1	23.6	24.6	26.7	35.5	27.9	17.6	19.9	22.6
LU	46.2	25.6	22.5	17.3	15.6	45.0	22.7	19.2	18.0	24.1
LV	24.7	20.4	23.5	29.3	34.8	27.4	21.5	19.5	23.2	27.4
MT	15.7	10.5	9.5	8.9	8.6	27.9	18.7	13.7	12.8	14.8
NL	35.7	20.9	25.3	23.1	30.3	50.1	23.8	23.8	21.8	25.1
PL	42.4	26.0	19.4	19.7	27.5	24.7	14.9	13.4	13.9	14.4
PT	39.5	17.4	10.7	11.7	14.4	38.0	18.6	10.5	9.6	11.8
RO	33.7	26.7	21.3	22.5	32.8	28.1	17.8	17.0	17.9	20.5
SE	55.9	27.0	16.0	14.1	18.5	45.4	20.4	13.5	12.7	14.9
SI	28.0	20.7	14.2	15.2	21.6	31.1	24.9	16.6	16.7	23.9
SK	27.1	18.3	14.4	14.5	15.5	18.0	14.7	11.3	11.9	10.1
UK	37.6	17.2	21.6	21.2	28.3	49.8	22.3	21.6	22.7	31.3

(*) Average marginal effects estimated through a probit model. Control variables: dummies on gender, citizenship, educational attainments, being enrolled in an education programme. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.10: Share of active individuals who earn less than 60% of the median of the annual gross labour income distribution (% values)

2006

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	43.5	31.5	27.1	55.0	27.4	77.6	48.5	17.5	45.6	40.9	47.9	37.2	36.7	33.5	42.7	48.6	25.4	56.4	26.7	17.5	41.2	44.4	34.9	39.4	60.0	29.5	27.9	43.1
25-34	20.2	18.0	19.0	17.4	14.1	27.9	13.3	11.9	26.0	21.4	18.8	16.6	19.0	19.2	18.1	23.3	21.1	25.4	20.7	9.5	19.4	22.6	15.2	24.3	25.7	19.0	16.5	16.3
35-44	21.3	14.8	17.6	17.1	15.2	24.6	11.1	16.6	18.7	21.8	14.2	16.1	17.1	17.3	21.8	17.0	24.5	23.2	22.2	9.8	25.3	20.0	11.6	20.2	15.9	14.4	14.4	20.7
45-54	21.7	15.9	16.5	19.0	18.4	23.8	11.0	23.1	22.8	17.4	15.4	15.5	15.0	17.1	26.2	14.0	25.7	17.2	29.7	9.3	23.6	22.0	13.6	23.3	14.4	16.5	15.8	21.0
55-65	19.6	20.3	25.8	19.2	17.7	29.4	14.2	28.4	32.1	20.0	19.8	18.9	13.5	16.6	32.1	13.8	27.7	11.6	34.8	8.4	28.5	27.9	20.4	39.8	19.7	19.8	14.9	28.7

2017

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	49.0	27.6	46.5	53.0	27.7	68.1	70.8	39.3	60.5	66.7	40.0	44.2	38.1	26.3	67.0	62.6	38.8	48.0	32.2	26.4	54.9	30.9	34.7	38.7	49.0	33.0	19.5	47.0
25-34	24.7	16.8	27.8	25.9	11.0	23.4	22.4	22.2	30.7	38.2	17.1	21.3	20.9	14.7	26.4	34.4	23.9	19.5	18.9	16.0	21.9	12.8	15.9	15.7	20.6	23.8	13.2	20.9
35-44	25.3	12.4	21.1	16.4	13.4	21.4	14.0	20.8	20.7	23.8	13.6	17.7	15.0	17.2	20.1	21.4	17.4	21.3	19.3	13.7	23.5	12.5	9.8	16.1	13.6	16.1	11.0	20.8
45-54	19.8	14.2	23.1	16.0	16.7	21.1	11.2	22.6	18.6	24.0	14.4	16.7	14.9	15.1	18.5	19.8	21.6	18.9	24.2	14.5	23.1	15.1	10.6	17.5	12.5	17.5	12.7	21.8
55-65	20.4	19.1	23.4	13.7	18.3	26.2	14.5	27.8	25.2	24.2	17.8	22.0	16.6	17.8	32.0	18.8	23.9	24.9	29.3	18.7	25.8	15.9	14.3	24.2	14.9	24.5	10.8	31.0

[1] Active individuals earning zero income are not included. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.11: OLS regressions of annual gross log labour income on workers characteristics in 2010. Individuals aged 25-34

	Female		At most lower secondary		Tertiary		Middle educated parents		High educated parents		N
AT	-0.326***	[0.052]	0.364***	[0.102]	0.541***	[0.111]	0.162**	[0.077]	0.204**	[0.094]	845
BE	-0.260***	[0.053]	0.098	[0.104]	0.310***	[0.107]	0.082	[0.069]	0.084	[0.072]	1081
BG	-0.221***	[0.035]	0.261***	[0.058]	0.552***	[0.069]	0.233***	[0.052]	0.360***	[0.064]	1153
CY	-0.251***	[0.035]	0.039	[0.060]	0.251***	[0.059]	0.109***	[0.039]	0.140***	[0.049]	777
CZ	-0.351***	[0.031]	0.242**	[0.100]	0.623***	[0.105]	0.119***	[0.034]	0.164***	[0.047]	1156
DE	-0.306***	[0.034]	0.617***	[0.072]	0.968***	[0.076]	0.095	[0.074]	0.078	[0.077]	1483
DK	-0.193***	[0.054]	-0.16	[0.117]	0.087	[0.119]	-0.045	[0.076]	0.016	[0.079]	344
EE	-0.487***	[0.048]	0.110	[0.078]	0.482***	[0.080]	0.087	[0.093]	0.131	[0.094]	717
EL	-0.218***	[0.048]	0.169*	[0.090]	0.492***	[0.095]	0.085	[0.057]	0.099	[0.070]	849
ES	-0.327***	[0.033]	0.134***	[0.046]	0.361***	[0.040]	0.122***	[0.046]	0.059	[0.048]	2234
FI	-0.158***	[0.037]	0.076	[0.078]	0.232***	[0.080]	-0.035	[0.053]	0.022	[0.054]	739
FR	-0.243***	[0.027]	0.066	[0.057]	0.394***	[0.058]	0.064*	[0.036]	0.090***	[0.034]	2016
HR	-0.197***	[0.037]	0.206**	[0.098]	0.620***	[0.105]	0.091*	[0.047]	0.150**	[0.064]	891
HU	-0.179***	[0.025]	0.239***	[0.047]	0.668***	[0.053]	0.142***	[0.028]	0.256***	[0.038]	2252
IE	-0.194***	[0.063]	0.028	[0.152]	0.582***	[0.146]	0.038	[0.081]	0.002	[0.091]	379
IT	-0.296***	[0.026]	0.186***	[0.033]	0.382***	[0.042]	0.147***	[0.029]	0.094*	[0.051]	2886
LT	-0.175**	[0.078]	0.117	[0.146]	0.405***	[0.146]	0.086	[0.154]	0.294*	[0.171]	592
LU	-0.137***	[0.034]	0.251***	[0.057]	0.673***	[0.061]	0.057	[0.042]	0.059	[0.059]	679
LV	-0.368***	[0.055]	0.272***	[0.080]	0.792***	[0.086]	0.277***	[0.087]	0.396***	[0.098]	898
MT	-0.149***	[0.033]	0.229***	[0.038]	0.558***	[0.041]	-0.010	[0.034]	0.120**	[0.053]	941
NL	-0.247***	[0.040]	-0.053	[0.078]	0.313***	[0.079]	0.102*	[0.056]	0.011	[0.058]	989
PL	-0.264***	[0.025]	0.121*	[0.068]	0.503***	[0.070]	0.113***	[0.037]	0.319***	[0.049]	2811
PT	-0.174***	[0.036]	0.225***	[0.041]	0.645***	[0.047]	0.078	[0.065]	-0.057	[0.069]	1001
RO	-0.306***	[0.035]	0.347***	[0.053]	0.811***	[0.065]	0.132***	[0.042]	0.096	[0.069]	1324
SE	-0.380***	[0.069]	0.454***	[0.144]	0.540***	[0.147]	0.131	[0.104]	0.126	[0.111]	600
SI	-0.295***	[0.040]	0.117	[0.080]	0.450***	[0.084]	0.057	[0.045]	0.092*	[0.054]	1072
SK	-0.270***	[0.030]	0.298***	[0.102]	0.494***	[0.105]	0.061	[0.054]	0.143**	[0.065]	1521
UK	-0.384***	[0.043]	0.252	[0.163]	0.616***	[0.163]	0.176***	[0.054]	0.208***	[0.052]	907

(*) Individuals with zero incomes are not considered. Control variables: dummies on self-employed, age and age squared. At most lower secondary is the reference category for education. Parents with at most a lower secondary education is the reference category for the highest parental education. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC 2011

Tab. A1.12: Share of young people living in a household whose oldest member is aged at most 34 (% values)

	2007		2018	
	15-24	25-34	15-24	25-34
AT	15.8	59.4	13.0	66.3
BE	13.7	68.7	6.1	62.3
BG	6.6	27.7	5.5	28.3
CY	4.5	50.7	5.8	44.9
CZ	7.0	55.7	10.7	52.2
DE	19.1	72.3	20.9	67.5
DK	44.6	82.1	42.1	84.7
EE	17.9	60.8	19.2	66.2
EL	14.8	34.9	9.6	28.9
ES	6.9	46.2	3.8	40.2
FI	39.1	81.9	41.3	80.9
FR	36.5	76.6	21.2	70.4
HR	5.2	24.4	2.5	19.8
HU	11.5	48.5	6.7	39.9
IE	10.7	57.2	9.1	53.5
IT	7.4	42.0	4.6	37.8
LT	11.3	54.7	17.7	57.3
LU	10.0	62.8	6.5	62.6
LV	11.5	40.5	12.5	51.1
MT	2.6	48.0	0.3	9.5
NL	23.8	77.6	22.3	77.7
PL	7.4	42.1	7.5	36.2
PT	6.4	43.2	3.6	37.4
RO	8.0	43.1	6.1	35.6
SE	41.4	81.1	31.3	78.9
SI	2.3	33.0	6.5	40.8
SK	3.3	33.0	2.6	26.6
UK	16.2	65.9	16.6	64.5

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.13: Mean annual equivalised gross income. Index number: Individuals over-65=100

	2006						2017					
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65
AT	95.4	103.2	110.1	118.1	127.9	120.7	94.5	107.3	105.0	114.0	132.8	128.6
BE	142.6	133.5	164.9	162.6	162.1	148.6	127.5	126.3	140.1	145.8	147.8	143.3
BG	123.9	124.9	147.5	143.1	156.3	131.6	140.9	140.2	161.2	170.8	174.1	157.0
CY	148.5	152.1	172.3	159.1	169.7	182.1	99.2	92.2	100.5	117.0	110.0	127.4
CZ	132.3	138.1	164.0	145.8	169.2	139.6	142.3	142.8	169.8	158.0	172.6	151.7
DE	115.9	112.7	127.9	144.9	150.8	130.6	130.0	116.0	130.2	146.9	153.7	137.6
DK	136.6	118.5	132.9	151.3	170.0	162.4	113.6	92.2	101.4	121.4	141.8	150.3
EE	168.4	165.1	231.0	175.5	170.6	152.2	166.2	146.5	184.1	177.7	174.6	158.8
EL	137.8	118.1	139.9	146.7	152.0	148.7	104.8	91.1	109.8	114.3	118.5	119.3
ES	120.9	119.9	143.4	137.4	144.0	139.3	109.4	100.8	111.3	117.7	115.3	132.3
FI	134.8	120.6	141.2	155.3	167.5	158.6	119.0	103.5	117.1	135.5	151.1	147.2
FR	105.5	97.0	112.9	117.9	130.4	133.1	88.9	84.2	93.7	99.3	107.5	120.0
HR	144.2	135.6	178.6	150.1	157.7	145.8	132.2	126.4	153.3	145.8	140.9	130.8
HU	113.0	114.6	144.8	128.2	136.6	132.2	112.2	107.9	138.3	124.8	130.9	116.3
IE	145.4	137.7	173.4	171.6	172.2	152.6	134.3	119.3	144.4	156.7	161.3	140.2
IT	108.9	104.0	122.9	123.6	132.0	139.0	88.1	91.3	96.4	99.7	107.1	124.0
LT	151.3	161.0	201.3	158.7	181.8	160.7	149.3	139.3	185.5	177.8	166.8	153.3
LU	98.8	97.6	112.6	116.7	126.1	136.3	82.0	81.0	97.1	97.0	103.7	103.7
LV	135.5	145.0	175.5	146.9	151.8	133.0	160.0	144.7	191.4	179.0	159.0	147.1
MT	125.5	140.3	168.3	143.5	146.8	134.5	93.6	91.0	117.2	108.2	104.5	102.3
NL	119.8	114.8	136.4	138.9	154.1	156.9	120.3	100.1	120.4	129.2	136.9	146.4
PL	104.4	100.5	125.7	120.4	120.1	118.7	116.5	100.9	130.6	126.3	120.7	115.0
PT	127.0	124.1	142.5	134.2	151.9	153.2	104.6	95.6	110.6	113.4	109.8	118.7
RO	124.5	133.3	167.9	155.5	163.8	131.5	119.1	106.1	153.2	138.0	139.9	130.1
SE	112.6	95.5	116.9	126.3	140.6	158.1	107.6	103.2	106.7	122.8	141.0	151.7
SI	134.3	133.4	149.7	139.8	148.9	133.1	137.6	130.6	139.7	145.3	145.3	129.0
SK	124.1	131.1	156.6	134.8	151.8	138.9	111.0	116.8	141.5	124.0	137.0	128.3
UK	133.1	134.0	173.2	170.2	171.0	158.1	117.0	112.4	135.1	146.1	147.7	135.7

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.14: Mean annual equivalised disposable income. Index number: Individuals over-65=100

	2006						2017					
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65
AT	92.0	98.3	103.1	108.5	115.7	113.4	88.9	100.4	99.0	103.1	116.8	116.7
BE	122.6	115.4	136.5	136.0	134.2	131.3	114.5	110.8	123.9	127.0	127.6	127.1
BG	114.4	114.0	135.0	130.4	140.1	124.3	124.6	123.7	139.6	146.9	150.3	140.6
CY	142.0	146.2	166.1	149.9	160.6	173.4	103.0	97.9	106.6	118.4	111.3	128.0
CZ	115.3	119.0	139.5	124.5	142.5	126.3	128.8	126.7	146.9	138.2	146.2	135.6
DE	104.6	101.8	111.6	122.4	127.0	118.4	114.9	103.4	111.3	123.8	125.8	117.3
DK	126.2	113.0	123.2	137.1	153.8	152.6	111.2	92.1	101.5	117.5	134.8	141.8
EE	150.3	146.9	201.4	154.6	150.2	139.7	156.2	137.2	170.2	163.7	159.5	148.6
EL	114.6	105.0	124.6	121.9	122.8	130.2	95.7	86.3	102.5	105.3	104.1	109.3
ES	112.3	111.1	132.8	125.6	130.4	128.6	99.8	91.8	102.9	107.3	103.4	120.6
FI	127.6	115.8	134.6	143.1	152.7	143.8	111.0	99.6	111.7	123.8	135.3	138.0
FR	96.6	89.6	102.4	105.1	112.8	121.2	81.6	78.5	86.0	89.3	95.7	108.4
HR	123.9	116.9	150.7	128.2	133.0	130.1	120.0	115.2	137.0	130.1	126.4	120.3
HU	94.1	95.4	116.4	104.1	110.3	117.0	97.8	93.5	115.1	105.8	109.9	103.2
IE	132.3	125.3	155.6	152.4	150.1	136.4	107.1	99.2	119.8	121.1	127.5	116.5
IT	102.1	98.0	115.2	114.3	119.7	128.2	84.2	85.6	93.1	94.0	98.8	114.9
LT	132.9	137.8	170.4	137.1	156.4	143.3	134.1	125.6	163.8	158.3	147.6	138.5
LU	95.0	92.8	104.1	107.9	114.3	124.8	86.5	86.0	93.7	95.2	99.7	105.1
LV	127.1	134.7	160.7	135.0	136.6	122.7	151.4	134.9	175.2	163.1	144.3	136.1
MT	111.9	127.1	148.0	126.5	132.4	124.2	127.8	129.2	156.7	142.8	136.6	125.4
NL	104.5	102.7	118.8	118.5	127.2	132.1	116.8	98.4	117.9	123.6	126.4	131.1
PL	94.4	92.3	112.8	106.6	106.2	111.8	111.6	95.6	120.8	118.1	110.3	108.4
PT	110.5	109.2	126.9	116.0	130.1	137.5	96.4	88.7	102.8	102.9	98.7	108.8
RO	111.3	118.9	147.9	134.0	143.8	125.4	105.2	94.5	133.0	121.0	122.3	119.9
SE	114.6	100.1	118.9	126.7	138.7	153.0	102.1	99.5	104.4	114.7	130.5	139.8
SI	110.2	111.2	122.3	114.3	120.2	118.1	110.3	106.6	112.9	115.4	115.2	110.7
SK	113.4	116.6	138.2	120.6	131.9	128.6	97.2	101.2	121.3	106.9	116.6	115.2
UK	119.2	120.3	150.5	145.3	146.4	139.6	101.8	101.4	117.8	123.3	126.9	121.2

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.15: OLS estimates of annual gross log equivalised income in 2017. Coefficients of age classes (reference age class: 35-44)

	<15	15-24	25-34	45-54	55-65	>65	N
AT	-0.125***	-0.082***	-0.017	0.032	0.023	0.030	12711
BE	-0.056***	-0.134***	0.015	0.033	0.061**	0.100***	13088
BG	-0.115***	-0.094***	0.002	-0.037	-0.012	-0.046	16947
CY	-0.071***	-0.125***	0.001	-0.049*	-0.041	-0.020	11051
CZ	-0.123***	-0.086***	0.076***	0.092***	0.067***	0.020	18889
DE	-0.113***	-0.134***	-0.036	0.025	-0.050*	-0.021	25168
DK	-0.019	-0.110***	0.004	0.076**	0.036	-0.068	11615
EE	-0.051**	-0.100***	0.048*	-0.005	-0.059**	-0.055*	14566
EL	-0.004	-0.265***	-0.034	-0.012	0.026	0.169***	56333
ES	-0.084***	-0.140***	0.039*	-0.057***	0.006	0.063**	33455
FI	-0.103***	-0.094***	-0.037**	0.016	0.024	-0.012	23342
FR	-0.096***	-0.142***	-0.011	0.006	0.058***	0.040	24066
HR	-0.073***	-0.084***	0.051**	-0.009	-0.091***	-0.006	21186
HU	-0.091***	-0.137***	0.068***	0.005	0.011	0.076***	16803
IE	-0.121***	-0.247***	0.033	-0.093***	-0.130***	-0.081*	12395
IT	-0.124***	-0.168***	-0.002	-0.035	-0.049*	0.136***	45627
LT	-0.126***	-0.038	0.042	-0.003	-0.058	0.001	10970
LU	-0.109***	-0.114***	0.016	-0.044	0.003	0.095*	10346
LV	-0.052*	-0.029	0.037	-0.037	-0.123***	0.020	12483
MT	-0.127***	-0.092***	0.108***	-0.027	0.008	0.072**	19844
NL	-0.089***	-0.126***	0.040**	0.029	0.043**	0.045	26745
PL	-0.058***	-0.182***	0.034**	-0.032**	-0.044***	0.038**	34364
PT	-0.084***	-0.121***	0.033*	-0.028	-0.011	0.063***	33770
RO	-0.078***	-0.149***	0.016	0.050*	0.082***	0.165***	17061
SE	-0.065***	-0.029	-0.002	0.058**	0.091***	0.094**	14168
SI	-0.056***	-0.091***	0.014	-0.027**	-0.044***	-0.002	25781
SK	-0.086***	-0.055*	0.090***	0.052*	0.069**	0.106***	15884
UK	-0.115***	-0.166***	0.085***	-0.024	-0.066**	0.035	15386

(*) Control variables: dummies on gender of the individual and the household head, dummies on citizenship, education and age class of the household head. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.16: OLS estimates of annual disposable log equivalised income in 2017. Coefficients of age classes (reference age class: 35-44)

	<15	15-24	25-34	45-54	55-65	>65	N
AT	-0.098***	-0.039	0.000	0.026	0.035	0.057*	12711
BE	-0.032	-0.110***	0.018	0.029	0.063**	0.118***	13088
BG	-0.106***	-0.079***	0.020	-0.028	0.028	-0.020	16947
CY	-0.067***	-0.078***	-0.012	-0.031*	-0.003	-0.008	11051
CZ	-0.079***	-0.055***	0.066***	0.067***	0.053***	0.025	18889
DE	-0.065***	-0.090***	-0.011	-0.007	-0.045	0.036	25168
DK	-0.004	-0.097***	0.004	0.063*	-0.010	-0.083	11615
EE	-0.033	-0.079***	0.033	-0.025	-0.056*	-0.024	14566
EL	-0.036***	-0.101***	0.024	-0.043***	0.033**	0.180***	56333
ES	-0.068***	-0.110***	0.034	-0.047**	0.024	0.091***	33455
FI	-0.086***	-0.079***	-0.027	0.015	0.028	-0.008	23342
FR	-0.077***	-0.098***	-0.012	0.012	0.065***	0.090***	24066
HR	-0.063***	-0.062***	0.055***	0.000	-0.049***	0.038*	21186
HU	-0.050***	-0.092***	0.046**	-0.007	0.024	0.095***	16803
IE	-0.096***	-0.187***	0.042*	-0.062***	-0.083***	-0.024	12395
IT	-0.099***	-0.131***	0.027	-0.025	-0.039	0.147***	45627
LT	-0.104***	-0.044	0.034	-0.014	-0.056	0.011	10970
LU	-0.014	-0.023	0.042	-0.089**	0.021	0.134**	10346
LV	-0.017	-0.012	0.035	-0.037	-0.104***	0.031	12483
MT	-0.100***	-0.055***	0.085***	-0.010	-0.004	0.013	19844
NL	-0.086***	-0.098***	0.044*	-0.014	0.027	0.090**	26745
PL	-0.019	-0.134***	0.040***	-0.050***	-0.035**	0.068***	34364
PT	-0.061***	-0.084***	0.034**	-0.013	0.008	0.097***	33770
RO	-0.071***	-0.141***	0.009	0.058**	0.105***	0.203***	17061
SE	-0.045*	-0.033	0.003	0.044	0.045	0.104**	14168
SI	-0.041***	-0.057***	0.017	-0.018*	0.000	0.059***	25781
SK	-0.057**	-0.037	0.096***	0.075**	0.099***	0.168***	15884
UK	-0.078***	-0.112***	0.092***	-0.002	-0.029	0.038	15386

(*) Control variables: dummies on gender of the individual and the household head, dummies on citizenship, education and age class of the household head. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. *Source*: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.17: Incidence of relative poverty according to annual equivalised market income (% values)

	2006							2017						
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65
AT	24.1	19.1	18.8	14.3	15.2	54.7	84.1	26.4	20.7	20.6	17.8	15.4	43.1	85.5
BE	22.7	24.8	16.0	17.0	21.2	52.1	88.2	22.5	25.8	17.3	18.9	21.4	42.6	89.8
BG	31.5	28.0	21.3	22.1	19.1	44.7	72.3	31.0	26.1	22.5	20.2	18.6	31.2	75.7
CY	15.6	17.6	13.1	15.0	13.6	33.7	83.7	24.2	27.9	17.7	20.6	19.6	31.7	85.8
CZ	23.6	19.8	14.5	17.0	14.3	47.6	86.4	18.4	16.1	11.4	13.8	12.1	38.4	87.0
DE	20.8	26.8	21.6	14.6	19.0	53.1	91.1	19.7	26.3	19.9	14.0	14.8	38.2	89.1
DK	19.7	33.6	22.0	15.1	14.1	39.1	92.1	18.3	39.4	29.1	16.0	12.3	27.1	88.3
EE	24.9	21.6	12.6	19.8	21.4	39.7	80.9	25.4	24.3	18.3	18.3	18.1	31.9	79.8
EL	17.0	29.6	18.8	16.0	21.1	42.2	76.4	19.1	31.1	22.9	20.2	20.7	43.8	78.6
ES	20.8	21.8	16.2	18.4	19.3	39.4	78.2	22.2	29.0	22.3	19.7	25.0	37.2	79.6
FI	22.6	29.4	19.8	17.3	16.9	40.9	91.4	20.3	31.8	22.4	16.7	16.8	32.9	89.5
FR	22.3	26.1	15.5	14.6	17.5	54.4	90.6	24.6	24.7	17.0	16.4	15.6	40.8	84.0
HR	22.2	24.3	13.2	23.2	22.7	42.3	75.9	21.5	22.5	15.2	19.0	21.3	39.2	78.5
HU	27.7	24.3	17.1	19.7	20.2	49.3	81.8	29.1	25.6	14.7	19.5	17.5	38.6	81.5
IE	33.9	31.5	19.7	22.0	26.4	42.4	84.1	31.4	36.4	24.6	23.0	24.1	38.0	84.4
IT	19.4	22.7	17.7	15.7	15.9	42.8	77.8	20.3	22.7	21.3	18.7	18.0	30.8	78.0
LT	27.0	23.7	19.7	21.9	19.1	45.1	81.9	28.1	24.8	17.6	20.2	19.2	33.5	79.5
LU	23.8	21.9	14.9	12.9	16.4	47.2	85.6	22.2	28.5	15.4	16.2	18.4	54.4	87.9
LV	27.0	21.4	17.1	22.0	23.0	40.0	70.1	22.2	26.1	14.8	19.3	21.5	35.4	75.5
MT	22.7	16.1	13.5	17.8	16.9	41.3	78.6	26.4	26.5	16.4	21.3	21.8	37.6	54.8
NL	21.3	26.5	13.6	18.1	18.2	51.4	93.9	17.5	31.0	17.5	16.3	18.0	33.0	93.5
PL	25.1	26.9	18.3	19.9	25.1	53.1	79.5	24.0	26.2	15.4	19.8	20.3	38.6	73.1
PT	20.1	23.2	15.1	20.2	20.1	42.0	81.0	17.9	24.0	16.2	14.8	18.8	37.1	82.3
RO	35.6	25.7	23.6	20.3	25.2	58.4	79.2	27.8	28.3	19.8	19.5	19.0	47.9	78.2
SE	21.8	31.9	20.3	15.5	13.6	24.7	92.0	24.1	33.6	24.5	18.5	14.2	22.1	87.9
SI	19.5	19.8	17.0	16.2	18.6	50.7	78.2	17.8	17.7	16.3	15.5	16.6	46.1	85.4
SK	22.6	19.7	15.0	19.1	14.2	49.0	83.4	25.6	20.3	15.2	18.9	14.2	35.4	75.7
UK	34.4	27.7	19.0	20.1	18.2	37.5	86.9	32.1	31.0	18.9	19.2	20.0	34.7	85.8

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.18: Incidence of relative poverty according to annual equivalised gross income (% values)

	2006							2017						
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65
AT	22.6	17.5	16.0	12.8	11.5	14.6	22.4	26.1	18.9	20.6	17.3	12.6	16.5	21.3
BE	22.2	23.3	13.9	15.1	16.7	24.7	41.0	22.3	25.1	16.7	16.6	18.8	20.0	34.1
BG	30.6	27.7	19.2	20.5	17.3	21.1	32.9	29.8	26.2	21.6	19.2	17.3	20.5	43.1
CY	12.4	11.4	9.5	11.8	9.1	16.3	57.2	22.8	21.4	16.6	17.2	14.4	17.6	32.3
CZ	19.2	17.0	9.9	12.8	8.5	8.9	15.2	15.9	15.7	8.1	10.5	9.1	13.6	29.2
DE	18.8	24.0	20.1	13.3	14.4	22.3	24.0	17.9	25.2	20.4	13.1	14.3	21.7	29.6
DK	13.8	31.5	16.4	9.7	7.5	8.2	35.7	14.6	35.4	22.8	12.4	7.3	6.9	17.2
EE	19.6	20.5	10.6	17.5	20.9	26.1	49.3	18.9	22.9	15.1	15.3	16.5	22.8	60.5
EL	21.5	30.6	16.4	18.1	18.3	20.3	33.2	22.3	31.5	20.5	19.0	18.4	17.7	14.7
ES	24.8	21.9	13.7	18.3	16.3	19.5	34.4	27.2	32.2	23.8	19.6	24.7	19.3	25.3
FI	15.8	26.0	14.6	12.1	11.5	15.0	35.0	16.5	30.7	17.6	12.3	13.2	13.3	23.7
FR	17.6	24.1	11.4	12.4	13.2	12.6	22.8	21.6	24.4	13.0	14.6	14.4	11.8	16.0
HR	20.6	24.8	11.6	18.5	20.6	24.5	40.9	19.7	22.3	12.3	16.6	18.1	26.2	39.5
HU	21.0	20.0	12.3	14.1	13.3	11.1	12.8	26.8	28.0	13.6	18.3	16.9	23.1	26.5
IE	22.7	22.7	11.8	14.2	17.8	27.8	40.9	20.0	30.2	13.8	15.0	16.9	25.3	27.2
IT	26.9	27.3	17.8	20.4	17.5	17.2	29.0	30.5	29.1	24.6	23.4	21.6	19.2	20.1
LT	23.2	21.4	15.0	18.6	16.8	24.7	45.3	25.7	22.3	15.3	19.1	18.8	24.6	49.0
LU	22.3	18.5	14.0	12.8	13.2	9.7	10.2	24.9	26.3	16.6	19.2	18.2	16.2	14.2
LV	23.0	19.2	14.8	19.7	20.9	30.2	53.5	19.5	24.7	12.4	16.9	21.5	28.9	55.8
MT	22.8	13.8	10.8	16.6	13.6	24.4	33.7	25.2	23.8	13.6	17.9	19.4	20.9	24.1
NL	20.8	23.5	12.3	14.9	11.7	13.9	29.4	15.9	28.6	15.5	14.6	13.9	17.2	23.6
PL	25.9	25.8	15.8	19.4	20.2	15.6	13.4	15.5	22.6	11.3	14.0	17.0	19.4	19.8
PT	21.3	19.5	11.7	17.9	15.2	20.7	38.0	20.1	25.2	15.8	15.2	18.5	20.8	28.3
RO	35.8	25.6	23.7	20.9	21.2	25.3	37.7	31.9	31.6	22.3	21.6	19.8	24.6	34.3
SE	14.8	29.3	14.4	10.4	7.7	5.2	18.3	22.0	31.4	20.8	16.5	11.4	10.2	23.0
SI	14.2	13.8	10.1	11.9	12.9	17.9	32.6	14.6	15.9	12.3	12.0	13.5	23.2	33.1
SK	16.8	15.2	8.9	13.3	9.5	9.4	19.0	21.9	18.0	11.1	13.8	10.5	13.2	16.0
UK	28.1	22.5	16.2	16.2	14.8	20.7	41.2	23.9	25.0	14.6	14.4	16.0	20.5	26.0

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.19: Incidence of relative poverty according to annual equivalised disposable income (% values)

	2006							2017						
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65
AT	15.2	12.8	12.2	9.2	9.2	11.2	14.6	19.6	15.6	16.1	13.0	11.0	11.8	14.0
BE	16.4	17.5	11.0	11.7	11.3	14.0	23.3	20.0	20.7	13.7	14.8	14.8	13.0	17.2
BG	29.4	26.6	19.0	19.8	17.8	18.2	24.2	27.1	24.2	19.4	18.1	16.1	16.9	29.8
CY	11.7	10.2	8.8	11.9	8.5	15.1	52.3	17.0	14.4	13.4	13.8	12.5	14.8	21.5
CZ	15.5	14.2	7.7	11.4	7.2	5.7	5.4	10.6	11.3	5.7	7.1	7.3	9.9	14.4
DE	13.6	20.4	16.8	11.1	13.6	17.5	16.8	13.8	19.4	17.2	11.4	12.4	18.1	18.8
DK	9.5	26.7	14.4	6.9	5.7	4.6	18.5	11.4	29.8	19.9	10.0	5.8	7.0	9.2
EE	17.0	18.7	9.0	15.8	19.1	20.8	33.6	15.0	20.3	13.4	13.7	16.2	21.1	47.0
EL	21.1	23.3	14.5	17.6	18.7	17.7	22.2	21.1	28.4	18.9	18.5	20.0	17.9	11.4
ES	25.2	20.7	13.8	18.3	16.2	18.0	25.7	25.8	30.6	22.6	18.8	24.0	17.5	15.8
FI	9.6	20.3	10.8	8.2	8.7	10.8	22.6	10.4	23.4	12.2	8.9	8.8	7.9	13.8
FR	14.6	20.8	9.4	11.2	13.2	9.0	13.4	19.0	20.5	11.4	12.9	12.9	9.9	8.2
HR	19.0	23.0	11.3	17.8	19.7	20.4	31.1	18.8	18.6	11.4	15.5	15.8	22.1	28.5
HU	18.6	17.8	10.9	12.8	12.1	6.9	6.2	12.3	18.3	7.5	12.4	13.5	15.6	9.4
IE	18.9	18.4	8.9	11.5	13.5	22.8	28.5	15.1	24.6	10.6	11.1	14.2	19.2	14.5
IT	23.9	24.6	16.4	18.2	16.2	14.6	22.6	26.0	26.6	21.9	20.4	19.8	17.5	15.3
LT	20.8	18.7	12.4	16.7	15.1	18.8	30.6	23.9	20.8	13.8	17.9	17.3	22.5	38.2
LU	19.9	17.2	14.1	12.3	12.3	9.5	7.1	22.5	22.7	17.2	18.2	18.9	15.8	12.8
LV	19.8	18.2	13.0	17.6	20.5	26.7	35.2	15.8	21.9	10.3	15.0	19.3	26.3	46.6
MT	19.5	13.0	9.2	14.1	12.1	17.6	21.0	20.9	15.7	8.1	14.4	13.7	20.0	25.2
NL	14.1	16.1	6.7	9.5	7.1	7.1	10.2	12.6	23.9	10.9	11.4	10.4	14.8	10.5
PL	23.6	22.6	15.1	18.8	18.8	12.0	7.6	12.0	20.4	10.4	12.5	17.6	17.8	15.4
PT	20.4	18.6	11.1	18.0	14.1	19.0	26.3	17.3	22.7	14.1	13.8	17.6	18.2	17.8
RO	34.2	23.8	22.3	19.6	19.7	20.1	29.7	30.6	30.4	21.8	20.5	19.4	20.1	23.1
SE	11.2	23.0	12.1	7.8	6.0	4.8	11.7	19.6	26.1	18.9	15.2	10.5	10.0	15.0
SI	11.1	9.9	8.6	9.4	10.2	11.8	20.2	11.7	12.4	11.3	10.2	11.8	15.9	18.5
SK	15.7	13.9	8.1	12.4	8.7	5.8	9.7	19.4	16.7	10.6	12.5	11.3	9.1	7.0
UK	23.3	19.6	14.1	14.0	12.8	17.8	30.0	20.9	21.2	13.1	13.1	14.5	18.5	17.1

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.20: Mean annual equivalised gross and disposable income. Index number: Household head over-65=100

	Equivalised gross income				Equivalised disposable income			
	2006		2017		2006		2017	
	<35	35-65	<35	35-65	<35	35-65	<35	35-65
AT	98.1	117.5	93.3	124.7	94.9	108.6	90.1	111.9
BE	152.1	162.1	129.5	148.6	126.4	134.9	117.3	129.0
BG	173.2	182.9	154.8	180.7	150.6	159.0	129.6	152.2
CY	150.7	172.9	80.6	114.2	147.4	163.7	90.4	116.1
CZ	159.1	164.0	166.1	168.9	134.8	137.7	143.6	144.8
DE	108.1	140.7	110.2	141.2	97.5	121.5	98.8	120.5
DK	115.7	156.4	85.6	133.2	110.1	143.6	87.6	127.0
EE	227.0	188.0	177.7	187.2	196.1	163.6	165.1	171.5
EL	122.2	160.8	96.9	124.8	114.8	130.1	96.5	111.6
ES	141.5	151.1	100.2	127.0	130.4	136.6	93.5	113.3
FI	123.8	157.2	102.0	139.5	120.9	144.5	99.5	127.5
FR	102.9	121.7	82.8	104.3	95.1	108.8	78.2	93.8
HR	192.3	184.8	155.8	157.0	154.2	148.2	138.3	137.9
HU	137.8	144.3	130.8	127.5	109.9	114.5	109.0	106.4
IE	133.5	170.2	118.5	155.1	125.7	149.1	101.6	121.3
IT	112.8	134.4	80.6	111.2	107.6	122.6	80.2	103.3
LT	223.3	199.4	171.2	177.5	180.2	164.4	149.5	155.4
LU	98.7	120.9	90.0	99.0	93.7	111.7	87.7	99.1
LV	188.5	169.6	205.0	193.0	171.3	151.3	185.4	172.1
MT	171.6	166.0	103.7	105.9	149.6	144.2	147.5	144.8
NL	116.6	144.4	100.3	132.4	105.2	121.7	101.7	123.4
PL	123.9	131.3	134.2	136.9	111.4	115.0	123.2	125.4
PT	123.8	151.1	92.8	114.2	112.1	129.7	89.8	103.4
RO	196.5	182.5	178.1	159.5	166.9	153.5	150.0	135.9
SE	100.3	132.5	89.9	133.2	104.7	132.5	90.4	123.9
SI	151.0	164.3	134.0	155.3	120.1	127.3	107.5	120.7
SK	167.1	154.8	155.1	147.7	143.9	134.5	127.4	121.9
UK	135.2	170.7	110.9	141.6	121.4	146.3	99.6	121.5

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.21: Incidence of relative poverty according to annual equivalised labour and market income, by household head age (% values)

	Labour income						Market income					
	2006			2017			2006			2017		
	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65
AT	22.0	23.2	93.6	26.9	22.8	96.3	22.3	22.8	92.6	27.0	22.3	94.6
BE	21.2	26.0	97.1	22.1	24.6	98.0	21.5	25.2	94.1	22.5	24.4	95.7
BG	22.7	26.7	94.2	26.1	22.6	88.1	22.4	26.5	93.3	25.8	22.5	87.0
CY	17.9	15.5	90.9	31.6	18.8	90.5	17.8	15.6	88.2	32.0	18.3	87.2
CZ	21.5	21.9	97.4	16.3	18.1	95.8	21.5	21.7	96.9	16.5	17.9	95.3
DE	30.9	22.8	97.0	28.8	19.8	93.1	30.8	22.6	93.4	29.0	19.4	91.2
DK	32.9	20.8	96.4	40.5	17.6	92.0	33.1	20.6	93.6	41.9	17.5	88.8
EE	17.0	24.3	91.1	25.1	21.8	87.5	16.9	24.2	90.6	25.2	21.6	87.0
EL	22.3	21.3	90.3	28.8	21.7	89.5	23.4	21.2	86.8	28.6	21.7	85.8
ES	17.4	21.4	92.7	25.1	22.9	90.7	17.1	21.4	90.3	25.2	22.9	87.0
FI	28.2	23.1	96.6	30.2	20.9	94.5	28.7	23.0	94.9	30.1	20.5	91.3
FR	22.2	25.4	96.8	21.8	23.1	96.1	22.7	25.0	92.3	23.7	23.0	85.6
HR	18.2	24.8	96.7	16.9	23.7	93.6	18.6	25.0	95.6	17.3	23.6	92.4
HU	23.0	25.5	93.3	21.9	23.9	91.0	22.9	25.5	93.1	22.1	24.0	90.6
IE	35.9	26.8	90.8	41.5	25.5	89.5	36.4	26.0	88.3	41.4	25.2	88.3
IT	19.6	20.0	89.1	26.0	18.0	87.0	19.8	19.8	87.0	26.4	18.3	83.6
LT	21.9	24.8	94.9	25.2	22.2	87.6	21.6	24.7	95.0	25.5	22.3	87.3
LU	21.4	21.1	95.3	16.7	25.7	94.8	22.7	20.1	90.0	17.0	26.1	89.5
LV	19.4	25.9	85.6	19.9	22.4	88.0	19.4	25.9	85.5	19.5	22.6	87.9
MT	17.4	22.4	97.9	24.7	26.1	58.3	17.2	21.7	94.7	24.1	25.8	57.6
NL	24.3	24.0	98.4	30.1	19.3	96.0	24.4	23.6	95.4	30.1	19.0	94.5
PL	20.5	26.8	92.9	17.9	23.0	89.9	20.6	26.7	92.7	18.0	23.1	89.7
PT	15.1	24.1	90.6	19.6	19.9	90.6	15.5	24.4	89.1	19.6	19.9	87.1
RO	23.0	31.0	96.5	20.7	25.9	96.8	23.2	30.9	96.5	20.5	25.9	96.8
SE	29.8	17.3	95.4	37.0	16.9	92.1	30.4	17.2	94.2	37.1	16.8	90.0
SI	21.8	22.0	97.4	21.1	21.0	98.0	21.6	21.9	96.9	21.2	20.9	96.5
SK	16.5	23.4	97.3	20.2	21.0	95.4	16.6	23.3	97.0	20.2	20.8	95.3
UK	35.4	21.7	95.1	31.5	23.2	91.3	36.2	21.4	91.5	32.1	23.3	88.5

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A1.22: Incidence of relative poverty according to annual equivalised gross and disposable income, by household head age (% values)

	Gross income						Disposable income					
	2006			2017			2006			2017		
	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65
AT	20.1	14.0	24.7	27.4	15.7	22.3	14.8	10.2	16.2	21.8	12.1	14.0
BE	19.6	18.5	44.6	22.0	18.6	37.3	14.8	12.8	25.8	19.2	14.8	19.4
BG	21.8	20.2	45.9	27.0	18.6	51.5	21.3	19.4	34.9	24.6	16.9	35.9
CY	13.5	9.6	62.2	28.5	14.3	33.7	12.2	9.2	56.7	20.0	11.9	23.1
CZ	16.1	10.4	17.8	12.4	11.2	33.4	13.7	8.2	6.8	9.1	8.0	16.3
DE	29.6	15.2	24.7	28.7	15.2	30.9	24.6	12.6	17.2	22.9	12.8	19.6
DK	26.9	9.0	38.0	35.6	9.7	17.6	23.9	5.7	19.9	30.8	7.9	9.5
EE	14.0	19.5	58.7	20.8	16.6	68.2	11.7	17.6	40.3	17.8	15.0	53.3
EL	23.7	18.7	37.1	35.0	17.3	18.7	18.0	18.3	24.3	27.9	18.1	15.1
ES	17.0	17.9	42.0	30.4	21.8	29.3	16.7	17.9	31.9	28.6	20.9	19.2
FI	22.6	13.2	36.5	26.7	13.3	24.2	16.2	9.3	23.8	19.1	8.8	14.1
FR	19.4	13.4	24.3	20.4	15.4	16.7	14.7	12.0	15.2	17.0	13.7	8.7
HR	18.0	19.6	51.0	15.4	19.0	48.2	16.8	17.8	39.6	13.1	17.2	35.0
HU	18.1	13.7	15.5	21.5	20.5	29.8	16.6	11.7	7.7	10.9	13.8	10.7
IE	24.4	17.4	44.0	24.4	18.7	28.6	19.5	14.2	30.3	18.2	15.0	14.9
IT	22.2	19.1	34.3	33.9	21.6	23.3	20.7	16.9	27.3	30.2	19.2	18.1
LT	18.1	18.6	55.7	23.5	18.8	55.1	14.9	16.5	38.5	21.7	17.3	43.5
LU	22.5	13.3	11.6	22.9	19.3	15.0	21.0	12.7	7.7	22.4	18.3	13.2
LV	15.8	21.5	69.6	16.5	19.8	67.6	14.2	19.4	48.1	13.5	17.3	57.5
MT	13.0	18.0	41.8	21.1	18.8	27.0	11.7	14.8	26.4	12.3	16.5	28.7
NL	24.1	13.9	30.0	28.2	14.2	24.1	16.3	8.5	9.9	22.3	11.4	10.8
PL	20.6	19.2	21.0	13.4	15.1	29.2	18.2	17.9	12.9	11.7	14.2	22.3
PT	14.3	17.5	44.5	21.4	17.4	31.4	13.8	16.6	31.7	19.1	15.7	20.8
RO	23.6	24.0	50.0	24.6	22.6	46.7	21.8	22.2	40.6	23.8	21.2	32.7
SE	24.5	9.1	19.0	33.0	13.2	23.7	20.1	6.9	12.3	29.3	11.8	15.8
SI	14.1	12.1	41.2	17.7	13.7	38.7	12.0	8.9	25.2	15.6	10.8	21.5
SK	10.5	11.8	24.3	16.4	13.1	22.7	9.8	10.5	12.8	15.3	11.7	10.7
UK	30.2	15.7	43.3	24.5	17.0	27.1	25.9	13.5	31.4	20.3	15.6	17.9

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.4: Share of individuals aged 15-24 who report to be unemployed at the moment of the interview



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.5: Share of employees aged 15-24 with a part-time arrangement



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.6: Share of employees aged 15-24 with a fixed-term arrangement



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.7: Share of individuals aged 15-24 we were in unemployment at least one month in 2017 and received an unemployment benefit (% values)



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.8: Share of individuals aged 25-34 living in a household whose oldest member is aged at most 34 (% values)



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A1.9: Mean annual worked weeks per year with at least one working spell from age 25 to 34. Index number: Cohort 1950-1959=100



Source: elaborations on AD-SILC data

Fig. A1.10: Standard deviation of mean annual earnings as a private employee per year with a working spell as a private employee from age 25 to 34. Index number: Cohort 1950-1959=100



Source: elaborations on AD-SILC data

Fig. A1.11: Mean annual worked weeks per year with at least one working spell in the 10 years after the entry in the labour market. Index number: Cohort 1960-1964=100



Source: elaborations on AD-SILC data

Fig. A1.12: Standard deviation of mean annual earnings as a private employee per year with a working spell as a private employee in the 10 years after the entry in the labour market. Index number: Cohort 1960-1964=100



Source: elaborations on AD-SILC data

Additional Tables and Figures not explicitly commented in the main text in Chapter 1

(*) The source is always “Elaborations on EU-SILC data”

Tab. A1.23: Share of active individuals in the population 15-65 (% values)

2006

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	48.0	27.3	45.9	21.9	30.6	34.0	25.5	27.9	27.4	39.7	27.2	36.4	35.1	28.8	34.6	35.8	25.6	26.3	36.6	56.2	23.1	29.5	34.3	34.9	33.3	14.9	27.9	59.0
25-34	74.6	85.1	86.3	81.7	79.2	71.5	73.3	79.3	81.9	85.8	72.5	85.6	89.1	77.0	77.5	76.5	83.9	84.8	85.9	80.2	74.6	85.7	85.2	81.2	82.7	77.9	89.9	85.5
35-44	86.9	85.5	94.3	85.8	91.5	87.3	88.0	86.5	83.1	85.0	85.0	89.9	85.3	84.1	78.5	80.1	88.5	84.3	89.9	69.3	76.0	89.0	88.0	84.0	89.7	89.7	93.8	87.9
45-54	85.3	76.6	90.1	80.2	90.3	87.2	86.8	86.1	74.5	76.6	86.6	86.6	76.3	76.1	73.8	74.6	87.1	75.7	85.5	58.2	72.7	76.4	82.6	71.5	88.9	80.1	89.9	84.8
55-65	32.2	52.3	43.5	52.6	40.9	48.7	53.9	59.5	42.4	46.2	54.2	34.0	36.2	27.4	53.5	31.9	51.6	33.6	54.1	28.6	40.0	27.9	49.8	26.3	65.8	22.7	31.9	60.6

2017

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	41.0	19.6	27.1	29.3	24.9	38.8	26.1	24.5	26.2	29.5	20.1	29.7	31.5	22.9	32.8	33.8	29.3	23.0	27.0	39.6	17.5	21.0	29.5	27.4	21.4	17.8	35.3	45.4
25-34	74.9	81.1	79.1	88.8	76.9	73.0	71.6	77.8	84.1	89.1	67.2	88.0	88.9	81.0	81.8	79.1	85.7	82.2	77.7	86.3	87.0	63.9	90.5	79.7	72.5	86.3	84.1	83.1
35-44	87.8	83.5	88.4	91.3	89.8	85.8	90.5	85.9	88.0	92.9	81.2	91.1	93.0	88.3	81.5	84.9	87.6	85.2	84.2	82.4	92.9	73.9	95.0	84.2	85.3	96.1	94.4	84.3
45-54	89.3	80.6	88.1	83.9	93.1	88.9	90.5	88.3	80.0	87.5	87.4	91.5	79.5	91.5	77.4	81.8	88.5	81.7	84.1	72.3	90.1	71.4	88.8	80.3	88.4	93.5	93.1	84.9
55-65	50.3	52.4	59.4	61.8	56.6	65.2	75.6	69.5	45.4	61.9	61.7	51.4	45.8	53.9	59.0	58.9	67.3	34.5	64.5	30.5	70.3	39.4	60.9	38.6	74.2	44.2	50.3	66.5

Tab. A1.24: Share of active individuals who spent at list one month in unemployment in the year (% values)

2006																											
	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	10.3	13.1	30.3	11.4	14.3	7.5	2.4	8.3	15.2	13.5	12.5	14.5	22.0	11.0	12.8	16.4	5.0	10.4	7.3	8.1	3.7	15.9	11.7	6.6	14.6	4.9	12.0	7.1
25-34	13.1	13.6	29.3	11.1	12.4	12.7	4.9	7.1	17.8	15.4	15.4	16.0	23.3	11.9	10.2	14.9	9.1	8.0	8.6	3.6	8.8	18.1	14.1	5.0	6.8	9.5	12.2	4.4
35-44	10.7	10.0	24.9	10.6	13.1	10.4	3.0	8.9	10.0	13.2	12.4	9.7	17.8	11.9	8.5	8.2	8.7	4.8	7.2	3.3	9.6	15.0	11.4	4.4	4.4	7.5	11.5	3.3
45-54	11.0	8.5	24.3	9.2	10.9	12.6	4.7	8.2	9.4	10.9	12.6	8.9	18.3	8.7	7.7	5.3	9.6	4.1	10.6	2.6	9.1	14.3	10.0	3.3	4.6	8.6	9.2	3.0
55-65	7.3	23.5	15.1	4.8	4.9	10.8	3.9	4.6	4.1	8.6	10.6	6.8	10.4	3.4	7.1	2.3	6.5	2.8	5.0	0.9	11.5	5.3	7.7	1.0	3.3	5.5	2.7	2.0
2017																											
	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	10.4	6.3	15.6	20.6	6.9	4.0	1.5	6.5	20.9	14.4	18.4	13.6	22.1	7.8	11.8	21.6	9.6	6.7	8.4	6.5	3.1	9.5	14.3	4.1	15.7	8.7	12.7	7.6
25-34	11.8	8.6	22.8	27.9	5.9	7.6	5.6	6.9	35.5	21.7	21.6	17.1	24.8	8.2	15.3	23.4	11.7	9.8	11.6	3.4	10.5	10.4	17.6	3.2	8.8	19.9	12.6	5.8
35-44	11.5	6.5	18.9	17.5	5.5	6.6	4.1	5.3	24.0	17.7	15.3	12.1	19.7	7.1	11.2	12.1	10.6	6.7	9.6	3.2	10.3	9.0	11.8	1.2	6.1	12.4	9.3	3.1
45-54	10.0	6.5	17.7	17.5	5.9	6.2	2.7	5.7	17.2	18.4	16.8	9.0	16.0	7.8	9.8	9.3	11.9	6.9	10.4	3.0	11.1	7.8	12.1	1.5	4.6	11.8	9.4	4.0
55-65	7.4	7.7	14.5	14.6	7.1	8.1	4.2	5.8	11.2	15.8	16.1	8.2	14.2	5.1	10.4	8.2	8.7	3.4	10.2	1.3	12.2	6.1	11.8	0.7	4.1	11.4	6.0	4.3

Tab. A1.25: Share of active individuals who report to be unemployed at the moment of the interview (% values)

2007

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	8.2	17.2	39.7	15.4	25.4	8.8	8.5	9.5	27.8	19.9	14.1	14.8	49.3	21.0	19.0	31.5	8.0	14.3	8.9	12.0	4.0	24.7	18.4	17.0	13.3	26.5	17.6	8.4
25-34	9.6	9.0	23.0	3.9	10.6	11.8	6.0	4.6	12.4	10.5	8.0	8.6	23.4	9.9	7.2	13.8	6.2	4.0	6.4	3.2	1.4	12.7	10.2	6.5	3.9	11.6	8.3	3.5
35-44	5.2	7.5	19.7	4.6	10.7	8.0	3.3	5.3	7.2	9.0	6.9	6.7	20.6	9.4	6.5	6.1	5.8	4.1	5.5	4.5	1.8	10.9	8.4	6.2	3.0	8.0	7.7	2.8
45-54	7.2	9.2	20.3	3.5	9.4	11.2	4.3	4.6	6.1	8.9	8.7	7.8	24.6	8.8	6.4	5.4	7.7	3.6	8.5	3.9	2.2	13.5	9.3	5.2	3.8	12.8	7.6	2.9
55-65	14.8	25.0	27.5	2.7	8.3	18.6	5.5	4.3	5.9	13.7	12.7	15.3	27.3	9.5	10.1	4.6	8.0	4.8	7.6	3.4	4.8	16.0	11.7	3.4	3.1	23.0	6.4	2.0

2018

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	9.0	14.9	27.1	21.7	13.1	6.5	10.6	9.1	51.1	38.5	19.4	20.3	34.8	20.0	21.4	46.0	17.7	19.5	14.6	8.6	5.4	14.4	23.8	3.9	15.4	19.7	16.7	11.2
25-34	9.1	6.2	14.0	13.2	3.9	6.4	11.0	6.7	29.3	21.1	12.2	10.9	17.9	5.7	11.8	20.6	8.8	6.9	9.7	2.2	3.1	7.4	13.7	0.8	8.5	12.8	9.3	5.3
35-44	6.5	5.9	11.4	10.0	3.3	5.3	5.6	3.5	19.8	14.6	7.7	7.8	15.9	5.0	9.4	10.0	10.0	7.4	8.5	1.9	3.2	6.9	8.9	0.6	5.7	8.3	6.6	2.3
45-54	5.9	6.0	11.2	12.2	5.0	5.3	4.3	6.3	15.9	17.0	10.1	7.5	16.7	5.5	8.4	8.3	11.5	5.8	8.5	1.5	3.2	7.0	11.1	0.8	5.3	9.8	8.1	3.1
55-65	9.3	10.3	15.7	14.7	8.1	9.9	6.9	6.1	21.1	22.3	14.8	11.7	26.1	7.7	12.5	10.6	10.3	7.0	10.8	1.4	4.5	9.1	16.3	0.4	5.9	20.1	9.3	5.1

Tab. A1.26: Share of self-employed among those working at the moment of the interview (% values)

2007

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	1.9	3.3	4.4	6.6	7.0	1.1	2.7	3.3	15.7	5.1	4.5	1.4	4.1	4.9	1.7	16.3	3.5	1.6	3.0	3.9	2.1	8.8	5.2	39.2	3.9	3.2	5.5	2.3
25-34	9.4	8.6	5.5	9.0	14.0	6.4	6.9	5.0	25.7	10.1	9.1	5.4	9.6	9.4	10.7	21.3	5.8	3.9	6.3	11.5	8.0	12.6	10.3	22.9	7.2	5.5	8.8	8.2
35-44	13.2	11.5	9.3	12.4	18.2	9.3	10.4	9.5	33.1	16.7	14.6	10.8	13.5	14.1	18.6	24.3	10.9	6.0	8.2	15.7	14.6	21.0	18.2	22.1	10.5	8.7	10.7	12.6
45-54	14.8	13.1	9.3	17.8	17.8	8.8	8.5	6.6	41.0	19.6	15.0	13.0	13.4	14.7	22.3	24.2	12.6	8.6	10.4	16.8	13.9	24.8	22.8	25.2	11.7	8.9	10.3	12.4
55-65	22.6	20.9	6.8	24.1	16.1	11.7	12.9	7.6	56.8	30.5	19.8	19.2	19.0	18.7	29.0	37.6	12.1	11.1	10.3	20.2	18.7	32.2	40.1	52.8	15.8	12.9	10.5	18.0

2018

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	1.9	7.1	1.9	1.0	10.0	1.1	5.2	2.4	13.4	5.5	5.0	4.6	2.8	2.5	2.9	10.2	6.0	1.9	1.8	2.7	5.1	10.7	4.4	35.7	2.4	6.6	8.4	3.3
25-34	7.3	8.0	8.2	10.0	12.4	2.8	4.8	8.1	18.7	9.8	8.6	7.9	6.6	6.5	5.9	16.5	10.0	3.3	6.1	7.4	9.8	15.5	9.1	18.1	5.3	9.5	12.8	11.7
35-44	12.2	12.4	9.8	11.6	16.3	5.2	9.3	11.2	25.5	15.3	14.1	9.1	8.8	9.9	13.1	20.7	12.1	5.4	12.0	12.4	16.4	19.8	9.9	21.0	11.1	9.5	18.1	14.7
45-54	14.3	12.7	11.8	11.1	18.4	5.5	10.8	11.7	32.5	18.2	16.0	10.1	10.7	10.5	18.2	22.9	11.9	6.9	13.0	14.7	18.6	25.6	13.0	22.7	12.2	10.4	17.4	14.9
55-65	17.3	16.0	12.5	16.0	21.9	7.6	11.6	11.5	48.0	21.7	17.1	12.2	14.2	14.9	25.1	26.7	10.9	13.3	10.5	21.9	19.8	23.4	13.8	31.1	16.1	11.3	17.0	21.8

Tab. A1.27: Share of employees with a part-time arrangement at the moment of the interview (% values)

2007

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	8.3	22.1	4.2	9.7	1.7	8.8	16.5	10.0	13.9	13.6	34.7	21.1	3.5	7.8	28.1	13.7	3.8	10.4	7.1	10.5	37.6	11.1	11.0	1.3	31.5	2.9	2.1	27.1
25-34	19.8	19.3	1.7	4.0	2.8	22.4	10.6	3.6	9.3	11.2	11.1	14.5	0.4	4.2	13.9	12.8	1.6	13.3	3.0	7.4	33.3	6.1	4.8	0.7	18.0	3.0	2.1	15.0
35-44	25.4	26.6	2.8	4.3	3.2	29.6	13.3	3.6	8.2	12.5	6.8	20.6	1.2	4.3	27.0	13.2	2.8	22.1	3.0	9.3	42.2	5.2	4.8	0.5	20.2	2.6	2.2	22.5
45-54	20.7	30.0	1.6	5.7	2.5	29.4	14.6	4.7	7.2	8.1	5.5	18.3	1.0	4.4	31.0	9.9	2.6	18.8	3.1	8.4	43.0	5.9	3.8	0.3	19.9	3.9	3.4	21.6
55-65	24.5	34.4	3.8	7.4	6.0	28.6	18.4	8.4	11.4	8.3	16.0	23.3	1.2	8.2	30.4	8.3	5.7	17.7	7.1	6.4	51.1	18.9	12.7	0.7	30.0	6.6	5.4	29.4

2018

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	12.2	23.7	9.1	15.1	6.8	18.1	23.7	25.6	22.7	29.2	26.3	21.1	2.1	6.2	42.5	27.1	8.7	14.8	14.9	10.6	49.6	14.1	9.3	1.1	29.9	4.1	3.6	33.6
25-34	25.3	22.0	4.5	4.8	3.2	22.5	7.0	7.0	12.2	15.8	9.1	14.6	2.6	3.9	18.8	17.8	2.2	11.1	2.5	4.2	37.8	4.7	4.9	0.9	15.9	5.9	1.6	17.8
35-44	31.1	28.9	2.7	6.1	4.0	29.6	10.4	6.4	8.5	11.0	7.3	15.5	2.9	5.3	18.8	15.5	3.2	18.7	2.7	5.7	48.0	5.3	3.9	0.4	16.2	4.7	3.0	23.1
45-54	27.2	31.5	2.8	5.6	3.1	30.8	8.7	5.0	6.7	12.1	6.6	17.0	2.7	4.1	21.6	16.0	6.3	22.2	5.1	7.3	45.3	4.8	3.6	0.9	16.1	4.4	2.8	22.3
55-65	26.9	43.6	4.2	7.7	3.1	33.3	13.1	10.9	8.8	12.5	11.1	24.6	1.8	6.4	32.5	13.0	6.3	25.0	8.3	10.9	52.5	7.1	6.1	0.4	25.0	8.2	4.2	33.9

Tab. A1.28: Share of employees with a fixed-term arrangement at the moment of the interview (% values)

2007

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	33.2	39.9	23.1	27.7	30.7	36.1	n.a.	4.4	53.0	63.5	41.9	47.5	38.8	26.0	24.6	36.6	13.4	41.5	16.3	10.1	34.7	67.5	58.5	8.9	42.2	55.5	34.6	10.4
25-34	9.4	17.0	10.9	18.4	15.2	18.0	n.a.	2.3	32.9	40.0	26.5	23.2	20.7	16.9	11.1	21.2	8.4	13.1	7.1	3.1	21.0	35.0	32.1	4.2	17.8	23.5	16.8	4.7
35-44	5.8	8.3	13.3	10.2	14.7	8.0	n.a.	2.2	20.5	29.6	10.2	14.2	10.9	12.3	9.8	12.8	7.1	5.7	4.7	4.4	11.3	24.1	18.4	4.0	9.9	11.2	11.0	3.2
45-54	3.6	8.0	9.9	10.0	12.3	7.2	n.a.	1.4	21.1	22.1	10.0	11.0	7.5	9.1	8.3	9.6	5.7	4.7	7.3	3.4	8.8	21.2	11.0	3.2	8.0	9.5	10.4	2.7
55-65	8.4	8.9	17.6	5.0	16.2	6.6	n.a.	1.3	25.0	18.4	8.5	9.2	6.9	14.4	9.7	8.7	7.8	5.3	3.6	3.3	7.0	24.5	13.2	2.9	6.9	8.0	12.2	3.4

2018

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	10.9	33.8	13.8	28.7	29.7	64.9	21.6	5.3	48.4	68.5	40.5	51.9	50.2	19.9	24.3	57.0	8.3	40.0	0.3	19.0	44.5	61.6	67.6	5.2	39.1	43.8	32.4	12.9
25-34	9.7	16.2	5.9	18.7	14.1	18.6	15.2	1.5	28.5	38.7	22.9	21.5	23.7	11.1	8.0	28.8	3.6	10.4	0.7	7.6	26.2	31.3	31.8	1.2	17.4	26.1	13.2	3.8
35-44	6.7	7.7	3.6	9.3	9.8	9.7	4.8	1.5	18.5	21.3	10.0	11.7	13.1	9.4	5.0	17.0	3.3	6.8	0.3	5.3	11.7	21.4	14.2	1.0	8.2	11.2	7.9	3.2
45-54	4.1	5.2	3.8	7.6	6.4	6.1	5.2	0.4	14.6	19.2	8.7	7.4	10.2	8.1	4.9	11.0	2.1	5.1	0.3	5.3	10.1	17.4	9.8	1.5	7.3	7.1	8.0	2.9
55-65	4.0	4.8	5.4	7.0	7.4	4.9	7.3	1.3	15.0	14.3	7.0	7.3	8.3	10.6	8.3	9.4	2.2	10.9	0.4	6.7	7.1	17.2	7.6	0.8	6.9	6.0	7.9	3.4

Tab. A1.29: Mean annual gross earnings of employees (thousands of Euros)

2006

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	16.6	20.2	1.8	11.0	5.7	10.8	24.6	6.2	8.9	10.6	16.1	14.9	6.9	3.8	18.7	12.8	5.3	21.5	4.8	10.9	18.5	3.7	7.0	2.3	14.1	9.5	4.2	18.3
25-34	25.6	27.7	2.2	18.3	7.9	25.2	37.7	9.0	13.8	15.7	26.0	21.0	9.7	5.6	31.5	19.2	6.0	36.5	6.0	14.9	28.3	6.1	11.3	3.4	24.3	13.6	5.1	34.6
35-44	28.4	32.5	2.3	22.5	8.0	28.9	44.4	8.0	21.0	18.4	30.5	24.6	10.6	6.1	37.8	24.0	5.5	46.5	5.7	16.1	33.5	7.5	14.1	3.4	30.0	15.8	5.3	39.2
45-54	30.2	34.2	2.3	24.3	7.7	30.5	42.6	6.4	23.7	21.1	31.4	26.4	11.1	5.9	39.7	27.7	5.6	54.1	5.0	16.1	36.2	7.0	17.3	3.6	30.7	16.7	5.2	38.5
55-65	34.7	36.3	2.1	25.1	7.6	28.9	40.6	5.5	23.4	22.0	30.3	29.0	12.6	6.7	38.8	30.4	5.6	71.6	4.6	16.5	40.0	8.3	17.1	4.2	29.7	19.7	5.4	33.1

2017

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	19.7	26.6	2.9	8.8	9.2	16.3	23.5	9.3	8.0	7.8	22.1	17.4	7.3	6.1	15.0	11.5	5.9	26.2	8.1	14.8	19.9	6.9	8.2	5.3	21.8	12.9	7.1	16.7
25-34	30.6	33.3	4.9	14.7	12.9	31.9	42.8	14.5	12.3	14.6	32.4	24.4	10.1	7.8	31.7	18.1	10.0	47.8	12.8	21.2	33.5	9.8	12.0	6.9	32.7	16.0	9.4	28.6
35-44	36.0	41.2	6.0	23.2	13.9	36.2	55.1	15.8	16.0	20.6	41.3	30.5	11.9	8.6	43.1	24.3	11.3	55.7	13.4	23.6	41.4	10.9	15.3	7.0	40.3	21.0	9.4	37.7
45-54	41.3	43.5	5.6	24.1	12.9	38.3	59.4	14.5	18.0	23.1	43.1	33.2	11.6	8.3	46.8	27.7	9.6	65.4	11.1	23.3	43.9	10.3	16.5	6.5	43.1	21.5	9.0	38.2
55-65	47.1	44.0	4.9	26.0	12.1	35.6	54.2	12.2	19.2	25.9	39.6	34.5	12.7	7.5	42.1	31.5	8.7	62.3	9.7	22.3	42.6	10.0	17.5	6.7	42.1	20.8	8.6	30.3

Tab. A1.30: Mean annual net earnings of employees (thousands of Euros)

	2006																		
	AT	BE	BG	CZ	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	12.5	14.4	1.5	4.5	5.0	7.5	9.1	12.0	5.1	n.a.	16.7	10.3	3.7	17.4	4.0	2.6	5.8	1.8	10.4	7.0
25-34	18.0	18.4	1.8	6.1	6.9	10.8	13.0	16.9	7.0	n.a.	25.5	14.7	4.5	28.7	4.7	4.3	8.7	2.6	17.2	9.4
35-44	19.7	21.2	1.9	6.3	6.5	14.9	14.9	19.7	7.7	n.a.	29.4	17.9	4.2	36.1	4.5	5.3	10.5	2.6	20.6	10.8
45-54	20.5	22.1	1.8	6.0	5.3	16.3	16.9	21.4	7.9	n.a.	30.1	20.0	4.3	42.3	3.8	4.9	12.4	2.7	21.0	11.2
55-65	23.1	22.8	1.7	5.8	4.6	16.1	17.5	23.5	8.9	n.a.	29.5	21.5	4.2	54.9	3.4	5.9	12.2	3.1	20.1	12.4
	2017																			
	AT	BE	BG	CZ	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	15.3	19.0	2.2	7.2	7.8	5.5	6.8	13.9	5.6	4.3	13.8	9.2	4.9	20.0	6.4	5.2	6.6	3.8	17.1	9.5
25-34	22.0	23.2	3.7	10.0	12.0	8.4	12.2	19.5	7.6	5.5	24.4	13.8	8.0	35.0	9.9	7.4	9.2	4.9	24.8	11.4
35-44	25.0	27.5	4.5	11.0	13.0	10.8	16.5	24.5	9.0	6.0	30.6	17.9	9.2	40.0	10.5	8.2	11.2	5.0	29.2	14.4
45-54	28.3	28.8	4.3	10.1	12.0	11.8	18.1	26.9	8.8	5.8	33.1	19.7	7.8	45.8	8.5	7.7	11.8	4.7	30.9	14.7
55-65	31.4	28.6	3.7	9.3	10.2	12.4	19.7	27.9	9.3	5.3	29.4	21.6	7.0	41.7	7.4	7.5	12.0	4.8	29.7	14.0

Tab. A1.31: Mean annual gross labour income of active individuals (thousands of Euros; active individuals earning zero income included)

	2006																										
	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	16.1	16.7	1.0	10.5	4.7	10.3	23.5	5.8	7.4	9.2	15.3	13.8	4.7	3.5	15.9	10.6	4.9	20.3	4.5	10.0	17.8	2.8	6.3	1.5	13.0	16.1	16.7	1.0
25-34	24.7	25.5	1.8	18.5	7.7	23.5	36.7	8.7	13.1	14.5	25.4	20.4	8.8	5.5	30.5	18.8	5.8	36.0	5.8	14.9	28.2	5.4	10.8	2.7	23.3	24.7	25.5	1.8
35-44	28.3	29.5	2.2	22.7	8.0	28.7	43.6	7.6	19.6	16.8	29.8	24.4	9.5	5.9	37.5	24.8	5.3	46.4	5.5	16.7	32.4	6.4	13.0	2.9	29.0	28.3	29.5	2.2
45-54	28.9	30.1	2.1	24.4	7.8	29.1	44.1	6.4	21.4	18.8	30.1	26.0	9.3	5.8	38.1	28.4	5.3	54.0	4.7	15.9	34.7	5.8	15.0	3.0	29.9	28.9	30.1	2.1
55-65	31.4	20.0	1.8	23.6	7.3	25.4	41.7	5.2	20.1	17.4	27.3	26.0	9.6	6.4	32.4	33.1	4.9	69.5	4.3	17.0	35.0	6.2	13.2	2.4	28.8	31.4	20.0	1.8
	2017																										
	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	18.7	20.7	2.5	7.5	8.7	15.5	20.7	8.9	4.0	6.8	20.0	16.4	5.5	5.8	13.3	8.5	5.9	22.0	7.6	13.5	19.5	5.9	6.5	3.4	20.8	18.7	20.7	2.5
25-34	29.9	31.8	4.8	13.8	12.6	30.6	41.3	14.3	9.2	13.8	30.8	24.5	8.7	8.0	28.8	16.7	10.0	45.6	12.3	20.3	32.8	9.1	10.9	5.8	31.0	29.9	31.8	4.8
35-44	35.7	39.7	6.1	21.7	13.8	36.1	54.2	15.5	13.4	19.2	39.3	30.8	10.6	8.3	39.5	24.2	11.9	53.5	13.1	21.8	40.1	10.0	14.4	5.9	39.2	35.7	39.7	6.1
45-54	40.6	40.0	5.7	22.0	12.9	37.8	61.2	14.3	15.5	20.7	40.3	33.2	10.0	8.2	46.0	28.0	9.6	61.9	10.7	21.1	40.8	9.1	14.5	5.5	41.7	40.6	40.0	5.7
55-65	44.8	37.8	4.7	23.4	11.5	33.7	54.1	12.0	15.2	21.2	36.1	33.4	9.7	7.4	35.3	30.5	8.6	64.9	9.2	19.5	37.3	8.8	14.6	5.1	39.7	44.8	37.8	4.7

Tab. A1.32: Mean annual net labour income of active individuals (thousands of Euros; active individuals earning zero income included)

2006

	AT	BE	BG	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	12.1	11.9	0.8	4.7	6.3	7.9	11.0	3.5	n.a.	14.2	8.3	3.5	16.4	3.8	2.0	5.2	1.2	9.6	7.0
25-34	17.6	17.1	1.5	6.7	10.5	12.0	16.3	6.3	n.a.	24.7	14.2	4.4	28.3	4.7	3.8	8.3	2.1	16.5	9.3
35-44	19.9	19.6	1.8	6.1	14.4	13.6	19.4	6.9	n.a.	29.5	18.4	4.1	36.1	4.4	4.6	9.7	2.2	19.9	10.6
45-54	19.9	19.9	1.7	5.5	15.6	15.0	20.8	6.7	n.a.	29.4	20.5	4.1	41.8	3.6	4.1	10.7	2.3	20.5	10.7
55-65	20.8	13.0	1.5	4.3	15.1	13.8	21.0	6.9	n.a.	25.1	23.1	3.8	53.4	3.2	4.5	9.4	1.8	19.6	11.4

2017

	AT	BE	BG	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	14.5	14.9	1.9	7.5	2.8	5.9	13.0	4.3	4.2	12.2	6.6	5.0	16.7	6.0	4.4	5.3	2.6	16.3	8.6
25-34	21.5	22.2	3.6	11.8	6.4	11.4	19.5	6.6	5.8	22.3	12.5	8.2	33.4	9.6	6.7	8.3	4.2	23.5	10.7
35-44	24.8	26.8	4.7	12.7	9.2	15.3	24.7	7.9	6.0	28.3	17.4	9.8	38.3	10.3	7.5	10.5	4.4	28.4	13.6
45-54	27.7	26.8	4.4	11.8	10.6	16.1	26.6	7.5	6.0	33.5	19.5	7.9	43.3	8.2	6.8	10.3	4.1	30.0	13.4
55-65	29.6	25.0	3.6	9.9	10.5	16.1	26.9	7.1	5.5	25.7	20.6	7.0	42.3	7.1	6.5	10.0	3.8	28.2	11.7

Tab. A1.33: Mean annual gross income from labour and unemp. benefits received by active individuals (thousands Euros; 'zero income' active individuals)

2006

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	16.4	17.7	1.0	10.6	4.8	10.6	24.2	5.8	7.4	9.4	15.9	14.3	4.7	3.6	16.8	10.8	4.9	21.0	4.5	10.0	17.8	2.8	6.4	1.5	13.7	16.4	17.7	1.0
25-34	25.3	26.4	1.9	18.6	7.7	24.3	37.9	8.7	13.2	14.8	26.1	21.1	8.8	5.6	31.0	19.4	5.8	36.3	5.9	15.0	28.4	5.4	11.0	2.8	24.0	25.3	26.4	1.9
35-44	28.7	30.6	2.2	23.0	8.1	29.3	44.6	7.6	19.7	17.1	30.4	25.0	9.5	6.0	38.8	25.5	5.3	46.7	5.6	16.8	32.7	6.4	13.2	2.9	29.8	28.7	30.6	2.2
45-54	29.4	31.1	2.1	24.7	7.8	29.8	45.1	6.4	21.5	19.1	30.9	26.6	9.4	5.8	39.2	29.0	5.3	54.5	4.8	16.1	35.2	5.9	15.3	3.0	30.5	29.4	31.1	2.1
55-65	32.9	26.2	1.8	24.2	7.4	26.8	43.4	5.2	20.2	17.8	28.6	27.8	9.8	6.6	33.6	33.2	5.0	70.2	4.3	17.0	36.2	6.3	13.7	2.4	29.5	32.9	26.2	1.8

2017

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-24	19.4	21.5	2.6	7.6	8.8	15.8	21.3	9.0	4.1	6.9	21.3	17.4	5.5	5.9	14.1	9.0	6.0	23.2	7.6	13.5	19.7	5.9	6.6	3.4	21.0	19.4	21.5	2.6
25-34	30.7	32.3	4.8	14.0	12.6	31.1	43.2	14.4	9.3	14.4	32.2	25.4	8.7	8.0	30.1	17.7	10.1	46.1	12.5	20.3	33.0	9.1	11.0	5.8	31.3	30.7	32.3	4.8
35-44	36.5	40.5	6.1	22.2	13.9	36.6	55.9	15.6	13.5	19.8	40.4	31.6	10.6	8.3	40.7	25.3	12.0	54.2	13.2	21.8	40.6	10.0	14.6	5.9	39.5	36.5	40.5	6.1
45-54	41.4	41.1	5.7	22.3	12.9	38.3	62.7	14.4	15.6	21.3	41.6	34.0	10.0	8.2	47.5	28.9	9.7	62.9	10.8	21.2	41.5	9.1	14.7	5.5	42.2	41.4	41.1	5.7
55-65	45.8	39.5	4.7	23.8	11.7	34.5	56.6	12.2	15.3	22.2	38.1	34.7	9.8	7.5	36.6	31.2	8.7	66.3	9.3	19.5	38.5	8.8	15.0	5.1	40.3	45.8	39.5	4.7

Tab. A1.34: Mean annual net income from labour and unemployment benefits received by active individuals (thousands of Euros; active individuals earning zero income included)

	2006																		
	AT	BE	BG	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	12.5	12.9	0.8	4.7	6.4	8.0	11.6	3.6	n.a.	15.1	8.6	3.5	16.9	3.8	2.0	5.3	1.3	10.1	7.0
25-34	18.2	18.0	1.5	6.7	10.7	12.2	17.1	6.4	n.a.	25.2	14.7	4.4	28.5	4.7	3.9	8.5	2.1	17.0	9.3
35-44	20.3	20.6	1.8	6.1	14.5	13.9	20.1	7.0	n.a.	30.7	18.9	4.1	36.2	4.5	4.6	9.8	2.2	20.5	10.7
45-54	20.5	20.9	1.7	5.5	15.7	15.3	21.4	6.8	n.a.	30.5	21.0	4.1	42.2	3.7	4.2	11.0	2.3	21.0	10.7
55-65	22.3	18.5	1.5	4.3	15.2	14.3	22.7	7.1	n.a.	26.3	23.2	3.8	53.9	3.3	4.6	10.0	1.9	20.2	11.6
	2017																		
	AT	BE	BG	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	15.2	15.7	1.9	7.6	2.9	6.0	14.1	4.3	4.2	12.9	7.0	5.0	17.8	6.1	4.4	5.3	2.6	16.5	8.7
25-34	22.3	22.8	3.7	11.9	6.5	12.0	20.5	6.6	5.8	23.6	13.4	8.3	33.8	9.7	6.7	8.4	4.2	23.7	10.8
35-44	25.6	27.5	4.7	12.8	9.3	16.0	25.5	8.0	6.1	29.5	18.3	9.9	38.9	10.4	7.5	10.7	4.4	28.7	13.6
45-54	28.4	27.8	4.5	11.9	10.6	16.8	27.4	7.6	6.0	35.0	20.3	8.0	44.1	8.3	6.8	10.5	4.1	30.3	13.5
55-65	30.6	26.6	3.7	10.1	10.5	17.1	28.1	7.2	5.5	26.9	21.2	7.1	43.4	7.2	6.6	10.5	3.8	28.6	12.1

Tab. A1.35: Share of active individuals who earn less than 60% of the median of the annual net labour income distribution (% values; active individuals earning zero income are not included)

	2006																		
	AT	BE	BG	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	39.6	24.8	21.1	16.2	40.7	38.2	38.1	33.9	n.a.	37.6	43.6	22.5	52.7	21.7	43.0	25.3	41.5	57.8	27.6
25-34	17.1	14.3	15.1	11.6	22.7	20.2	17.1	17.8	n.a.	17.4	20.8	20.6	23.0	17.1	22.0	10.7	24.0	24.6	17.1
35-44	19.0	11.8	12.0	15.1	17.2	20.5	16.9	14.8	n.a.	20.2	15.0	20.8	21.0	18.6	19.2	10.4	19.7	15.1	12.9
45-54	19.3	13.6	11.7	21.6	20.3	16.9	16.1	13.9	n.a.	25.9	13.1	23.0	15.6	27.0	20.6	12.9	22.6	13.1	15.1
55-65	18.9	17.0	19.6	26.5	27.7	19.9	19.6	12.5	n.a.	28.3	13.4	24.6	12.7	32.9	25.2	20.5	39.8	19.2	19.0
	2017																		
	AT	BE	BG	EE	EL	ES	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI
15-24	44.6	21.6	47.7	38.4	58.4	65.0	44.2	37.7	26.0	55.9	58.7	34.2	41.7	28.5	30.2	33.9	32.1	47.8	29.6
25-34	22.8	12.8	27.2	20.4	28.5	35.7	21.4	20.4	14.4	21.4	32.3	20.0	17.0	15.7	13.6	15.7	14.4	19.6	21.9
35-44	22.8	8.5	20.7	19.3	18.6	22.9	18.2	14.7	15.3	17.5	19.8	14.3	18.7	15.7	12.5	9.9	14.8	13.0	15.0
45-54	16.9	10.7	22.5	21.2	16.7	23.7	16.9	14.5	14.4	17.0	18.1	17.4	18.6	21.2	15.1	11.6	15.4	11.6	15.7
55-65	18.1	15.8	23.3	26.6	21.4	24.0	22.4	16.1	16.4	29.2	17.8	18.3	26.9	27.4	15.3	14.6	22.2	14.4	22.3

Tab. A1.36: Unconditional standard deviation of log annual gross earnings of active workers by age classes in 2017

	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65
AT	1.063	0.970	1.092	1.075	1.009
BE	0.730	0.515	0.539	0.593	0.630
BG	1.065	0.980	1.030	0.962	0.910
CY	0.624	0.696	0.824	0.759	0.805
CZ	0.572	0.503	0.573	0.619	0.591
DE	0.884	0.781	0.808	0.848	0.895
DK	0.830	1.067	0.826	0.799	0.816
EE	0.716	0.787	0.792	0.743	0.727
EL	0.757	0.618	0.619	0.639	0.738
ES	1.344	1.097	0.980	1.166	1.155
FI	0.856	0.947	0.814	0.857	0.992
FR	0.961	0.857	0.845	0.890	0.960
HR	0.716	0.695	0.641	0.594	0.647
HU	0.889	0.759	0.855	0.830	0.912
IE	0.797	0.828	0.786	0.857	0.917
IT	0.997	0.872	0.820	0.814	0.853
LT	0.987	0.982	0.873	0.771	0.860
LU	0.770	0.629	0.700	0.772	0.864
LV	0.829	0.851	0.912	0.838	0.918
MT	0.568	0.579	0.598	0.608	0.657
NL	1.112	0.915	0.978	0.871	0.974
PL	0.687	0.622	0.651	0.662	0.626
PT	0.779	0.644	0.671	0.716	0.837
RO	0.418	0.450	0.421	0.402	0.407
SE	0.956	0.741	0.764	0.710	0.935
SI	0.791	0.898	0.785	0.794	0.972
SK	0.625	0.577	0.560	0.510	0.481
UK	0.883	0.690	0.784	0.844	0.808

(*) Individuals with zero earnings are not considered.

Tab. A1.37: RMSE of OLS estimates of log annual gross earnings of active workers by age classes in 2017

	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65
AT	0.755	0.497	0.708	0.512	0.522
BE	0.365	0.363	0.336	0.362	0.366
BG	0.661	0.681	0.700	0.672	0.570
CY	0.391	0.465	0.457	0.420	0.446
CZ	0.415	0.360	0.357	0.370	0.341
DE	0.566	0.489	0.451	0.499	0.496
DK	0.212	0.523	0.481	0.430	0.441
EE	0.642	0.562	0.520	0.487	0.501
EL	0.635	0.433	0.375	0.413	0.383
ES	0.998	0.718	0.568	0.623	0.564
FI	0.498	0.475	0.347	0.410	0.386
FR	0.730	0.549	0.497	0.504	0.489
HR	0.597	0.490	0.440	0.408	0.399
HU	0.541	0.476	0.537	0.497	0.465
IE	0.476	0.464	0.467	0.428	0.483
IT	0.772	0.638	0.550	0.532	0.521
LT	0.650	0.748	0.577	0.511	0.483
LU	0.447	0.429	0.404	0.473	0.592
LV	0.524	0.520	0.503	0.469	0.559
MT	0.393	0.380	0.379	0.392	0.401
NL	0.633	0.396	0.438	0.394	0.385
PL	0.554	0.466	0.498	0.488	0.453
PT	0.662	0.454	0.467	0.437	0.478
RO	0.351	0.328	0.316	0.296	0.269
SE	0.802	0.497	0.457	0.414	0.397
SI	0.515	0.467	0.476	0.510	0.514
SK	0.371	0.396	0.379	0.354	0.325
UK	0.839	0.413	0.493	0.534	0.545

(*) Individuals with zero earnings are not considered. Control variables: dummies on gender, citizenship, educational attainment, dummy for those still in education, occupation (2-digit ISCO), part-time contract, fixed-term contract, sector of activity, firm's size.

Tab. A1.38: Mean equivalised market income by individuals' age (thousands of Euros)

	2006							2017						
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65
AT	19.3	21.6	23.2	25.5	27.4	14.7	4.2	26.2	31.4	30.5	33.2	39.7	28.4	5.6
BE	21.9	20.5	26.4	25.6	25.0	16.0	3.4	28.5	27.3	32.3	33.3	33.1	25.4	4.1
BG	1.6	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.3	0.6	4.6	4.6	5.3	5.7	5.8	4.4	1.4
CY	18.2	17.5	20.3	19.2	19.7	16.0	3.9	16.9	14.9	16.8	20.0	18.8	17.6	3.6
CZ	5.9	6.4	7.6	6.8	7.9	4.4	1.1	10.6	11.0	12.7	12.0	13.2	8.9	1.7
DE	21.4	20.9	24.7	28.4	28.9	17.8	3.5	31.5	28.6	33.1	37.3	39.4	29.4	5.7
DK	33.1	28.5	32.6	37.9	42.3	31.7	4.5	44.2	34.1	37.6	47.9	56.7	53.1	10.0
EE	5.6	5.8	8.1	6.1	6.0	4.3	1.2	11.9	11.3	14.0	13.5	13.8	10.8	3.1
EL	15.9	12.7	14.6	16.5	16.2	12.0	4.1	11.7	9.5	11.2	12.2	12.7	8.9	2.8
ES	13.6	13.0	15.4	15.0	15.4	11.6	3.6	18.2	15.9	17.2	18.8	18.1	16.8	4.4
FI	22.5	20.3	24.2	27.2	29.4	21.0	2.8	29.4	25.3	28.9	34.7	39.4	31.1	4.6
FR	18.0	16.9	20.2	21.3	23.5	14.3	2.7	24.9	23.6	26.5	28.6	31.3	25.8	7.9
HR	7.2	6.9	9.1	7.4	7.9	5.9	2.1	8.4	8.0	9.6	9.2	8.7	6.8	2.0
HU	3.7	4.1	5.4	4.6	5.0	3.1	0.9	6.0	6.3	8.1	7.1	7.8	5.3	1.6
IE	24.1	23.0	31.1	30.6	30.0	23.4	5.2	27.6	24.1	30.5	33.8	34.8	26.2	5.1
IT	19.2	17.5	19.8	21.2	22.4	16.1	5.4	20.3	20.4	19.9	21.9	23.9	21.9	6.0
LT	4.1	4.5	5.5	4.4	5.1	3.6	1.0	8.3	8.0	10.7	10.5	9.7	7.8	2.2
LU	33.0	32.2	38.8	41.1	43.1	32.2	7.2	39.3	35.6	47.3	48.3	50.7	28.9	6.9
LV	4.0	4.5	5.4	4.5	4.7	3.4	1.7	9.8	9.1	12.1	11.3	10.1	8.1	2.9
MT	10.4	11.5	14.0	11.8	12.0	9.0	3.1	24.6	23.8	30.7	28.4	27.3	22.0	16.2
NL	25.2	23.1	29.3	29.0	31.5	21.8	3.2	34.5	27.5	35.3	37.0	38.0	34.0	3.6
PL	4.5	4.1	5.3	5.2	4.9	3.0	1.0	7.7	6.8	9.2	8.6	8.4	6.2	2.3
PT	11.1	10.4	11.7	11.7	12.8	9.2	2.4	13.1	11.6	13.3	14.0	13.3	11.1	2.6
RO	1.7	2.0	2.4	2.3	2.4	1.2	0.5	4.0	3.5	5.3	4.7	4.8	3.2	1.0
SE	21.8	18.8	23.3	25.7	29.0	27.6	3.3	29.2	28.6	29.3	34.6	41.1	38.7	6.3
SI	12.0	12.0	13.1	12.7	13.5	8.0	3.0	16.9	16.2	16.9	17.8	18.0	11.8	3.1
SK	3.9	4.3	4.9	4.3	4.9	2.9	0.8	7.1	7.7	9.3	8.0	9.1	6.6	2.2
UK	24.9	26.1	34.8	34.5	34.2	25.1	5.0	24.4	23.6	30.0	32.6	32.7	25.3	5.3

Tab. A1.39: Mean equivalised gross income by individuals' age (thousands of Euros)

	2006							2017						
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65
AT	23.2	25.1	26.8	28.7	31.1	29.3	24.3	31.1	35.4	34.6	37.6	43.8	42.4	33.0
BE	25.2	23.6	29.2	28.8	28.7	26.3	17.7	32.4	32.1	35.6	37.0	37.5	36.4	25.4
BG	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.0	1.5	5.3	5.3	6.0	6.4	6.5	5.9	3.8
CY	19.5	20.0	22.6	20.9	22.3	23.9	13.1	18.9	17.5	19.1	22.3	20.9	24.2	19.0
CZ	6.8	7.1	8.5	7.5	8.7	7.2	5.2	11.6	11.7	13.9	12.9	14.1	12.4	8.2
DE	24.7	24.0	27.2	30.8	32.1	27.8	21.3	35.9	32.1	36.0	40.6	42.5	38.1	27.7
DK	37.9	32.9	36.9	42.0	47.2	45.1	27.8	49.4	40.1	44.1	52.8	61.7	65.4	43.5
EE	6.4	6.3	8.8	6.7	6.5	5.8	3.8	14.4	12.7	16.0	15.4	15.2	13.8	8.7
EL	16.6	14.2	16.9	17.7	18.3	17.9	12.1	12.9	11.2	13.5	14.1	14.6	14.7	12.3
ES	14.5	14.3	17.2	16.4	17.2	16.7	12.0	19.5	18.0	19.9	21.0	20.6	23.6	17.9
FI	26.5	23.7	27.8	30.6	32.9	31.2	19.7	34.6	30.1	34.0	39.4	43.9	42.8	29.1
FR	21.6	19.9	23.1	24.1	26.7	27.2	20.5	28.8	27.3	30.4	32.2	34.9	38.9	32.4
HR	8.3	7.8	10.3	8.7	9.1	8.4	5.8	9.3	8.9	10.8	10.3	10.0	9.2	7.1
HU	5.0	5.0	6.4	5.6	6.0	5.8	4.4	7.3	7.1	9.1	8.2	8.6	7.6	6.5
IE	29.8	28.2	35.5	35.1	35.2	31.2	20.5	33.1	29.4	35.6	38.6	39.7	34.5	24.6
IT	20.7	19.8	23.4	23.5	25.1	26.4	19.0	22.1	22.9	24.2	25.0	26.9	31.1	25.1
LT	4.6	4.9	6.1	4.8	5.5	4.9	3.0	9.7	9.0	12.0	11.5	10.8	9.9	6.5
LU	38.2	37.7	43.5	45.1	48.7	52.6	38.6	45.0	44.4	53.3	53.2	56.9	56.9	54.9
LV	4.7	5.0	6.0	5.1	5.2	4.6	3.4	11.3	10.2	13.5	12.6	11.2	10.3	7.0
MT	11.3	12.6	15.1	12.9	13.2	12.1	9.0	28.0	27.2	35.0	32.4	31.2	30.6	29.9
NL	27.3	26.1	31.0	31.6	35.1	35.7	22.8	37.6	31.3	37.7	40.4	42.8	45.8	31.3
PL	5.1	4.9	6.1	5.9	5.9	5.8	4.9	9.4	8.1	10.5	10.2	9.7	9.3	8.1
PT	12.0	11.8	13.5	12.7	14.4	14.5	9.5	14.1	12.8	14.9	15.2	14.8	16.0	13.4
RO	2.1	2.2	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.2	1.7	4.5	4.0	5.8	5.3	5.3	5.0	3.8
SE	26.6	22.5	27.6	29.8	33.2	37.3	23.6	34.2	32.8	33.9	39.1	44.8	48.3	31.8
SI	14.0	13.9	15.6	14.6	15.5	13.9	10.4	19.2	18.2	19.4	20.2	20.2	18.0	13.9
SK	4.5	4.8	5.7	4.9	5.5	5.1	3.7	8.2	8.7	10.5	9.2	10.2	9.5	7.4
UK	29.1	29.3	37.9	37.2	37.4	34.6	21.9	28.4	27.3	32.8	35.5	35.9	33.0	24.3

Tab. A1.40: Mean equivalised disposable income by individuals' age (thousands of Euros)

	2006							2017						
	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65	<15	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-65	>65
AT	17.9	19.1	20.1	21.1	22.5	22.1	19.5	23.8	26.9	26.5	27.6	31.2	31.2	26.7
BE	18.8	17.7	20.9	20.8	20.6	20.1	15.3	24.5	23.7	26.5	27.2	27.3	27.2	21.4
BG	1.6	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.4	4.4	4.4	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.0	3.5
CY	17.6	18.2	20.6	18.6	19.9	21.5	12.4	16.6	15.8	17.2	19.1	18.0	20.7	16.2
CZ	5.7	5.9	6.9	6.1	7.0	6.2	4.9	10.0	9.8	11.4	10.7	11.3	10.5	7.7
DE	18.8	18.3	20.1	22.0	22.8	21.3	18.0	26.4	23.8	25.6	28.5	28.9	27.0	23.0
DK	24.6	22.0	24.0	26.7	29.9	29.7	19.5	33.1	27.4	30.2	34.9	40.1	42.1	29.7
EE	5.4	5.3	7.2	5.5	5.4	5.0	3.6	12.5	11.0	13.6	13.1	12.8	11.9	8.0
EL	11.8	10.8	12.8	12.5	12.6	13.4	10.3	8.5	7.7	9.2	9.4	9.3	9.8	8.9
ES	12.3	12.1	14.5	13.7	14.2	14.0	10.9	16.3	14.9	16.8	17.5	16.8	19.6	16.3
FI	20.0	18.2	21.1	22.5	24.0	22.6	15.7	26.2	23.5	26.3	29.2	31.9	32.5	23.6
FR	17.2	15.9	18.2	18.7	20.1	21.5	17.8	22.6	21.8	23.8	24.7	26.5	30.0	27.7
HR	6.5	6.2	7.9	6.8	7.0	6.9	5.3	7.4	7.1	8.4	8.0	7.8	7.4	6.1
HU	3.9	4.0	4.8	4.3	4.6	4.8	4.1	5.8	5.5	6.8	6.3	6.5	6.1	5.9
IE	25.2	23.8	29.6	29.0	28.6	26.0	19.0	25.7	23.8	28.7	29.0	30.6	27.9	24.0
IT	15.9	15.3	18.0	17.8	18.7	20.0	15.6	16.7	17.0	18.5	18.7	19.6	22.8	19.8
LT	3.8	3.9	4.8	3.9	4.4	4.1	2.8	8.3	7.7	10.1	9.8	9.1	8.5	6.2
LU	30.9	30.2	33.9	35.1	37.2	40.6	32.6	43.5	43.2	47.1	47.9	50.1	52.8	50.3
LV	3.9	4.1	4.9	4.1	4.2	3.7	3.1	9.3	8.3	10.8	10.1	8.9	8.4	6.2
MT	9.2	10.4	12.1	10.3	10.8	10.2	8.2	16.0	16.2	19.6	17.9	17.1	15.7	12.5
NL	19.0	18.6	21.5	21.5	23.1	24.0	18.1	27.0	22.8	27.3	28.6	29.3	30.4	23.2
PL	3.8	3.7	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.0	7.5	6.4	8.1	7.9	7.4	7.2	6.7
PT	9.3	9.2	10.7	9.8	10.9	11.6	8.4	10.7	9.8	11.4	11.4	10.9	12.0	11.0
RO	1.7	1.8	2.3	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.5	3.5	3.2	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.0	3.4
SE	18.8	16.4	19.5	20.8	22.7	25.1	16.4	25.3	24.7	25.9	28.4	32.4	34.7	24.8
SI	10.4	10.5	11.5	10.8	11.3	11.1	9.4	14.2	13.7	14.5	14.8	14.8	14.2	12.8
SK	4.0	4.1	4.8	4.2	4.6	4.5	3.5	6.7	7.0	8.4	7.4	8.1	8.0	6.9
UK	22.4	22.6	28.2	27.3	27.5	26.2	18.8	22.9	22.8	26.5	27.7	28.6	27.3	22.5

Tab. A1.41: Mean equivalised labour and market income by household head' age (thousands of Euros)

	Equivalised gross labour income						Equivalised market income					
	2006			2017			2006			2017		
	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65
AT	19.9	22.5	1.8	25.4	32.7	1.5	20.2	23.0	2.6	25.9	33.7	2.7
BE	22.2	21.8	0.7	27.6	29.8	1.1	22.7	22.8	2.1	27.9	30.7	2.6
BG	1.8	1.8	0.2	4.5	5.1	0.8	1.8	1.8	0.2	4.6	5.3	1.0
CY	17.5	18.2	2.0	12.7	18.8	2.7	17.9	19.1	3.1	13.0	19.4	3.8
CZ	6.4	6.5	0.3	11.2	11.3	0.7	6.5	6.6	0.4	11.4	11.5	0.8
DE	19.4	24.4	1.1	27.2	34.2	4.4	19.9	25.4	3.1	27.6	35.1	6.1
DK	27.6	35.8	2.0	30.0	49.6	5.1	27.0	36.8	4.2	29.8	51.0	9.2
EE	6.9	5.6	0.6	11.9	12.6	2.0	7.0	5.6	0.7	12.0	12.8	2.1
EL	12.0	15.1	1.6	9.4	11.5	1.4	12.4	15.8	2.5	9.7	11.9	2.0
ES	13.8	14.1	1.4	14.9	18.2	2.1	14.0	14.5	2.1	15.1	18.7	3.1
FI	19.7	23.7	1.4	23.4	31.9	2.4	20.1	25.4	2.3	24.2	34.2	4.3
FR	17.5	18.7	0.7	22.3	25.9	1.6	17.9	19.5	2.4	22.9	28.0	7.7
HR	7.7	7.3	0.4	8.5	8.4	0.6	7.8	7.4	0.5	8.5	8.5	0.8
HU	4.4	4.3	0.3	7.0	6.6	1.0	4.4	4.4	0.3	7.1	6.7	1.0
IE	20.5	27.2	3.0	22.1	31.2	3.5	21.2	29.0	4.5	22.3	31.9	4.0
IT	17.1	19.8	3.0	16.3	22.3	3.5	17.6	20.5	4.0	16.8	23.1	5.0
LT	5.0	4.4	0.4	8.8	9.0	1.5	5.0	4.4	0.4	9.0	9.3	1.6
LU	32.3	36.9	3.3	43.5	41.6	2.3	32.8	38.6	6.3	43.7	42.6	5.9
LV	4.9	4.2	1.0	10.7	9.8	1.5	5.0	4.3	1.0	10.9	10.0	1.6
MT	11.4	10.8	0.4	25.9	25.5	14.7	11.8	11.4	1.4	26.2	26.1	15.4
NL	23.7	26.3	0.8	28.6	35.3	2.0	24.0	27.8	2.8	28.8	36.3	3.6
PL	4.6	4.6	0.4	8.1	7.9	1.0	4.7	4.6	0.4	8.2	8.0	1.0
PT	10.1	11.6	1.2	11.0	13.1	1.4	10.1	11.8	1.5	11.2	13.4	2.1
RO	2.2	2.0	0.1	5.0	4.2	0.2	2.2	2.0	0.1	5.0	4.2	0.2
SE	19.0	25.1	1.6	23.2	34.7	3.5	19.4	26.1	3.2	23.4	37.1	6.0
SI	10.9	12.3	0.7	14.4	16.6	0.8	11.0	12.4	0.9	14.4	16.9	1.3
SK	4.6	4.1	0.2	8.5	7.8	0.5	4.6	4.1	0.2	8.5	7.8	0.6
UK	24.4	30.6	1.8	22.6	29.2	3.1	24.9	32.0	3.8	22.8	30.1	4.6

Tab. A1.42: Mean equivalised gross and disposable income by household head' age (thousands of Euros)

	Equivalised gross income						Equivalised disposable income					
	2006			2017			2006			2017		
	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65	<35	35-65	>65
AT	23.8	28.5	24.3	30.0	40.2	32.2	18.5	21.1	19.4	23.7	29.4	26.3
BE	25.8	27.4	16.9	31.6	36.3	24.4	18.9	20.2	14.9	24.3	26.7	20.7
BG	2.0	2.1	1.2	5.3	6.2	3.4	1.7	1.8	1.1	4.4	5.1	3.4
CY	19.3	22.1	12.8	15.5	22.0	19.3	17.9	19.8	12.1	14.7	18.9	16.3
CZ	7.6	7.8	4.8	12.7	12.9	7.6	6.3	6.4	4.6	10.6	10.7	7.4
DE	22.7	29.6	21.0	31.0	39.7	28.2	17.4	21.6	17.8	22.9	28.0	23.2
DK	32.0	43.3	27.7	37.0	57.5	43.2	21.3	27.8	19.4	25.9	37.6	29.6
EE	7.7	6.4	3.4	14.2	14.9	8.0	6.4	5.3	3.3	12.3	12.7	7.4
EL	13.8	18.1	11.3	11.2	14.4	11.5	11.3	12.8	9.8	8.1	9.4	8.4
ES	15.5	16.5	10.9	17.0	21.5	17.0	13.2	13.8	10.1	14.6	17.7	15.6
FI	24.0	30.5	19.4	29.6	40.4	29.0	18.7	22.4	15.5	23.5	30.1	23.6
FR	20.9	24.7	20.3	26.8	33.8	32.4	16.8	19.2	17.6	21.7	26.0	27.7
HR	9.1	8.8	4.7	9.8	9.9	6.3	7.1	6.9	4.6	7.7	7.7	5.6
HU	5.5	5.8	4.0	8.2	7.9	6.2	4.3	4.5	3.9	6.3	6.2	5.8
IE	26.9	34.2	20.1	28.4	37.2	24.0	23.6	28.0	18.8	24.0	28.6	23.6
IT	20.4	24.3	18.1	19.6	27.1	24.3	16.1	18.3	14.9	15.4	19.9	19.3
LT	5.6	5.0	2.5	10.3	10.6	6.0	4.4	4.1	2.5	8.7	9.1	5.8
LU	37.4	45.8	37.9	48.2	53.0	53.6	30.0	35.8	32.0	43.2	48.8	49.3
LV	5.5	4.9	2.9	12.2	11.5	5.9	4.5	4.0	2.7	10.0	9.2	5.4
MT	13.2	12.8	7.7	30.5	31.2	29.5	10.8	10.4	7.2	17.4	17.1	11.8
NL	26.3	32.5	22.5	31.6	41.7	31.5	18.9	21.9	18.0	23.7	28.8	23.3
PL	5.4	5.8	4.4	9.6	9.8	7.2	4.1	4.3	3.7	7.5	7.6	6.1
PT	11.4	13.9	9.2	12.4	15.3	13.4	9.2	10.6	8.2	9.9	11.4	11.0
RO	2.6	2.4	1.3	5.6	5.0	3.1	2.2	2.0	1.3	4.3	3.9	2.9
SE	23.9	31.5	23.8	28.6	42.3	31.8	17.2	21.8	16.4	22.3	30.6	24.7
SI	13.8	15.0	9.1	17.2	19.9	12.8	10.5	11.2	8.8	13.2	14.8	12.3
SK	5.4	5.0	3.3	9.8	9.4	6.3	4.6	4.3	3.2	7.9	7.6	6.2
UK	28.7	36.2	21.2	26.7	34.1	24.1	22.3	26.9	18.4	22.3	27.2	22.4

Annex to Chapter 2

Tables and Figures commented in the main text

Tab. A2.1: Total expenditure on social protection benefits, 2002-2017 (% of GDP)

	Share of social protection benefits in GDP (%)				Percentage point change in the share of social protection benefits in GDP			
	2002	2007	2012	2017	2002-2007	2007-2012	2012-2017	2002-2017
FR: France	28.10	28.40	31.40	31.70	0.30	3.00	0.30	3.60
DK: Denmark	28.10	29.40	32.40	30.80	1.30	3.00	-1.60	2.70
FI: Finland	24.10	23.60	29.20	30.10	-0.50	5.60	0.90	6.00
AT: Austria	27.40	26.20	28.40	28.60	-1.20	2.20	0.20	1.20
DE: Germany	28.50	25.90	27.70	28.50	-2.60	1.80	0.80	0.00
SE: Sweden	28.80	26.80	28.60	28.20	-2.00	1.80	-0.40	-0.60
IT: Italy	23.40	24.50	27.90	28.00	1.10	3.40	0.10	4.60
NL: Netherlands	23.40	24.20	28.50	27.60	0.80	4.30	-0.90	4.20
BE: Belgium	25.20	25.00	28.40	27.20	-0.20	3.40	-1.20	2.00
EU27			27.40	26.90			-0.50	
UK: United Kingdom	22.30	23.70	28.30	26.10	1.40	4.60	-2.20	3.80
EL: Greece	18.00	20.80	27.50	24.90	2.80	6.70	-2.60	6.90
PT: Portugal	20.60	21.80	25.00	23.60	1.20	3.20	-1.40	3.00
ES: Spain	19.00	19.90	25.20	23.00	0.90	5.30	-2.20	4.00
SI: Slovenia	23.40	20.50	24.30	22.30	-2.90	3.80	-2.00	-1.10
LU: Luxemburg	20.20	19.10	22.30	21.50	-1.10	3.20	-0.80	1.30
HR: Croatia			21.20	20.50			-0.70	
PL: Poland	20.60	17.90	18.40	19.60	-2.70	0.50	1.20	-1.00
CY: Cyprus	14.60	16.10	19.90	18.10	1.50	3.80	-1.80	3.50
HU: Hungary	19.70	21.60	21.00	18.10	1.90	-0.60	-2.90	-1.60
CZ: Czech Republic	18.00	17.10	19.80	18.00	-0.90	2.70	-1.80	0.00
SK: Slovakia	18.20	15.00	17.30	17.70	-3.20	2.30	0.40	-0.50
BG: Bulgaria		13.00	16.10	16.40		3.10	0.30	
MT: Malta	17.20	17.60	19.00	15.90	0.40	1.40	-3.10	-1.30
EE: Estonia	12.40	11.70	14.70	15.80	-0.70	3.00	1.10	3.40
LV: Latvia	13.30	10.30	14.10	14.60	-3.00	3.80	0.50	1.30
IE: Ireland	15.30	16.80	22.80	14.40	1.50	6.00	-8.40	-0.90
LT: Lithuania	13.60	13.90	15.50	14.40	0.30	1.60	-1.10	0.80
RO: Romania	13.30	12.90	15.20	14.10	-0.40	2.30	-1.10	0.80

(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits. The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States.
Source: Elaborations of Eurostat ESSPROS databases https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Tab. A2.2: Total expenditure on social protection benefits as a % of real 2002 GDP in different European Union countries, 2002-2017

	2002	2007	2012	2017	2002-2007	2007-2012	2012-2017	2002-2017
FR: France	28.10	30.32	33.27	34.90	2.22	2.95	1.63	6.80
DK: Denmark	28.10	32.02	33.73	34.38	3.92	1.71	0.65	6.28
FI: Finland	24.10	27.71	32.38	34.56	3.61	4.67	2.19	10.46
AT: Austria	27.40	29.04	31.94	32.78	1.64	2.89	0.84	5.38
DE: Germany	28.50	28.23	31.47	34.43	-0.27	3.25	2.95	5.93
SE: Sweden	28.80	31.08	33.00	34.99	2.28	1.92	2.00	6.19
IT: Italy	23.40	25.17	26.03	26.53	1.77	0.86	0.49	3.13
NL: Netherlands	23.40	26.70	30.81	31.70	3.30	4.12	0.89	8.30
BE: Belgium	25.20	27.68	31.19	31.41	2.48	3.51	0.22	6.21
EU27	:	:	29.76	31.53	:	:	1.77	:
UK: United Kingdom	22.30	26.35	30.38	30.12	4.05	4.03	-0.26	7.82
EL: Greece	18.00	25.04	25.15	23.00	7.04	0.11	-2.15	5.00
PT: Portugal	20.60	22.81	24.45	25.29	2.21	1.65	0.84	4.69
ES: Spain	19.00	21.63	24.81	25.03	2.63	3.18	0.22	6.03
SI: Slovenia	23.40	25.55	28.31	29.08	2.15	2.76	0.77	5.68
LU: Luxemburg	20.20	21.97	23.47	24.19	1.77	1.50	0.71	3.99
HR: Croatia	:	:	24.56	26.66	:	:	2.09	:
PL: Poland	20.60	23.01	27.72	34.84	2.41	4.71	7.11	14.24
CY: Cyprus	14.60	18.52	20.42	19.71	3.92	1.90	-0.70	5.11
HU: Hungary	19.70	25.87	24.27	24.93	6.17	-1.59	0.66	5.23
CZ: Czech Republic	18.00	22.04	25.39	26.61	4.04	3.35	1.22	8.61
SK: Slovakia	18.20	21.31	27.12	31.47	3.11	5.81	4.35	13.27
BG: Bulgaria	:	18.22	25.04	30.08	:	6.82	5.04	:
MT: Malta	17.20	19.83	23.48	24.61	2.63	3.65	1.12	7.41
EE: Estonia	12.40	17.89	21.05	26.36	5.49	3.16	5.31	13.96
LV: Latvia	13.30	17.31	22.50	27.76	4.01	5.18	5.26	14.46
IE: Ireland	15.30	19.31	23.32	21.60	4.01	4.01	-1.72	6.30
LT: Lithuania	13.60	22.40	26.39	30.28	8.80	3.99	3.89	16.68
RO: Romania	13.30	18.36	23.28	27.60	5.06	4.92	4.32	14.30

(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits. The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States.
Source: Elaborations of Eurostat ESSPROS databases https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Tab. A2.3: Total expenditure on social protection benefits in different European Union countries, 2002-2017 (PPP constant 2010 Euro/capita)

	PPP constant 2010 Euro				Change in PPP constant 2010 Euro per capita			
	2002	2007	2012	2017	2002-2007	2007-2012	2012-2017	2002-2017
LU: Luxemburg	9,974	11,365	12,559	13,209	1,391	1,194	650	3,236
DK: Denmark	8,108	9,435	9,988	10,287	1,327	553	299	2,179
DE: Germany	7,964	7,788	8,723	9,770	-176	934	1,047	1,805
NL: Netherlands	7,323	8,282	9,415	9,640	959	1,133	226	2,317
SE: Sweden	7,976	8,474	8,968	9,583	498	494	615	1,607
AT: Austria	7,998	8,435	9,130	9,371	437	696	241	1,373
FR: France	7,351	7,923	8,721	9,274	573	797	554	1,924
FI: Finland	6,563	7,358	8,258	9,011	795	899	753	2,448
BE: Belgium	7,007	7,509	8,197	8,337	502	688	140	1,329
UK: United Kingdom	5,527	6,572	7,455	7,593	1,045	883	138	2,066
EU27	:	:	6,819	7,343	:	:	524	:
IT: Italy	6,411	6,880	7,089	7,315	469	210	225	903
IE: Ireland	4,641	5,679	6,764	6,685	1,038	1,085	-79	2,044
ES: Spain	4,228	4,917	5,287	5,313	689	370	26	1,086
SI: Slovenia	4,165	4,513	4,839	5,112	348	327	272	946
PT: Portugal	3,905	4,301	4,553	4,855	396	252	303	950
CZ: Czech Republic	3,273	3,944	4,275	4,543	671	331	268	1,270
EL: Greece	3,547	4,926	4,823	4,507	1,379	-103	-316	960
MT: Malta	3,045	3,467	3,962	4,465	422	495	502	1,420
CY: Cyprus	3,179	4,125	4,403	4,338	946	278	-65	1,160
PL: Poland	2,415	2,746	3,240	4,166	331	493	926	1,751
SK: Slovakia	2,677	2,945	3,440	3,907	269	495	467	1,230
HU: Hungary	3,015	3,880	3,490	3,750	865	-390	260	735
EE: Estonia	1,484	2,359	2,747	3,485	876	387	738	2,001
HR: Croatia	:	:	3,001	3,294	:	:	293	
LT: Lithuania	1,382	2,483	2,734	3,196	1,101	251	463	1,814
LV: Latvia	1,257	1,757	2,182	2,739	499	426	557	1,482
RO: Romania	928	1,596	2,073	2,534	668	477	461	1,605
BG: Bulgaria	:	1,338	1,853	2,344	:	515	491	:

(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits. PPP adjustment was made by applying the Purchasing Power standard price level adjustment. Purchasing power standards (PPS): unit independent of any national currency that removes the distortions due to price level differences. The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaboration of Eurostat ESSPROS databases https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Tab. A.2.4: Per capita elderly/non-elderly spending ratios ("ENSR") (=ratio between the social protection expenditures on the elderly and the social protection expenditures on the non-elderly, adjusted for differences in the population structure and in unemployment rates), 2002-2017 - using the effective retirement age to define the elderly/non-elderly population age cut-off.

	Evaluated based on cash benefits components of relevant the functions included in the measure only					Evaluated based on cash and in-kind benefits of the relevant functions included in the measure only				
	2002	2007	2012	2017	2002-2017 % change	2002	2007	2012	2017	2002-2017 % change
LU:Luxemburg	0.91	0.94	0.98	1.24	0.36	0.88	0.91	0.95	1.20	0.36
DK:Denmark	0.64	1.77	2.09	2.27	2.55	0.72	1.18	1.47	1.59	1.19
DE:Germany	1.48	1.79	1.51	1.42	-0.04	1.22	1.56	1.32	1.20	-0.02
NL:Netherlands	0.79	1.49	1.75	1.58	0.99	0.78	1.52	1.85	1.64	1.11
SE:Sweden	1.08	2.31	3.20	3.59	2.33	1.12	2.24	2.82	2.90	1.59
AT:Austria	1.17	1.47	1.61	1.79	0.52	0.92	1.13	1.25	1.39	0.51
FR:France	1.31	1.61	1.78	1.70	0.31	1.31	1.60	1.72	1.65	0.26
FI:Finland	1.09	1.00	1.31	1.45	0.33	1.05	0.95	1.22	1.40	0.34
BE:Belgium	0.61	0.60	0.60	1.08	0.78	0.60	0.59	0.61	1.16	0.94
EU27	:	:	2.33	2.19	:	:	:	2.18	2.02	:
IT:Italy	7.07	1.72	2.35	2.37	-0.67	6.82	1.68	2.29	2.29	-0.66
IE:Ireland	1.11	1.24	1.49	1.25	0.13	0.96	1.10	1.51	1.25	0.31
ES:Spain	1.39	1.22	2.71	3.38	1.43	1.24	1.12	2.64	3.12	1.50
SI:Slovenia	3.28	3.54	4.11	3.43	0.05	2.80	2.85	3.67	2.97	0.06
PT:Portugal	1.94	3.06	4.36	5.60	1.88	2.00	3.10	4.38	5.58	1.80
CZ:Czech Republic	2.80	1.90	2.69	1.45	-0.48	2.81	1.87	2.68	1.45	-0.48
EL:Greece	4.60	2.60	7.24	7.25	0.57	4.23	2.52	6.81	6.90	0.63
MT:Malta	2.12	3.28	3.19	2.83	0.33	2.15	3.14	2.56	2.60	0.21
CY:Cyprus	1.65	1.92	2.54	3.96	1.40	1.64	1.87	2.46	3.83	1.34
PL:Poland	8.20	7.53	10.98	3.91	-0.52	8.14	7.07	9.52	3.64	-0.55
SK:Slovakia	5.86	3.40	4.10	3.13	-0.47	5.22	3.52	4.22	3.26	-0.37
HU:Hungary	1.82	2.15	4.14	2.90	0.59	1.64	1.99	4.04	2.78	0.69
EE:Estonia	9.66	6.67	5.51	3.65	-0.62	7.69	5.06	3.93	2.76	-0.64
HR:Croatia	:	:	5.60	5.33	:	:	:	5.18	4.51	:
LT:Lithuania	12.09	2.36	6.42	2.80	-0.77	7.94	1.88	5.76	2.42	-0.70
LV:Latvia	6.01	2.49	8.02	2.82	-0.53	5.52	2.24	6.80	2.56	-0.54
RO:Romania	4.59	6.41	11.50	20.65	3.50	4.10	5.40	9.92	17.38	3.24
BG:Bulgaria	:	5.11	3.71	2.56	:	:	3.89	3.20	2.31	:

(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits. The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States. The effective retirement age in each country and year are taken from the OECD database: Average effective age of retirement in 1970-2018 in OECD countries (https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/average-effective-age-of-retirement.htm). *Source*: Elaborations on Eurostat ESSPROS databases https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Fig. A2.1: The composition of social protection benefit expenditures, 2017

a. PPP constant 2010 Euros / capita



b. % of total social protection benefit expenditures



(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits (in ppp constant 2010 Euros). The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaborations on Eurostat ESSPROS databases https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Fig. A2.2: Change in the spending for each social protection function between 2002 and 2017 in different European Union countries, PPP constant 2010 Euros / capita



(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits (in ppp constant 2010 Euros). The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaborations on Eurostat ESSPROS databases https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Fig. A2.3: Percentage point change in the share of expenditures on different social protection functions in total social protection benefit expenditures in different European Union countries, 2002-2017



(*) Countries are sorted by the level of 2017 expenditures on social protection benefits (in ppp constant 2010 Euros). The EU-27 average is computed as the population-weighted average of the national values across the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaboration on Eurostat ESSPROS database https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/social-protection/data/database.

Fig. A2.4: The average social transfers rates for different age groups in different European Union countries, 2017

(*) The age variable is missing for Malta and therefore the age profiles cannot be derived. The average social transfers rate for each age group is computed as the ratio between the average household income from social transfers and the average gross household income of each age group. *Source*: Elaborations on 2018 EU-SILC data.

Fig. A2.5: Percentage point change in social transfers rates and percent change in average equivalised household market income across the different European Union countries, 2007-2017



(*) The age variable is missing for Malta and therefore the age profiles cannot be derived. The average social transfer rate for each age group is computed as the ratio of the average household income from social transfers to the average gross household income of each age group. *Source*: Elaborations on 2018 EU-SILC data.

A2.1 Change in the redistributive effect of taxes and social transfers between 2007 and 2017

This section analyses how the redistributive effects of tax and benefit systems in different EU countries changed over time between 2007 and 2017 (using the 2008 and 2018 cross-sections) and examines the contribution of the change in the between age groups redistributive effects to the overall change in the redistribution of the systems i.e. how much the change in the extent to which tax and benefit systems redistribute between age groups contributed to the overall change in redistribution.

Figure A2.4 documents how the Gini inequality of equivalised household market income and equivalised household disposable income has changed between 2007 and 2017 across the EU-27 member states and in the UK. The last chart of Figure 2.9 shows the change in the overall redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers, where the redistributive effects in each year is measured as the absolute difference between equivalised household market income inequality and the equivalised household disposable income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.[1] A wide variety exists across time and space in both the level of market and disposable income inequality and fiscal redistribution. Disposable income inequality increased in LU, HU BG, DK, IT, LV and SE due to the combined effects of rising market income inequality and a falling redistribution of the tax and benefit system.

As shown in Figure A2.4 the redistributive effect of the tax and benefit system declined on average and in the majority of countries, including HU, RO, SE. CZ, SK, LU, LV, DK, EE, UK, PL, DK, NL, AT, BE, BG and HR. The trend towards less redistribution was by far most pronounced in HU (8.4 Gini points). Other countries with above the average declines in redistribution included RO, CZ and SE (where it fell by around 3 Gini points) followed by IT, SK, LU, LV, DK, EE (where it declined by around 2 Gini points) and finally UK, PL, DK, NL, AT, BE, BG and HR where it fell by less than 1 Gini point. The decline in redistribution in BG, DK, UK, DE, LV, LU, IT, SE and HU coupled with rising market income inequality or with smaller declines in market income inequality resulted in an increase in disposable income inequality. On the other hand, in HR, AT, BE, PL, EE, SK, CZ and RO the decline in redistribution was followed by higher declines in market income inequality resulting in a falling in disposable income inequality.

Although the trend towards smaller redistribution was evident in most EU countries, there have been a minority of countries where the redistributive effects of tax and social transfers actually increased. The trend towards more redistribution was most pronounced in PT, CY and ES (where it increased by between 3 and 4 Gini points) followed by IE, FI, EL, LV and FR where it rose by 2 Gini points as well as MT where it increased by 1 Gini point. In most countries and especially PT the rise in the redistributive effect of tax and benefit system, paired with either a falling market inequality or much smaller rise in market income inequality (as in the case of PT) led to a decrease in equivalised household disposable income inequality. Exceptions are CY where the rise in market income

[1] Table A2.7 presents results based on a relative computation of the redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers in each year (i.e., the relative reduction in market income inequality due to social transfers and taxes). Here we chose to focus on results based on the absolute computation of the redistributive effect given that the relative computation is not possible in the sequential analysis of the disaggregate effects of old-age pensions/non-old-age benefits and taxes (and social security contributions).

inequality was offset by the rise in redistributive effects of the tax and benefit system and ES and MT where the rise in market income inequality was not offset by the rise in the redistributive effect of the tax and benefit system resulting in an increase in the disposable income inequality.

Fig. A2.4. Change in equivalised household market income and equivalised household disposable income Gini inequality and the change in the overall redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers in different EU countries, 2007-2017



(*) Countries are sorted by the change in overall redistribution as measured by Gini from largest to smallest. The EU-27 statistics are calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU-27 Member States countries. See also Tables A2.6. *Source*: Elaboration on 2008 and 2018 EU-SILC data.

Figure A2.5 illustrates the trends in the overall redistribution broken down by the change in the redistributive effects achieved by taxes and social security contributions, old-age pensions and non-old-age benefits for each of the EU-27 member states and for the UK. Looking first at countries with rising redistribution, one can see again a great deal of cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of each component to the overall trend. In PT and FI the rise in redistribution, was driven by the rise in the redistributive effects of old-age pensions and taxes while benefits either contributed by much less (FI) or had a negative effect (PT) on the change. In ES it was driven by the rise in the redistributive effects of both old-age pensions and benefits and to a lower degree by the rise in tax redistribution. In Ireland, on the other hand the rise in redistribution was driven by the rise in taxes redistribution and to a lower degree by old-age pensions (while benefits had a negative effect on the overall redistribution). In MT, the rise in redistribution was exclusively driven by the rise in the redistributive effects of old-age pensions (the redistributive effects of both taxes and benefits declined over this period and had a negative contribution to the overall change in redistribution). In CY and FR, the rise in the redistribution was mainly

driven by taxes and benefits and in EL, by the rise in the redistribution achieved by old-age pensions and to a lesser extent by other non-old-age benefits while taxes had a negative effect on the overall size of achieved redistribution. The increasing redistributive effects of old-age pensions highlight how old-age pensions acted as strong cushion during the period of crisis in EL but also point to an imbalance of how the achieved redistribution affected different age groups.

In countries where the total redistributive effects of taxes and benefits fell, the trend towards lower redistribution was mainly driven by either the decline in the redistributive effects of old-age pensions or the decline in the redistributive effect of benefits. Worth-noting exceptions are the UK and LU where the falling redistribution was mainly driven by the decline in redistributive effect of taxes as well as HU where the declines in the overall redistribution was equally driven by declines in the redistribution achieved by taxes, old-age pensions and benefits.

Fig. A2.5. Change in the redistributive effects of old-age pensions, non-old benefits and taxes between 2007 and 2017 in different EU countries



(*) Countries are sorted by the change in overall redistribution as measured by Gini from largest to smallest. The EU-27 statistics are calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU-27 Member States respectively. See also additional Tables A2.8. *Source*: Elaboration on 2008 and 2018 EU-SILC data.

Table A2.5 decomposes the overall change in redistribution (col. 1) into the part that is due to the change in the between age group redistribution (col. 2) and the part that is due to the change in the within age group redistribution (col. 3) (the age groups used in the

decomposition are the same used in the decomposition analysis in section 2.3.3). Countries are sorted by the size of overall change in redistribution as measured by the GE(2) from largest to smallest.

Tab. A2.5: Change in the between-age-group and the within-age-group redistributive effects of taxes and benefits as measured by the GE(2) index in different EU countries, 2017

	Total change in *total* redistribution based on GE(2) index	Total change in the *between* age groups redistribution (as measured by the GE(2) index	Total change in the *within* redistribution as measured by the GE(2) index	The contribution of the change in the *between* age group redistribution to the *overall* change in redistribution (%)
IE	0.317	0.007	0.310	0.022
EL	0.199	-0.009	0.208	-0.045
BG	0.127	0.001	0.126	0.008
ES	0.081	0.004	0.077	0.049
DK	0.078	0.003	0.075	0.038
CY	0.064	0.000	0.064	0.000
FI	0.038	0.003	0.035	0.079
PT	0.031	0.023	0.008	0.742
LV	0.020	0.010	0.010	0.500
LU	0.016	0.004	0.012	0.250
MT	0.013	:	:	:
EU-27	0.001	-0.003	0.003	-5.269
LT	-0.005	-0.009	0.004	1.800
AT	-0.006	-0.011	0.005	1.833
DE	-0.012	0.001	-0.013	-0.083
SI	-0.024	0.004	-0.028	-0.167
EE	-0.039	-0.017	-0.022	0.436
UK	-0.041	-0.010	-0.031	0.244
IT	-0.044	-0.019	-0.025	0.432
NL	-0.059	0.002	-0.061	-0.034
FR	-0.060	0.003	-0.063	-0.050
SK	-0.065	-0.018	-0.047	0.277
SE	-0.071	-0.014	-0.057	0.197
BE	-0.087	-0.017	-0.070	0.195
CZ	-0.094	0.001	-0.095	-0.011
PL	-0.094	-0.010	-0.084	0.106
RO	-0.125	-0.013	-0.112	0.104
HU	-0.182	-0.004	-0.178	0.022
HR	:	:	:	:

(*) Countries are sorted by the change in overall redistribution as measured by GE(2) from largest to smallest. Column (1) measure the change in the overall redistribution of the tax and social transfer system while Columns (2) and (3) measures respectively the change in the between- and within-age-group redistribution between 2007 and 2017. The between age-group-redistribution in each year is measured as the difference in the between-age-group market income GE(2) inequality and in the between-age-group disposable income GE(2) inequality. Similarly the within age group redistribution in each year is measured as the difference in the within age group market income GE(2) inequality and the between age group disposable income GE(2) inequality. The EU-27 average is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaboration on 2008 and 2018 EU-SILC data.

The first thing to note here is that the ordering of countries is different from Figure A2.5 which measures the change in redistribution in terms of the Gini coefficient, reflecting the difference in the two measures used to evaluate the effects. Despite these differences the two give a consistent picture concerning the direction of the change of the redistributive effect.

The second thing to note is that although in most countries changes in the between-age-group redistribution were much smaller than the change in the within-age-group redistribution, in some countries the change in the between-age-group redistribution made a substantial contribution to overall change in redistribution. For example, in PT, LV and LU the rise in the between-age-group redistribution accounted respectively for 74%, 50% and 25% of the overall increase in redistribution. On the other hand, in EE and IT the decrease in the between-age-group redistribution accounted for around 40% of the overall decline in redistribution while in SI, SE, BE and UK the decrease in the between-age-group redistribution accounted for 20%-28% of the overall decrease in redistribution.

A2.2 Multi-generational households and redistribution through shared living arrangements

In line with the standard practice in related literature, in sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.4 we computed the redistributive effects of the tax and benefit systems as the difference between equivalised household market income and equivalised household disposable income (and the respective partial effects of old-age pensions, non-old-age benefit and taxes received by all household members equivalised to account for differences in sizes and composition of different households). The underlying assumption behind this approach is that all incomes in the household are pooled and shared equally between all household members. This measure includes incomes received by the individual and/or his/her spouse (in the case of married couples) but also income received by other people who live in same household but who do not belong to the same family unit (e.g. co-resident parents or co-resident adult children) – where family unit is defined single individual or a couple with any dependent children. In this framework, the intra-household choices do not depend on who in the household receives each income source, which is obviously a restrictive assumption (Karagiannaki and Burchardt 2020).

Although, this section does not relax the assumption that the incomes received by all household members are pooled and shared equally, it adopts a modelling framework, which takes a direct account of whether different income components that comprise the equivalised household disposable income of each household member is deriving from income received by the individual and/or his/her spouse or from income received by other household members who live in same household. This disaggregation is relevant for individuals who live in multi-generational households (e.g. young adult children with their parents or households elderly people living with their adult children and grandchildren). This allows us to isolate the effect of old-age pensions and/or non-age benefits received by individuals living in the same nuclear family as the individual (which we term “Family unit old-age pensions” and “Family unit benefits” respectively) from that of old-age

pensions and/or non-age benefits received by household members from other family units who live in the same household (which we term “Old-age pensions received by other household members” and “Non-old-age benefits received by other household members” respectively).

This allows us to isolate the impact of old-age pensions on the incomes of young people who live with their elderly parents and vice versa the impact of the income of non-elderly people on the incomes of elderly people. This disaggregation is only possible for income components which are recorded in EU-SILC at the individual level (which as discussed above include labour earnings, old-age pensions, disability benefits, unemployment benefits etc.) but not for components recorded at the household level (e.g. child-benefits and housing benefits). The latter are assigned equally to all household members and are included in the variable ‘Family unit non-old age benefit income’ and therefore contribute to the overall redistribution. This analysis allows to investigate the extent to which the redistributive effects of social transfer systems in different countries operate through multi-generational living arrangements and the extent to which the redistribution that takes place within these types of households offset the degree of age orientation of tax and benefit systems.

Figure A2.6 shows the redistributive effects of taxes overall as well as the redistributive effects of old-age pensions and benefits broken down into by whether each of these components are received by the individuals themselves and/or by their spouses/partners and those received by other household members respectively (e.g. adult children living with their parents or elderly people living with their children and their families). Figure A2.6a presents the redistributive effects of each component in absolute terms (i.e., measured in Gini points reduction in inequality by each income source) while Figure A2.6b presents the effects relative to the size of the total redistribution achieved by taxes and social transfers. The height of each bar in Figure A2.6a gives the degree of the overall redistribution in each country (note that this is the same as that of Figure 2.6).

As one would expect, there is a large cross-country variation in the redistributive effects of old-pensions received by other household members on the overall size of redistribution. This variation reflects differences across countries in the extent of multi-generational living arrangements as well as the differences in the overall redistributive effects of old-age pensions (Karagiannaki and Burchardt, 2020). Old-age pensions received by other household members have the smallest effects in countries with low prevalence of multigenerational households such as the Nordic countries, NL, DE, IE and the UK. In these countries old-age pensions received by other household members account for less than 1% of the overall size of redistribution. On the other hand, the largest effects for old-age pensions received by other household members are found in PT where they account for 16% of the overall size of redistribution (or around a quarter of the overall size of redistribution achieved by old-age pensions) and in EL where they account for 15% of the overall redistribution (or around a fifth of the redistributive effects of old-age pensions). Large effects are also found in SK where they account for 14% of the overall redistribution (or around a fifth of the redistributive effects of old-age pensions) and in ES where they account for 11% of the overall redistribution (or around 25% of the redistributive effects of old-age pensions). Smaller but still very strong effects are also found in RO, BG, HR and IT.

The redistributive effects of benefits received by other household members also display a high degree of cross-country variation, with effects ranging from 2% of the overall redistribution in FI (or less than 10% of the overall redistributive effect of benefits in this country) to almost 10% in CY (or a third of the overall size of the redistributive effects of non-old-age benefits).

In sum, the evidence in this section suggests that a substantial part of the redistributive effects of social transfers accrue from to individuals other than the benefit recipient and members of his nuclear family through shared living arrangements. The importance of these "indirect" redistributive effects is higher in countries where the prevalence of multi-generational households is higher, highlighting the important protection role of the family in these countries in protecting the well-being of their members.

Fig. A2.6: Breakdowns of the redistributive effects of old-age pensions and non-old age benefits by whether they were received by the individuals or their spouses or by other household members in different European Union countries, 2017

a. Gini points reduction in inequality



b. Percent of the overall redistribution of taxes and social transfers



(*) Countries are sorted by the level of overall redistribution from largest to smallest. The EU-27 average is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU27 Member States. Total redistribution in the first chart is measured as the differences in the equivalised household market income inequality and equivalised household disposable income inequality. The redistributive effect of each income components is estimated sequentially (see section 2.2). *Source*: Elaboration on 2018 EU-SILC data.

Additional Tables

Tab. A2.6: Equivalised household market income and equivalised household disposable Gini inequality in different European countries, 2007 and 2017

	2007			2017			2017-2007
	Market income	Disposable income	Total redistrib.	Market income	Disposable income	Total redistrib.	Change in redistribution
AT	0.488	0.277	0.211	0.475	0.269	0.206	-0.005
BE	0.489	0.272	0.217	0.468	0.256	0.212	-0.005
BG	0.493	0.362	0.131	0.524	0.397	0.127	-0.004
CY	0.397	0.290	0.107	0.434	0.290	0.144	0.037
CZ	0.457	0.248	0.209	0.418	0.239	0.179	-0.030
DE	0.521	0.302	0.219	0.506	0.303	0.203	-0.016
DK	0.457	0.243	0.214	0.477	0.269	0.208	-0.006
EE	0.453	0.309	0.144	0.429	0.301	0.128	-0.016
EL	0.502	0.332	0.170	0.515	0.327	0.188	0.018
ES	0.454	0.324	0.130	0.493	0.333	0.160	0.030
FI	0.474	0.263	0.211	0.488	0.258	0.230	0.019
FR	0.477	0.296	0.181	0.471	0.275	0.196	0.015
HR	:	:	:	0.470	0.295	0.175	-0.004
HU	0.515	0.252	0.263	0.467	0.288	0.179	-0.084
IE	0.513	0.299	0.214	0.517	0.280	0.237	0.023
IT	0.490	0.311	0.179	0.493	0.337	0.156	-0.023
LT	0.494	0.345	0.149	0.500	0.369	0.131	-0.018
LU	0.462	0.275	0.187	0.493	0.328	0.165	-0.022
LV	0.482	0.378	0.104	0.475	0.354	0.121	0.017
MT	0.435	0.281	0.154	0.451	0.287	0.164	0.010
NL	0.475	0.272	0.203	0.470	0.272	0.198	-0.005
PL	0.497	0.320	0.177	0.448	0.280	0.168	-0.009
PT	0.525	0.362	0.163	0.526	0.321	0.205	0.042
RO	0.555	0.360	0.195	0.514	0.351	0.163	-0.032
SE	0.460	0.250	0.210	0.452	0.268	0.184	-0.026
SI	0.436	0.234	0.202	0.435	0.233	0.202	0.000
SK	0.423	0.238	0.185	0.371	0.209	0.162	-0.023
UK	0.514	0.332	0.182	0.512	0.340	0.172	-0.010
EU-27	0.476	0.295	0.181	0.471	0.294	0.177	-0.004

(*) The EU-27 average is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaboration on 2018 EU-SILC data.

Tab. A2.7: Equivalised household market income and equivalised household disposable Gini inequality in different European countries and redistribution measure in relative terms, 2007 and 2017

	2007			2017			2017-2007
	Market income	Disposable income	Total redistrib. (% change in market income inequality due to taxes and social transfers)	Market income	Disposable income	Total redistrib. (measured in % change in market income inequality)	Percentage point change in redistribution =(6)-(3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
AT	0.488	0.277	0.432	0.475	0.269	0.434	0.001
BE	0.489	0.272	0.444	0.468	0.256	0.453	0.009
BG	0.493	0.362	0.266	0.524	0.397	0.242	-0.023
CY	0.397	0.290	0.270	0.434	0.290	0.332	0.062
CZ	0.457	0.248	0.457	0.418	0.239	0.428	-0.029
DE	0.521	0.302	0.420	0.506	0.303	0.401	-0.019
DK	0.457	0.243	0.468	0.477	0.269	0.436	-0.032
EE	0.453	0.309	0.318	0.429	0.301	0.298	-0.020
EL	0.502	0.332	0.339	0.515	0.327	0.365	0.026
ES	0.454	0.324	0.286	0.493	0.333	0.325	0.038
FI	0.474	0.263	0.445	0.488	0.258	0.471	0.026
FR	0.477	0.296	0.379	0.471	0.275	0.416	0.037
HR	:	:	:	0.470	0.295	0.372	:
HU	0.515	0.252	0.511	0.467	0.288	0.383	-0.127
IE	0.513	0.299	0.417	0.517	0.280	0.458	0.041
IT	0.490	0.311	0.365	0.493	0.337	0.316	-0.049
LT	0.494	0.345	0.302	0.500	0.369	0.262	-0.040
LU	0.462	0.275	0.405	0.493	0.328	0.335	-0.070
LV	0.482	0.378	0.216	0.475	0.354	0.255	0.039
MT	0.435	0.281	0.354	0.451	0.287	0.364	0.010
NL	0.475	0.272	0.427	0.470	0.272	0.421	-0.006
PL	0.497	0.320	0.356	0.448	0.280	0.375	0.019
PT	0.525	0.362	0.310	0.526	0.321	0.390	0.079
RO	0.555	0.360	0.351	0.514	0.351	0.317	-0.034
SE	0.460	0.250	0.457	0.452	0.268	0.407	-0.049
SI	0.436	0.234	0.463	0.435	0.233	0.464	0.001
SK	0.423	0.238	0.437	0.371	0.209	0.437	-0.001
UK	0.514	0.332	0.354	0.512	0.340	0.336	-0.018
EU-27	0.476	0.295	0.378	0.471	0.294	0.373	-0.004

(*) The EU-27 average is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU27 Member States. *Source*: Elaboration on 2018 EU-SILC data.

Tab. A2.8: The redistributive effects of old age pensions, benefits and taxes in 2007 and 2017

	2007				2017				Change in the overall redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers			
	Old-age pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total redistribut.	Old-age pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total redistributi.	Old age pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total redistrib.
AT	0.115	0.049	0.047	0.211	0.105	0.052	0.049	0.206	-0.010	0.003	0.002	-0.005
BE	0.105	0.068	0.045	0.217	0.102	0.058	0.052	0.212	-0.002	-0.009	0.007	-0.005
BG	0.093	0.027	0.012	0.131	0.082	0.035	0.010	0.127	-0.011	0.009	-0.002	-0.004
CY	0.064	0.027	0.016	0.107	0.060	0.047	0.037	0.144	-0.004	0.020	0.021	0.037
CZ	0.116	0.051	0.042	0.209	0.111	0.032	0.037	0.179	-0.006	-0.020	-0.005	-0.030
DE	0.128	0.050	0.041	0.219	0.125	0.040	0.039	0.203	-0.003	-0.011	-0.002	-0.016
DK	0.082	0.090	0.043	0.214	0.090	0.079	0.039	0.208	0.008	-0.011	-0.004	-0.006
EE	0.091	0.026	0.028	0.144	0.069	0.037	0.023	0.128	-0.022	0.011	-0.005	-0.016
EL	0.112	0.018	0.041	0.170	0.147	0.026	0.015	0.188	0.036	0.008	-0.026	0.018
ES	0.074	0.027	0.030	0.130	0.086	0.039	0.036	0.160	0.012	0.012	0.006	0.030
FI	0.094	0.074	0.043	0.211	0.103	0.078	0.049	0.230	0.009	0.004	0.006	0.019
FR	0.109	0.050	0.022	0.181	0.106	0.057	0.033	0.196	-0.003	0.007	0.011	0.015
HR	:	:	:	:	0.100	0.035	0.041	0.175	:	:	:	:
HU	0.130	0.078	0.056	0.263	0.102	0.044	0.034	0.179	-0.028	-0.034	-0.022	-0.084
IE	0.056	0.108	0.051	0.214	0.059	0.092	0.087	0.237	0.003	-0.016	0.036	0.023
IT	0.122	0.017	0.040	0.179	0.091	0.025	0.041	0.156	-0.032	0.007	0.001	-0.023
LT	0.093	0.030	0.027	0.149	0.076	0.035	0.020	0.131	-0.017	0.005	-0.007	-0.018
LU	0.106	0.046	0.036	0.187	0.107	0.049	0.009	0.165	0.001	0.003	-0.027	-0.022
LV	0.061	0.020	0.024	0.104	0.070	0.025	0.026	0.121	0.009	0.006	0.002	0.017
MT	0.078	0.040	0.037	0.154	0.098	0.033	0.034	0.164	0.020	-0.007	-0.003	0.010
NL	0.099	0.053	0.052	0.203	0.092	0.055	0.052	0.198	-0.007	0.002	0.000	-0.005
PL	0.122	0.039	0.017	0.177	0.110	0.045	0.013	0.168	-0.012	0.007	-0.004	-0.009
PT	0.094	0.028	0.041	0.163	0.115	0.027	0.063	0.205	0.021	-0.001	0.022	0.042
RO	0.125	0.037	0.033	0.195	0.113	0.026	0.025	0.163	-0.013	-0.012	-0.008	-0.032
SE	0.101	0.073	0.037	0.210	0.083	0.065	0.037	0.184	-0.018	-0.008	0.000	-0.026
SI	0.098	0.050	0.054	0.202	0.102	0.049	0.051	0.202	0.004	-0.001	-0.003	0.000

SK	0.121	0.034	0.030	0.185	0.103	0.031	0.028	0.162	-0.018	-0.003	-0.002	-0.023
UK	0.084	0.056	0.043	0.182	0.08	0.062	0.03	0.172	-0.004	0.007	-0.013	-0.010
EU-27	0.100	0.047	0.036	0.182	0.097	0.045	0.036	0.177	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	-0.005

(*) The EU-27 average is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU27 Member States. *Source*: Elaboration on 2018 EU-SILC data.

Tab. A2.9: The between- and within-age-group redistributive effects of old-age pensions, benefits and taxes in 2007 and 2017

a. 2007

	Between age groups redistributive effects (reduction in between age group GE(2) market income inequality when applying each tax and benefit instrument sequentially)				Within age groups redistributive effects (reduction in within age group GE(2) market income inequality when applying each tax and benefit instrument sequentially)				The contribution of between age group redistributive effects to overall redistribution (%)			
	Pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total between redistribution	Pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total within redistribution	Old- age pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total redistribution
AT	0.062	0.002	0.003	0.067	0.114	0.077	0.060	0.250	0.196	0.006	0.009	0.211
BE	0.065	0.004	0.007	0.075	0.113	0.124	0.005	0.242	0.206	0.013	0.022	0.237
BG	0.036	0.002	0.004	0.041	0.122	0.048	0.003	0.172	0.169	0.009	0.019	0.192
CY	0.033	0.002	0.001	0.035	0.062	0.057	0.053	0.171	0.160	0.010	0.005	0.170
CZ	0.053	0.003	0.005	0.061	0.103	0.078	0.056	0.237	0.177	0.010	0.017	0.204
DE	0.080	0.000	0.005	0.085	0.149	0.098	0.044	0.291	0.212	0.000	0.013	0.225
DK	0.051	0.003	0.003	0.057	0.067	0.147	0.069	0.283	0.150	0.009	0.009	0.168
EE	0.049	-0.001	0.006	0.054	0.069	0.041	0.028	0.137	0.257	-0.005	0.031	0.283
EL	0.051	0.003	0.005	0.059	0.176	0.033	0.109	0.318	0.136	0.008	0.013	0.157
ES	0.029	-0.001	0.002	0.030	0.081	0.042	0.048	0.170	0.146	-0.005	0.010	0.151
FI	0.057	0.001	0.004	0.062	0.084	0.125	0.038	0.247	0.184	0.003	0.013	0.201
FR	0.039	0.001	0.000	0.040	0.166	0.105	0.083	0.353	0.099	0.003	0.000	0.102
HR	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
HU	0.055	0.003	0.003	0.060	0.151	0.131	0.085	0.367	0.129	0.007	0.007	0.141
IE	0.027	0.003	0.003	0.032	0.069	0.194	0.073	0.335	0.074	0.008	0.008	0.087
IT	0.054	0.000	0.002	0.056	0.166	0.040	0.086	0.291	0.156	0.000	0.006	0.161
LT	0.049	0.001	0.005	0.054	0.096	0.055	0.034	0.184	0.206	0.004	0.021	0.227
LU	0.047	0.001	0.002	0.050	0.101	0.066	0.041	0.208	0.182	0.004	0.008	0.194
LV	0.026	-0.001	0.003	0.028	0.074	0.039	0.029	0.142	0.153	-0.006	0.018	0.165
MT	0.034	0.002	0.004	0.040	0.068	0.050	0.053	0.171	0.161	0.009	0.019	0.190
NL	0.056	0.001	0.006	0.063	0.109	0.090	0.070	0.269	0.168	0.003	0.018	0.189
PL	0.047	0.002	0.001	0.050	0.170	0.067	0.023	0.259	0.152	0.006	0.003	0.161
PT	0.049	0.000	0.003	0.052	0.155	0.064	0.105	0.323	0.131	0.000	0.008	0.139
RO	0.058	0.003	0.006	0.066	0.191	0.079	0.046	0.315	0.152	0.008	0.016	0.173
SE	0.056	0.002	0.003	0.061	0.095	0.124	0.083	0.302	0.155	0.006	0.008	0.169
SI	0.044	0.005	0.005	0.053	0.080	0.063	0.068	0.210	0.167	0.019	0.019	0.201
SK	0.050	0.002	0.004	0.055	0.090	0.043	0.028	0.160	0.233	0.009	0.019	0.256
UK	0.051	0.003	0.006	0.060	0.119	0.107	0.096	0.321	0.135	0.008	0.016	0.158
EU-27	0.048	0.002	0.004	0.053	0.114	0.081	0.055	0.250	0.296	0.024	0.068	0.175

b. 2017

	Between age groups redistributive effects (reduction in between age group GE(2) market income inequality when applying each tax and benefit instrument sequentially)				Within age groups redistributive effects (reduction in within age group GE(2) market income inequality when applying each tax and benefit instrument sequentially)				The contribution of between age group redistributive effects to overall redistribution (%)			
	Pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total between redistribution	Pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total within redistribution	Old- age pensions	Benefits	Taxes	Total redistribution
AT	0.052	0.003	0.002	0.056	0.100	0.079	0.077	0.255	0.167	0.010	0.006	0.180
BE	0.055	0.001	0.003	0.058	0.087	-0.003	0.088	0.172	0.239	0.004	0.013	0.252
BG	0.037	0.001	0.005	0.042	0.221	0.141	-0.064	0.298	0.109	0.003	0.015	0.124
CY	0.032	0.001	0.002	0.035	0.074	0.081	0.081	0.235	0.119	0.004	0.007	0.130
CZ	0.057	0.001	0.005	0.062	0.070	0.040	0.032	0.142	0.279	0.005	0.025	0.304
DE	0.081	-0.001	0.006	0.086	0.170	0.094	0.015	0.278	0.223	-0.003	0.016	0.236
DK	0.053	0.004	0.003	0.060	0.102	0.148	0.108	0.358	0.127	0.010	0.007	0.144
EE	0.036	-0.002	0.003	0.037	0.043	0.049	0.024	0.115	0.237	-0.013	0.020	0.243
EL	0.049	0.001	0.001	0.050	0.374	0.070	0.082	0.526	0.085	0.002	0.002	0.087
ES	0.034	0.000	0.000	0.034	0.112	0.066	0.070	0.247	0.121	0.000	0.000	0.121
FI	0.060	0.001	0.004	0.065	0.094	0.120	0.068	0.282	0.173	0.003	0.012	0.187
FR	0.040	0.003	0.001	0.043	0.133	0.093	0.065	0.290	0.120	0.009	0.003	0.129
HR	0.042	0.001	0.003	0.045	0.103	0.054	0.066	0.222	0.157	0.004	0.011	0.169
HU	0.052	0.002	0.003	0.056	0.100	0.070	0.019	0.189	0.212	0.008	0.012	0.229
IE	0.032	0.003	0.005	0.039	0.110	0.199	0.337	0.645	0.047	0.004	0.007	0.057
IT	0.036	0.000	0.001	0.037	0.126	0.049	0.092	0.266	0.119	0.000	0.003	0.122
LT	0.041	-0.001	0.005	0.045	0.092	0.077	0.020	0.188	0.176	-0.004	0.021	0.193
LU	0.048	0.003	0.003	0.054	0.125	0.078	0.017	0.220	0.175	0.011	0.011	0.197
LV	0.035	-0.001	0.004	0.038	0.071	0.048	0.034	0.152	0.184	-0.005	0.021	0.200
MT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.127	0.045	0.052	0.224	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
NL	0.061	0.001	0.003	0.065	0.047	0.083	0.079	0.208	0.223	0.004	0.011	0.238
PL	0.039	0.000	0.001	0.040	0.103	0.059	0.014	0.175	0.181	0.000	0.005	0.186
PT	0.074	0.001	0.001	0.075	0.146	0.052	0.134	0.331	0.182	0.002	0.002	0.185
RO	0.050	0.002	0.002	0.053	0.131	0.040	0.033	0.203	0.195	0.008	0.008	0.207
SE	0.041	0.004	0.003	0.047	0.086	0.101	0.059	0.245	0.140	0.014	0.010	0.161
SI	0.049	0.004	0.004	0.057	0.070	0.058	0.054	0.182	0.205	0.017	0.017	0.238
SK	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.037	0.063	0.030	0.020	0.113	0.227	0.013	0.013	0.247
UK	0.045	0.003	0.003	0.050	0.117	0.110	0.064	0.290	0.132	0.009	0.009	0.147
EU-27	0.047	0.001	0.003	0.051	0.113	0.076	0.062	0.251	0.294	0.013	0.046	0.169

(*) The EU-27 average is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the relevant statistics for the EU-27 Member States. *Source*: Elaborations on 2008 and 2018 EU-SILC data

Annex to Chapter 3

To isolate the policy effect, we use a ceteris paribus approach where all factors except for the set of policy rules are kept constant. This is done by using the same underlying EU-SILC input data set for the simulation in two different policy years: data with gross incomes and population characteristics of the year t=0 (e.g. 2007) are applied to the policy years t=0 (e.g. 2007) and t=1 (e.g. 2014) of the period of interest. To express those changes in real terms, disposable incomes are adjusted by inflation based on the CPI. The analysis can be expressed as:

$$PE' = \frac{1}{\propto} I[\, f_1(p_1, \propto y_0)] - I[f_0(p_0, y_0)]$$

where I denotes the mean disposable income which depends on the policy system f_t (i.e. which policies do exist?) that in turn depends on the policy parameters p_t (e.g. how high are benefits?) and socio-economic characteristics like gross income, age and disabilities of the population y_0 provided in the microdata; α is the indexation parameter to make nominal values between t=0 and t=1 comparable.

To add an ex-ante approach both systems are additionally run with the data of t=1. This reduces the dependence of the policy effect on the population characteristics of the starting period. After weighting all possible combinations, we obtain[2]:

$$PE = \frac{1}{6}\left[\left(2 + \frac{1}{\propto}\right) * \left(I[\, f_1(p_1, y_1)] - \propto I\left[\, f_0\left(p_0, \frac{1}{\propto} y_1\right)\right]\right) + (2+\propto) * \left(\frac{1}{\propto} I[f_1(\, p_1, \propto y_0)] - I[f_0(p_0, y_0)]\right)\right]$$

This method cancels out changes in socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the population and creates a counterfactual scenario that allows us to assess how the income distribution would have changed through the implemented policy reforms between t=0 and t=1 if all other factors would have been kept constant. The resulting difference in the income distribution can thus only be attributed to changes in a country's tax-benefit policies (see for example Bargain and Callan 2010).

Changes to the market income can be written as:

$$ME = \frac{1}{6}\left[(2 + \alpha)\left(I\left[\frac{1}{\alpha} y_1\right] - I[y_0]\right) + (\frac{1}{\alpha} + 2\,)(I[y_1] - I[\alpha y_0])\right]$$

where $I[y_o]$ and $I[y_1]$ denote mean gross incomes in t=0 and t=1 respectively. $I\left[\frac{1}{\propto} y_1\right]$ is the counterfactual mean of gross incomes in t=0 using data of t=1, while $I[\alpha y_0]$ is the corresponding counterfactual mean of gross incomes in t=1 using data of t=0 (Paulus & Tasseva, 2018).

Isolating the automatic stabilizer effect is more sophisticated, as automatic stabilizers, by their very nature, react to changes in economic characteristics of the population. Following Paulus and Tasseva (2018) the effect of automatic stabilizers can be disentangled by:

[2] For decomposition details see Paulus and Tasseva (2018).

$$AE = \frac{1}{6}\left[\left(2 + \frac{1}{\propto}\right) * \left(I[f_1(p_1, y_1)] - I[f_1(p_1, \propto y_0)] * (I[y_1] - I[\propto y_0])\right) + (2 + \propto) * \left(I\left[f_0\left(p_0, \frac{1}{\propto} y_1\right)\right] - I[f_0(p_0, y_0)] * \left(I\left[\frac{1}{\propto} y_1\right] - I[y_0]\right)\right)\right].$$

Fig. A3.1 Changes in equivalised household incomes across EU-27; 2007 vs. 2014 (I)



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD; *FI: 2007-2015, *FR: 2006 - 2014,

Fig A3.2: Changes in equivalised household incomes across EU-27; 2007 vs. 2014 (II)



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD; *LU: 2007-2015, MT: 2009-2014, UK: 2008 - 2013

Fig. A3.3: Weighted EU-27 averages of changes in real disposable income; 2007 vs. 2009, 2009 vs. 2011 and 2011 vs. 2014



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD, * excluding DK, FR, MT, UK



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD, * excluding FI, FR, LU, UK



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD, * excluding FI, FR, LU, MT, UK



Annex to Chapter 4

Additional Tables and Figures commented in the main text

Fig. A4.1: Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on COFOG data

Fig. A4.2: Expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on COFOG data

Fig. A4.3: Expenditure on curative and rehabilitative care per capita



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.4: Expenditure on curative and rehabilitative care as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.5: Expenditure on medical goods per capita



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.6: Expenditure on medical goods as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.7: Expenditure on long-term care as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.8: Social expenditure on families and children as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.9: Expenditure on tertiary education per capita



Source: elaborations on COFOG data

Fig. A4.10: Expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP



Source: elaborations on COFOG data

Annex to Section 4.3

Fig. A4.11: Health care spending share of GDP



Source: elaborations on Eurostat data

Fig. A4.12: Share of Health spending by age for the Netherlands (as a share of total health spending)



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.13: Share of long-term care spending on GDP 2017



Source: elaborations on OECD data

Fig. A4.14: Long-term care share in health spending (in %) in 2016



(1) Including 2016 data for Poland.
(2) 2016.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: hlth_sha11_hc)

Source: elaborations on Eurostat data

Fig. A4.15: Per capita total LTC expenditure and per capita GDP (constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year) 2002-2015.



(*) LTC expenditure per capita is the sum of social and health LTC expenditure per capita. Per capita total LTC expenditure in constant prices, constant PPPs, 2010 US Dollars. Own work using data from OECD Stats. AUSTL: Australia; AUSTI: Austria; BEL: Belgium; CAN: Canada; CZE: Czechia; DEN: Denmark; EST: Estonia; FIN: Finland; FRA: France; GER: Germany; GRE: Greece; HUN: Hungary; ICE: Iceland; IRE: Ireland; ITA: Italy; KOR: Korea; LAT: Latvia; LUX: Luxembourg; NET: Netherlands; NOR: Norway; POL: Poland; POR: Portugal; SLR: Slovak Republic; SLO: Slovenia; SP: Spain; SWE: Sweden; SWI: Switzerland; US: United States. The line corresponds to the prediction for per capita total LTC expenditure from estimation of a fractional polynomial of percentage of per capita GDP and older and 95% the confidence interval. *Source*: elaborations on Eurostat data

Fig. A4.16: Per capita total LTC expenditure and percentage of population aged 65 and older (2002-2015).



(*) LTC expenditure per capita is the sum of social and health LTC expenditure per capita. Variables in constant prices, constant PPPs, 2010 US Dollars. Own work using data from OECD Stats. The line corresponds to the prediction for per capita total LTC expenditure from estimation of a fractional polynomial of percentage of population aged 65 and older and 95% the confidence interval. *Source*: elaborations on Eurostat data

Fig. A4.17: Per capita total LTC expenditure (LTC) and per capita total healthcare expenditure (HCE) 2002-2015



(*) LTC expenditure per capita is the sum of social and health LTC expenditure per capita. Healthcare expenditure per capita does not include LTC expenditure related to health services. *Source*: elaborations on Eurostat data

Health Care Reforms

Health and long-term care do exhibit some reform trends, which we summarise in two tables below. Table A.4.4 in Annex reports the main cross-country changes in payments for health care. Some countries still have informal payments for health care providers (EL, AT and many Eastern European countries such as PL, HU, BG and RO). Another feature has been the rise in informal payments and cost sharing amidst the Great Recession. Finally, we show that there have been some changes in coverage and unmet needs including a reduction of the health care coverage to migrants and changes in the cost sharing, that result in an increase in out of pockets payments ("OOP").

In DE, we observe a rise in voluntary health insurance which can influence the prompt access to some health services and even surgery when there are waiting times such as surgery for hip and knee operations. In Austria over the last 10 years, absolute out of pocket spending increased by 36.4%, from €4610 million in 2006 to €6287 million in 2015, while its share of total health expenditure slightly decreased by 0.3 percentage points in the same period (OECD 2017c; Statistics Austria 2017), and cost-sharing differs across different supplementary health insurance funds. Special Eurobarometer on corruption (2017) found that 9% of survey respondents in AT reported having provided their physician with an additional payment, a valuable gift or hospital donation to obtain faster treatment. This is

clearly above the EU27 average of 5% and higher than in BG, LV and PL as reported from the Eurobarometer survey in 2013[3].

Tab. A4.1: Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of the population that reveals that has undergone unmet needs for a variety of circumstances[4])

	2008	2010	2013	2014	2018
BE	0.5	0.4	1.9	2.5	1.8
BG	15.3	10.5	8.9	5.6	1.9
CZ	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.3
DK	0.6	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.3
DE	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.6	0.2
EE	7.3	4.8	8.4	11.3	16.4
IE	1.8	2.1	3.3	3.7	2.0
EL	5.4	5.5	9.0	10.9	8.8
ES	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.6	0.2
FR	1.9	1.9	2.6	2.8	1.2
HR	:	6.3	3.3	3.3	1.4
IT	5.2	5.2	7.0	7.0	2.4
CY	2.8	4.1	4.4	4.7	1.4
LV	9.9	15.1	13.8	12.5	6.2
LT	5.7	2.6	3.2	3.7	2.2
LU	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.3
HU	3.4	1.7	2.6	2.5	0.8
MT	0.7	1.6	0.9	1.1	0.2
NL	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.2
AT	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.1
PL	6.0	8.3	8.8	7.8	4.2
PT	1.1	2.0	3.0	3.5	2.1
RO	11.1	11.1	10.9	9.8	4.9
SI	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	3.3
SK	1.3	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.6
FI	0.8	3.9	4.3	3.3	4.7
SE	2.6	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.5
UK	1.0	1.0	1.6	2.1	4.5
IS	1.7	3.1	:	4.4	:
NO	1.3	1.4	1.5	0.8	1.4

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

In some Southern European countries such as ES, we observe a rise in out of pocket spending as a result of the increase in medicine co-payments for older age individuals. Overall in ES, average cost sharing in 2015 had increased to 24% from 20% in 2009, which compares to an average EU co-payment of 15% (Garcia-Armesto et al. 2010, OECD and European Observatory of Health Systems 2017b).

In Nordic countries, there are low inequalities in the use of health care, but significant inequalities in prevention and especially in the update of private supplementary health insurance, such as in DE. In Eastern European countries, health care is fragmented and out of pocket payments are still large, while countries like PL exhibit some degree of informal

[3] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28867153/

[4] it presents a variety of reasons why needs for healthcare services are not met, for example because of cost (too expensive), distance (too far to travel) or timeliness (waiting lists) which makes it possible to identify causes of limitations in access to healthcare services.

payments and 9% of the population are still not covered by the mainstream health insurance scheme (OECD and European Observatory of Health Systems 2017a).

Other reforms influencing intergenerational fairness refer to changes in health coverage of migrants and spending cuts amidst the Great Recession. A number of countries exhibited changes in user charges. Specifically, in some of these countries such as ES, elderly people who were exempted from cost-sharing lost their exemption, which is likely to reduce intergenerational inequality in health care use. Some countries such as EL faced a so-called 'triple hit', namely a reduction in their disposable income followed high rising under charges for prescription drugs and a reduction in health care service availability (Kyriopoulos et al. 2019). Indeed, there was a capping of health care spending in EL in 2012, and significant health care spending cuts in the UK and IE.

Table A4.1 reports the share of the population with self-reported unmet need for medical care as measured by EU-SILC. The table displays a large heterogeneity. In countries like BE and EE unmet need for medical care increased over the last decade, whilst in BG, PL, LT and RO and HR it largely decreased. In a number of other countries, it remained stable.

Long-term care reforms

Long-term care (LTC) is at the forefront of a new wave of reforms extending the role of the public sector in this area. However, unlike in other areas of social services, we still know little about what the drivers of LTC investment are. Most health care programs in place are designed to fund only a limited intensity of post-acute care, hence households might end facing significant costs to fund LTC in the absence of public support, which might end up impoverishing them.

Tab. A4.2: Main Long-term Care reforms affecting intergenerational fairness in the last decade

	Entitlement	Financing	Cost-sharing
AT	Universal	Mandatory social health insurance scheme	LTCI benefits are capped – user tops up or means-tested social assistance supports.
FR	Universal	Decentralised (many actors – complex flows)	Income related – from 0-80% of total cost.
DE	Universal	Mandatory social health insurance scheme	LTCI benefits are capped – user tops up or means-tested social assistance supports.
IT	Universal	Tax funded, fragmented (central, regional, local)	Substantial income related co-payments – up to 100% of cost.
NL	Universal	Mandatory social health insurance scheme	Co-payments by user related to income
ES	Universal	Mandatory central government	Co-payments by user related to income (up to 90% of cost) reserved amount
SE	Universal	Decentralised	Co-payments by user related to income. Reserved amount
UK	Means-tested	Decentralised	Means-tested co-payments up to 100% of cost.
PL	Means Tested	Centralised	Cash supports

(*) Year: Expenditure from 2012. *Sources*: OECD Health Data 2010, ANCIEN study country reports. (1) Year 2010. 'Inst' refers to institutional care, 'home' refers to home care, and 'telecare' refers to telecare. Information refers to the main systems where information can be verified.

The most obvious pressure for LTC reforms comes from an increasing demand resulting from the ageing of the population (increasing the potential demand for care; see Table A4.2). Arguably, as already pointed out, the most important determinant of LTC spending refers to female labour market participation as middle age women have traditionally been the caregivers in most societies. Another reason for reform is that health systems are increasingly becoming more inefficient in some western countries, as a result of excessive hospital care use (Costa-Font et al. 2018). In Spain, the SAAD Act 39/2006, encompassed both the universalisation of the public subsidisation of health and community care services along with a caregiver allowance to support the provision of informal care. However, as part of its budget cuts, the amount of the long-term care subsidy was slashed significantly (Royal Decree 20/2012 of 13 July 2012). Finally, the subsidy for those receiving an equivalent cash allowance to pay for informal caregivers was reduced between 15% and 25%, according to the degree of dependency.

In IT and ES public involvement related to long-term care, characterised by by low public expenditure and caregiving being largely and informally provided by family, friends and relatives (Costa-Font 2010b). However, unlike the Netherlands, where insurance design was redefined, in ES we see major reform expanding public insurance to allow for further public funding. More specifically, in 2007, the Dependency Act (Sistema para al autonomía y la atención a la dependencia, known by its Spanish acronym SAAD) expanded public insurance to the entire population, subject to a needs test but previous means tests were lifted. SAAD allowed individuals to receive a subsidy or care support after a personal care plan was designed that involved either in-kind formal care provision or a caregiving allowance. This LTC system design mimicked some of the design characteristics (e.g., setting out a different subsidy by degree of dependency and type of care) of the German scheme instigated in 1994 (see Rothgang 2010)[5]. In 2011, caregiving allowances for major dependency could amount to 530€ and 300€ for the severely disabled which compare to a minimum wage of 641.40 €/month. Hence, there was a strong moral hazard incentive. Only a few months after the implementation of SAAD, about 50% of its beneficiaries were claiming caregiving allowances, so the system offers a choice subsidy or supports. The austerity reforms that took place in ES in 2012 led to a significant reduction in both the cash and the in-kind LTC subsidies, by 25 and 15% respectively (Costa-Font et al. 2016). Hence, consistently with the NL, the coverage was further redefined to adjust to the new economic situation.

Among other reforms the NL is one of the most interesting as its the most comprehensive LTC programmes and spends amongst the highest percentage on LTC in the EU as a portion of the health budget. DE and the UK have a similar LTC health spending, but markedly different per capita expenditures on LTC and structures. While the NL and DE may have higher LTC financing, they have implemented significant reforms to their systems to improve efficiency and/or choice of care. To the contrary, there has been little to no reform in PL or HU, where there continues to be unmet need.

DE's LTC system is interesting in many ways. Firstly, while residents are required to have LTC insurance, there is a choice between social or private LTC insurance. Both social and private insurance must provide a mandatory package of basic benefits and can expand upon this package with other offerings. Similar to the NL, the presence of a central mandate on minimum benefits reduces or eliminates inequity between the regions. In DE, there is no difference in LTC interregional benefits. Though LTC insurance is mandatory, it does not

[5] However, in ES the advocates of a Social Security based German-style LTCI lost to those that proposed a tax based and regionally organised LTC system.

cover all the costs associated with LTC and individuals are expected to use private assets to cover the difference, before falling back on social care possibilities. The mandatory insurance provides benefits of risk pooling. DE has been running on a surplus, associated with its positive economic situation, so it is perhaps less surprising that most recent reforms in 2017 have focused on expanding care benefits to include less severe levels of dependency and dementia.

The NL's LTC model and recent reforms reflects a balance or shift from a centralised model, similar to DE, to a two-level national and regional model. Two key reforms were the implementation of the WMO (Social Support Act) and WLZ (Long-Term Care Act). These reforms resulted in the split of the previous LTC fund into a national system (WLZ), with regional office administration, and the municipal system. The national (WLZ) system was tasked with providing more intensive services of residential/nursing care. The municipal system was left in charge of providing in-kind services which were defined by the WMO, though had freedom on how to deliver the services. The municipal (WMO) budget was still set nationally. This is a situation where the accepted tenders/contracts were at a price so low that it was unsustainable for service providers. Therefore, adjustments to reforms were needed to ensure a minimum price was paid. A similar situation was seen in the UK, where local providers were unable to stay in business at the price local authorities were willing to pay. This raises the separate issue of ensuring a sufficiently funded supply side market. The Dutch reforms resulted in a decrease in the usage of residential care and an increase in home care – which is both less costly and more desired by the elderly population.

In contrast to more Northern countries, ES and IT operate on the basis of more intense family support. Whilst the Italian LTC model is mainly cash based, ES implemented a long-term care reform in 2007 where a tax funded system of subsidies, providing both cash and in-kind care to old age individuals, was implemented. However, the economic downturn put fiscal pressure on the LTC system, which resulted in freezing and limiting new accesses, delay in needed infrastructure and decreased funding. While these cuts improved the financial stability in terms of funding of (less) services provided, there continues to be access issues and waiting lists, where a notable percentage of individuals will have died before receiving access to services. It may come as a surprise that there was oversupply of residential care for a period, but this reflected the cultural and familial preference for at home care.

IT's population demonstrated a strong preference for at home or family provided care, which was addressed through the very flexible Companion Allowance. Individuals could use this allowance as they wanted and it was not dependent on showing any financial need for cash funds, only on the verification of their level of dependency. In 2017, a national fund was established which was managed regionally. While there were federal priorities for the regions, there was a large amount of instability between regions. With both the Companion Allowance and the National Fund, it is difficult to connect specific funds to specific LTC services and to compare IT's LTC regional systems. Both ES' and IT's systems reflect strong cultural preferences for family provided care, but differences in who acts as the ultimate payer and decider of services. While the NL and DE have centrally defined benefits to ensure a reasonable level of equity, there does not seem to be the same mandate in either ES' or IT's systems, which could contribute to the large differences observed between regions.

In IT, the most common financial scheme has been the aforementioned 'Companion Allowance' (CA), a cash allowance programme for individuals with severe dpendence, which provides support to 13.5% of the population and provides a cash transfer comparable to the Spanish SAAD 505€ in 2017 (Pavolini et al. 2016). Again, like in ES, the CA was affected by the austerity reforms as public funding for LTC services for the elderly were slashed by

25% between 2005 and 2016 (Jessoula et al. 2018). Only some regions such as Emilia Romagna toped up the CA with a means tested cash allowance and expanded the support for home care. However, overall, IT's system has remained cash-based over time and relies mainly on informal caregivers (Pavolini et al. 2016).

FR's model is based on cash payments with complementary insurance that encompasses low premiums and high uptake (Doty et al 2015). The fact that the main LTC scheme, the APA (Allocation Personalisee d'Autonomie), a caregiving cash allowance, is means tested, has led to a demand for complementary insurance to cover the share of care not publicly funded. What sets France apart from the other countries is that there is a supply of private insurance, widely available through employment sponsored insurance policies. Even though its share of LTC expenditure is low, private insurance covered as much as 11% of the FR elderly population in 2012 (Doty et al. 2015).

Education reforms

The attendance of children from the age of 4 in early childhood education has expanded, and is, by now, almost universal in the EU. There are also high rates of participation in early childhood education by children from the age of 3. Yet the 90% participation rate for the general children population decreases to 77.8% in the group of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Experiencing education in the early years of life has been found to be beneficial for better learning outcomes later on in life, and particularly for children from socio-economically disadvantaged homes. The challenge of ensuring equal access to education in the early years needs to be addressed.

In 2017, EU Member States invested, on average, 4.6% of their gross domestic product (GDP) in their education systems. This proportion has been slightly but continuously decreasing in recent years, down from 4.9% in 2014. On average, EU Member States spend about one third of their public expenditure for education on pre-primary and primary education; 41% on secondary education; and 15% on tertiary education.

Table A4.3 displays the share of early leaver from education and training by country. In 2018, early leaving from education and training stood at 10.6% in the EU. The countries with the highest rates are ES (17.9%), MT (17.5%) and RO (16.4%), IT (14.5%), BG (12.7%), HU (12.5%) and PT (11.8%). Overall, we observe that the rate decreased by -3.3pp in the EU between 2010 and 2018. In some countries like PT, ES and EL, the reduction even exceed -10 percentage points. However, in some countries like RO the reductions were more modest. In other countries, like SE, the rate increased however.

Tab. A4.3: Percentage of Early leavers from education and training

	2010	2014	2016	2017	2018
EU27 (from 2020)	13.8	11.1	10.6	10.5	10.5
BE	11.9	9.8	8.8	8.9	8.6
BG	12.6	12.9	13.8	12.7	12.7
CZ	4.9	5.5	6.6	6.7	6.2
DK	11.5	8.1	7.5	8.8	10.4
DE	11.8	9.5	10.3	10.1	10.3
EE	11.0	12.0	10.9	10.8	11.3
IE	11.9	6.7	6.0	5.0	5.0
EL	13.5	9.0	6.2	6.0	4.7
ES	28.2	21.9	19.0	18.3	17.9
FR	12.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	8.7
HR	5.2	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.3
IT	18.6	15.0	13.8	14.0	14.5
CY	12.7	6.8	7.6	8.5	7.8
LV	12.9	8.5	10.0	8.6	8.3
LT	7.9	5.9	4.8	5.4	4.6
LU	7.1	6.1	5.5	7.3	6.3
HU	10.8	11.4	12.4	12.5	12.5
MT	23.8	20.9	19.2	17.7	17.4
NL	10.1	8.7	8.0	7.1	7.3
AT	8.3	7.0	6.9	7.4	7.3
PL	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.0	4.8
PT	28.3	17.4	14.0	12.6	11.8
RO	19.3	18.1	18.5	18.1	16.4
SI	5.0	4.4	4.9	4.3	4.2
SK	4.7	6.7	7.4	9.3	8.6
FI	10.3	9.5	7.9	8.2	8.3
SE	6.5	6.7	7.4	7.7	7.5

Source: elaborations on Eurostat data

Childcare reforms

The European Pillar of Social Rights declares that 'children have the right to affordable early childhood education and care of good quality'. Some countries provide a legal entitlement to an ECEC place, while others make ECEC attendance compulsory. However, currently only one European country – LV – guarantees a free public ECEC place for every child from as early as 1-and-a-half year. In other countries, most parents have to pay for ECEC in the earliest years (Motiejunaite-Schulmeister et al. 2019).

In Europe, most families have to pay fees for ECEC for the youngest group of children. The availability of ECEC free of charge increases noticeably at age 3 and this trend continues with each year of age, becoming almost universal across Europe during the last year before compulsory primary education starts. Only seven EU Member States (DK, DE, EE, LV, SI, FI and SE) guarantee a place in ECEC for each child from an early age (6-18 months). A place in publicly subsidised ECEC is guaranteed from the age of 3 or a little earlier in the three Communities of BE, as well as in CZ, ES, FR, LU, HU and PL. During the last five years, five countries (CZ, HR, LT, FI, and SE) have introduced compulsory ECEC for one year prior to starting primary education.

Attending the last year of ECEC has been made compulsory in CZ (from the school year starting September 2017), HR (2014), LT (2016), FI (2015) and SE (2018). Two countries have made compulsory attendance longer than one year. In HU, ECEC has been

compulsory for children from the age of 3 since September 2015. EL is gradually lowering the starting age of compulsory pre-primary school attendance from age 5 to age 4 (between 2018-2021). Three countries are planning to introduce compulsory ECEC: from September 2019, it will be compulsory from age 3 in FR (final parliamentary discussion in progress); in BE and SK, legislation is in preparation to make the last year of ECEC before primary education compulsory from September 2020.

From around age 3, almost half of European countries offer free ECEC for at least a few hours per week. In many countries, this is a period of transition when children change from a childcare-type to an education-type setting. Most of these countries combine free ECEC with a place guarantee (BE, ES, FR, LU, HU and PL). The situation is similar in IT and MT where there is no explicit legal entitlement. In IE, a free pre-school education programme of 0-16 weekly hours is available for children from around age 3. Monthly ECEC fees for children under 3 years in euro PPP tend to be the lowest in the Baltic and Balkan countries, as well in SE. Moreover, in LV, LT, RO and ME, ECEC is entirely free; parents only have to pay for a child's meals.

Fig. A4.18: Health System satisfaction 2006 – 2016



Source: elaborations on ESS data

Fig. A4.19: Education System satisfaction 2006 – 2016



Source: elaborations on ESS data

Fig. A4.20: Life satisfaction 2006 – 2016



Source: elaborations on ESS data

Fig. A4.21: Age effects on life satisfaction



Source: elaborations on ESS data

Annex to Section 4.4

Fig. A4.22: Estimated probabilities of financial burden of medical care in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.23: Estimated probabilities of financial burden of medicines in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Annex to Section 4.5

In the case of health expenditure, we use an insurance-based approach to differentiate individuals in terms of their health needs. The specific monetary amount to be attributed to each individual is computed, for each specific country and year, on the basis of the following expression

$$T = h\frac{\omega_{agi}}{\bar{\omega}} \ (1) \ ,$$

where h is the health expenditure per capita, $\bar{\omega}$ is the average self-assed health status (e.g. good, fair, bad, very bad) of the population and ω_{agi} is a specific individual weight computed using an approach similar to the one proposed by D'Ambrosio and Gigliarano (2009) and Zheng (2006) (this approach uses a specific health matrix to compute the individual weights as the average self-assessed health status for each of the different considered sub-groups in the population). In our case, we compute ω_{agi} as the average self-assessed status by age class, gender and quintiles of household disposable income. To compute the extended income and analyse how it influences intergenerational fairness, we use six different age classes: less than 25 years old; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-65; over 65 years old.[6]

[6] Note that in the EU-SILC individuals below 16 years old have no information on their health status. Therefore, they are attributed, according to their gender, the average health status of those in the same quintile of equivalised household income and aged between 17 and 24 years old to compute ω_{agi}.

Fig. A4.24: Median disposable (Panel A) and extended (Panel B) income



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.25: Median disposable income by age class in 2006



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.26: Median extended income by age class in 2006



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.27: Median disposable income by age class in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.28: Median extended income by age class in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.29: Gini coefficient on disposable income



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.30: Gini coefficient on the extended income



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.31: Gini coefficient on disposable (Panel A) and extended (Panel B) income by age class in 2006



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.32: Gini coefficient on disposable income by age class in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.33: Gini coefficient on extended income by age class in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.34: Relative poverty on disposable income

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.35: Relative poverty on extended income



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.36: Relative poverty on disposable income by age class in 2006



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.37: Relative poverty on extended income by age class in 2006



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.38: Relative poverty on disposable income by age class in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.39: Relative poverty on extended income by age class in 2017



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.40: Within-age groups inequality on disposable income



Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Fig. A4.41: Within-age groups inequality on extended income

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.1: Health care spending a Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a number of European countries

	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Austria	10.2	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.3
Belgium	10.0	10.4	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.4
Czech Rep.	6.9	7.7	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.5
Denmark	10.3	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.1	10.5
Estonia	6.3	6.1	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.4
Finland	8.9	9.5	9.7	9.4	9.2	9.1
France	11.2	11.6	11.5	11.5	11.3	11.2
Germany	11.0	11.0	11.1	11.1	11.2	11.2
Greece	9.6	8.0	8.1	8.3	8.0	7.8
Hungary	7.5	7.1	7.0	7.1	6.9	6.6
Iceland	8.5	8.3	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.3
Ireland	10.5	9.7	7.3	7.4	7.2	7.1
Italy	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.9	8.8	8.8
Korea	6.2	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.6	8.1
Latvia	6.1	5.5	5.7	6.2	6.0	5.9
Lithuania	6.8	6.2	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.8
Luxembourg	7.0	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.4
Netherlands	10.2	10.6	10.3	10.3	10.1	9.9
Norway	8.9	9.3	10.1	10.5	10.4	10.2
Poland	6.4	6.2	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.3
Portugal	9.8	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.1
Slovak Rep.	7.8	6.9	6.8	7.0	6.7	6.7
Slovenia	8.6	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.2	7.9
Spain	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.0	8.9	8.9
Sweden	8.5	11.1	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0
Switzerland	10.7	11.5	11.9	12.2	12.3	12.2
UK	8.4	9.8	9.7	9.7	9.6	9.8

Source: elaborations on OECD data

Tab. A4.2: Long Term care spending as a Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a number of European countries

	2006	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	1.26	1.24	1.50	1.47	1.49	1.54	1.54
Belgium	1.95	1.96	2.17	2.18	2.24	2.28	2.19
Bulgaria	:	:	:	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Switzerland	:	:	2.07	2.13	2.21	2.23	2.25
Cyprus	:	:	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24
Czechia	:	:	:	:	:	0.86	0.94
Germany	1.53	1.50	1.68	1.67	1.71	1.77	1.79
Denmark	:	:	2.53	2.47	2.45	2.46	2.49
Estonia	0.18	0.20	0.30	0.27	0.27	0.30	0.33
Greece	:	:	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.05
Spain	0.65	0.66	0.88	0.85	0.87	0.86	0.85
Finland	1.35	1.37	1.60	1.67	1.75	1.72	1.68
France	1.17	1.23	1.62	1.62	1.67	1.72	1.75
Croatia	:	:	:	:	:	0.18	0.21
Hungary	0.27	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.27	0.29	0.30
Ireland	:	:	:	2.35	2.42	2.27	2.18
Iceland	:	:	:	1.69	1.65	1.71	1.70
Italy	:	:	:	:	0.91	0.93	0.94
Liechtenstein	:	:	:	:	:	0.79	0.80
Lithuania	0.23	0.34	0.61	0.52	0.48	0.47	0.54
Luxembourg	:	:	:	1.25	1.03	1.05	1.04
Latvia	:	:	:	:	:	0.29	0.30
Netherlands	2.36	2.29	2.61	2.69	2.96	2.98	2.95
Norway	:	:	:	2.47	2.50	2.57	2.68
Poland	:	:	:	:	:	0.38	0.36
Portugal	0.11	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.23
Romania	:	:	:	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.27
Sweden	0.65	0.64	0.64	2.74	2.86	2.90	2.90
Slovenia	:	:	:	:	:	:	0.87
Slovakia	:	:	:	:	0.02	0.02	0.02
UK	:	:	:	:	:	1.76	1.74

Source: elaborations on Eurostat data

Tab. A4.3: Education expenditure in the European Union (as a % Gross Domestic Product)

	2006	2007	2008	2011	2012	2014	2016
Belgium	5.98	6.00	6.43	6.55	6.56	6.43	6.29
Bulgaria	4.04	3.88	4.44	3.82	4.06	3.93	4.09
Czechia	4.42	4.05	3.92	4.51	3.95	3.79	3.77
Denmark	7.97	7.81	7.68	8.75	:	:	7.33
Germany	4.43	4.49	4.57	4.98	4.61	4.52	4.53
Estonia	4.70	4.72	5.61	5.16	4.85	:	:
Ireland	4.73	4.92	5.67	6.15	5.32	3.77	:
Greece	:	:	:	:	3.58	3.68	3.41
Spain	4.26	4.34	4.62	4.82	4.18	4.16	4.07
France	5.61	5.62	5.62	5.68	5.51	5.47	5.45
Croatia	4.04	4.02	4.32	4.21	:	:	:
Italy	4.67	4.27	4.56	4.29	4.16	4.10	4.04
Cyprus	7.02	6.95	7.45	7.87	6.14	6.17	5.77
Latvia	5.13	5.07	5.71	4.96	4.91	5.33	4.40
Lithuania	4.82	4.64	4.88	5.17	:	4.12	3.67
Luxembourg	3.41	3.15	:	:	:	3.90	3.57
Hungary	5.44	5.29	5.10	4.71	3.98	4.26	4.19
Malta	6.45	6.18	5.72	7.96	5.60	4.89	4.47
Netherlands	5.50	5.32	5.50	5.93	5.59	5.40	5.18
Austria	5.40	5.33	5.47	5.80	5.49	5.43	5.25
Poland	5.25	4.91	5.08	4.94	4.94	4.81	4.56
Portugal	5.07	5.1	4.89	5.27	5.20	4.79	4.90
Romania	:	4.25	:	3.07	2.67	2.72	2.69
Slovenia	5.72	5.15	5.20	5.68	5.12	4.64	4.48
Slovakia	3.80	3.62	3.61	4.06	4.01	4.59	3.94
Finland	6.18	5.9	6.10	6.76	:	6.75	6.06
Sweden	6.75	6.61	6.76	6.82	7.17	7.05	7.06
UK	5.38	5.29	5.28	5.98	5.89	5.68	5.36
Iceland	7.55	7.36	7.56	7.36	6.84	6.84	6.67
Liechtenstein	2.05	1.92	2.05	2.53	:	:	:
Norway	6.49	6.66	6.40	6.66	6.45	6.72	6.94
	5.28	4.88	4.95	5.28	:	5.08	5.05

Source: elaborations on Eurostat data

Tab. A4.4: Health Care Systems affecting intergenerational equity 2009-2019

	Coverage of statutory insurance (unmet needs)	Informal payments	Out of pocket payments and private insurance
AT	Comprehensive coverage, low unmet needs and annual aggregate of prescription fees for medicines is capped for all at 2 % of personal income.	Private payments and 7.4% were offered earlier treatment when visiting the physicians'private practices (Czypionka et al. 2013).	OOP spending represented just under 19 % of total health expenditure in Austria. Private voluntary health insurance (VHI) covered approximately 37 % of the population in 2017.
BE	Comprehensive coverage, but co-payments are common and high inequalities as about 7% (0.1%) of people in the lowest (highest) income quintile reported unmet medical needs, but dental care is covered.	No informal payments reported	OOP spending represents 18 % of all health spending
BG	10-15% of the population not covered by statutory health insurance, Self-reported unmet needs for medical care was 2 % in 2017, a decline of 13 percentage points from the level reported in 200832.6 % of Bulgarians experienced difficulty and 54.8 % reported some difficulty in obtaining medicines in 2017.	Informal payments are reported for 8.2% in 2011 (Sterpurko et al. 2017).	At 46.6 %, Bulgaria reported the highest share of OOP spending in the EU. OOP medical spending, excluding long-term care, accounted for 6.3 % of final household consumption
CZ	The health system provides broad coverage with many benefits and low cost-sharing. only 0.5 % of the surveyed population reported unmet needs	Informal payments are uncommon	Private health spending stood at 18 % of total health spending in 2017 and Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, which stood at 14.8 % in 2017, are slightly below the EU average. There are annual ceilings on co-payments for prescribed medicines.
HR	Comprehensive mandatory health insurance system, with most types of health services included and low rate for self-reported unmet needs for medical care (1.6 %).	No informal payments reported	HU has a high share of public expenditure on health and OOP expenditure (10.5 %) is clearly below the EU average
DK	Comprehensive coverage except for dental care over 4 % of Danish people reported some unmet needs for dental care	No informal payments reported	OOP accrues for 14 % of health care costs, lowest in the EU as a whole
FR	Coverage is universal ad unmet needs for medical care due to cost, distance or waiting times are very low, with only 1 %.	No informal payments	Private voluntary insurance plays an important role in France, accounting for about 7 % of total spending mainly to cover co-payments on health services, pharmaceuticals, eyeglasses and dental care. The remaining 9 % is paid directly out of pocket by households, the lowest share across EU countries.
DE	Share with unmet needs is close to zero, except for dental care	No informal payments	Below EU average out of pocket expenses but in 2016, almost one in four Germans had complementary health insurance.
EL	Of the 10 % of households with unmet needs, four out of five cite cost as the main barrier to accessing care. Cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals increased from 13 % in 2010 to 18 % in 2013 (Yfantopoulos 2018).	Informal payments represent more than a quarter of OOP payments, raising serious concerns about equity	High levels of OOP payments, at 35 % of health spending, as a share of household budget in the EU (4.2 % compared to the EU average of 2.2 %). Voluntary health insurance plays only a minor role and accounted for 4 % of total health spending in 2017.
HU	Limited coverage, Almost 12 % of households in Hungary face some spending on health that exceeded their capacity to pay in 2015. High out-of-pocket costs, particularly for pharmaceuticals. In addition, access to care is impeded by shortages of health professionals 1.0 % of the population reported that they could not access care in 2017 because of waiting lists, costs or distance from care.	Informal payments are smaller at in the region of 1-4% by reported by 20.8% in 2011 (Sterpurko 2017)	Out-of-pocket (OOP) spending accounts for 27 %, almost twice the EU average.

IT	Rising cost-sharing requirements for many health services and pharmaceuticals in several regions. Co-payments are required for diagnostic procedures, pharmaceuticals, specialist visits in outpatient settings and unjustified (non-urgent) interventions in hospital emergency departments. About 2 % of the population reported unmet needs for medical care in 2017.	No evidence of informal payments	Following the economic crisis, the share of OOP payments in health spending increased from 21 % in 2009 to 23.5 % in 2017, and cost-sharing increased for many health services and is above the EU average.
PL	Compulsory health insurance covers only 91%. About 7% of the population reports some unmet needs.	17% reported by Polish report to have paid informal payments (Stepurko et al. 2015).	OOP expenditure is 25% of total health spending in 2015.
PT	Comprehensive coverage. Some 3% of the Portuguese population reported unmet medical care needs due to cost, distance or waiting time (2015), and 5.4% of people from low-income households reported going without a medical examination when needed for financial reasons in 2015.	No evidence of informal payments	Out-of-pocket payments in Portugal represent 28% of total health expenditure through modest levels of catastrophic expenditures from private spending on health in PT (Barros & Borges. 2017).
NL	Dutch health system was based on social insurance combined with a private insurance scheme covering the better-off. Long-term care was reformed in 2015 in order to contain costs Municipalities took on responsibility for social care, but with a reduced budget irregular migrants have to pay their incurred health costs out-of-pocket.	No evidence of informal payments	With the 2006 abolition of the private insurance scheme, irregular migrants have to pay their incurred health costs out-of-pocket. As a result of the rising deductible, out-of-pocket spending has been rising as a share of total health expenditure – although at 12.3% in 2015 it still remained below the EU average.
RO	Levels of unmet needs due to geographical barriers are some of the highest in the EU. Cost is creating a major obstacle to access for certain new treatment. 11.1% of people from low-income households reported going without a medical examination.	Informal payments are widespread 28% reported in a 2014 Eurobarometer that they had to give an additional payment.	OOP spending in RO represents 21.3% of total health expenditure up from 18.5% in 2005, mainly due to pharmaceuticals and direct payments. However, the magnitude is a lower bound given the importance of informal payments.
ES	Reduced coverage for pharmaceuticals among old age, and dental care is not covered	No evidence of informal payments	Increased from 20 % in 2009 to 25 % in 2014 as cost-sharing increased for pharmaceuticals well above the EU average of 16 %. OOP, average share of private health insurance in ES remained around 13-15% until 2014.
IE	Free health care converges for those with a medical card (40%) the rest face co-payments. GP Visit Card' which entitles the holder to free general practitioner visits. Persons over 70 years who are not entitled to a medical GP visit card can instead receive an annual cash grant of €400 up to a certain income	No evidence of informal payments	IE has reduced its spending on health care by 6.6% after the financial downturn and austerity reforms. Private medical insurance uptake has declined from 47.6% in 2005 to 40% in 2015.
SK	Compulsory insurance coverage for 98% of the population	Informal payments are reported in 72% of the population[7].	Public per capita health spending slowed in 2009 and declined in 2010 and 2011 by 0.4 and 1.5%
SE	Full coverage with small user fees and co-payments	No evidence of informal payments	Health spending (15 %) is paid directly out of pocket by households, the number of people with private health insurance has increased rapidly in the last 15 years, with an estimated 10 % of the population.

Source: elaborations on OECD (2019)

[7] http://www.hpi.sk/en/2014/01/analysis-of-informal-payments-in-the-health-sector-in-slovakia/

Tab. A4.5: Health system satisfaction and age effects

VARIABLES	(1) Recession	(2) No Recession	(3) Ordered Probit
age30	-0.426***	-0.313***	-0.158***
	(0.0457)	(0.0677)	(0.0183)
age40	-0.427***	-0.439***	-0.166***
	(0.0617)	(0.0630)	(0.0238)
age50	-0.484***	-0.560***	-0.192***
	(0.0698)	(0.0950)	(0.0269)
age60	-0.325***	-0.356**	-0.127***
	(0.0917)	(0.135)	(0.0362)
age70	-0.153	-0.180	-0.0554
	(0.110)	(0.168)	(0.0445)
age80	0.350**	0.259	0.145***
	(0.134)	(0.179)	(0.0546)
Gndr	-0.354***	-0.300***	-0.136***
	(0.0375)	(0.0491)	(0.0154)
Eduyrs	0.0275	0.000708	0.00699
	(0.0172)	(0.0176)	(0.00664)
Constant	5.767***	5.833***	
	(0.327)	(0.264)	
Observations	314,023	51,495	365,518
R-squared	0.013	0.011	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Source*: elaborations on ESS data

Tab. A4.6: Education system satisfaction and age effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Recession	No Recession	Ordered Probit
age30	-0.198***	-0.119	-0.0831***
	(0.0451)	(0.0837)	(0.0195)
age40	-0.287***	-0.273***	-0.124***
	(0.0563)	(0.0875)	(0.0245)
age50	-0.301***	-0.331***	-0.133***
	(0.0692)	(0.104)	(0.0306)
age60	-0.247***	-0.238*	-0.109***
	(0.0817)	(0.136)	(0.0371)
age70	-0.181**	-0.178	-0.0793**
	(0.0870)	(0.142)	(0.0388)
age80	0.0496	-0.0554	0.0152
	(0.0803)	(0.125)	(0.0350)
gndr	-0.121***	-0.0594	-0.0454***
	(0.0250)	(0.0409)	(0.0102)
eduyrs	0.00643	-0.00261	0.00117
	(0.0188)	(0.0192)	(0.00799)
Constant	5.858***	5.618***	
	(0.264)	(0.282)	
Observations	301,925	49,461	351,386
R-squared	0.003	0.003	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Source*: elaborations on ESS data

Tab. A4.7: Life satisfaction and age effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Recession	No Recession	Ordered Probit
age30	-0.376***	-0.391***	-0.166***
	(0.0482)	(0.0563)	(0.0198)
age40	-0.520***	-0.552***	-0.230***
	(0.0664)	(0.0866)	(0.0273)
age50	-0.598***	-0.698***	-0.260***
	(0.0934)	(0.129)	(0.0395)
age60	-0.359***	-0.438**	-0.146***
	(0.115)	(0.184)	(0.0527)
age70	-0.307**	-0.357*	-0.115**
	(0.126)	(0.181)	(0.0557)
age80	-0.173*	-0.211	-0.0543
	(0.0935)	(0.174)	(0.0450)
gndr	-0.0689*	-0.0653	-0.0216
	(0.0360)	(0.0465)	(0.0156)
eduyrs	0.0820***	0.0991***	0.0333***
	(0.0125)	(0.0131)	(0.00560)
Constant	6.337***	5.908***	
	(0.211)	(0.282)	
Observations	316,79	51,717	368,507
R-squared	0.028	0.038	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. *Source*: elaborations on ESS data

Additional Tables not commented in the main text

Tab. A4.8: Estimated probabilities of using health care services

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	93.1	86.8	70.6	91.9	93.7	82.4	79.2	90.4	58.5	89.3	93.8	87.8	64.9	78.3	46.3	60.0	94.1	96.6	83.1	58.7	88.8	88.9	92.2	39.7	88.1	84.7	83.9	72.1
35-65	96.0	88.8	72.5	92.5	94.9	88.2	88.7	91.0	67.1	92.4	96.7	90.3	73.1	78.6	56.4	71.0	92.4	96.9	82.0	60.6	92.9	91.4	95.4	46.9	94.9	85.5	86.4	77.7
Over 65	97.2	88.9	77.8	91.3	96.6	87.7	85.7	92.2	89.4	93.2	98.0	93.7	75.5	81.5	55.7	78.8	93.2	97.6	80.5	73.3	97.0	93.5	96.0	54.4	93.0	89.1	91.6	80.6

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.9: Estimated probabilities of using health care services controlling for covariates

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	95.1	89.2	74.0	94.4	95.1	85.0	81.2	91.7	71.2	91.5	96.3	90.8	71.8	82.9	49.8	66.0	94.3	97.2	84.2	66.5	90.8	90.6	92.9	48.7	89.3	87.0	86.1	77.5
35-65	95.4	88.3	72.6	91.2	94.8	87.2	87.0	90.4	69.4	91.8	95.9	89.4	73.9	78.6	56.0	71.6	92.3	96.7	82.4	62.0	91.5	91.3	94.9	48.9	93.8	85.1	86.6	77.0
Over 65	97.2	88.6	76.0	93.3	95.7	88.6	87.9	93.0	81.4	93.9	97.0	93.7	70.6	77.6	55.0	76.1	94.6	98.4	79.0	63.5	96.2	92.9	96.9	44.2	94.8	85.5	89.6	77.5

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.10: Estimated probabilities of paying for health care services

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	72.0	95.1	56.9	95.5	69.9	79.5	89.3	82.1	89.3	69.5	92.3	48.0	57.7	30.8	47.7	87.7	31.6	98.1	90.2	78.1	83.1	60.2	80.1	43.4	99.6	47.8	92.1	47.2
35-65	82.5	97.1	62.6	95.6	74.8	86.8	95.2	83.2	90.6	68.5	94.9	46.6	56.5	33.5	61.6	91.6	29.2	96.5	92.1	70.1	85.8	53.6	84.1	48.4	99.9	50.7	92.3	58.5
Over 65	81.2	96.3	61.8	98.1	73.4	85.9	94.3	78.2	87.8	64.8	98.3	50.5	61.7	28.8	51.2	82.0	18.7	97.9	93.4	67.3	85.1	45.6	78.3	58.8	99.7	60.2	93.7	44.4

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.11: Estimated probabilities of paying for health care services controlling for covariates

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	74.6	95.4	59.5	95.9	71.0	81.8	91.9	81.5	89.3	70.0	93.8	48.5	59.4	32.6	44.6	87.3	30.0	98.2	90.7	76.3	83.6	58.4	75.3	42.9	99.5	50.9	92.7	44.6
35-65	81.0	96.9	61.3	96.1	74.1	85.5	95.0	82.2	90.8	67.9	94.0	45.4	55.8	33.5	59.6	90.7	28.9	96.2	91.6	68.7	84.9	53.1	82.9	48.8	99.9	50.2	92.1	55.0
Over 65	84.9	96.3	63.9	94.5	75.4	88.5	95.3	82.2	87.8	66.9	98.6	53.3	62.5	26.9	64.9	85.8	23.4	98.2	94.3	72.0	84.9	50.8	83.9	58.0	99.0	53.4	93.9	59.9

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.12: Estimated probabilities of financial burden of medical care

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	27.1	37.9	85.1	93.4	29.8	35.4	17.8	8.5	63.2	31.3	28.3	13.8	23.9	42.8	32.2	97.1	33.3	38.7	65.5	68.2	23.4	66.9	40.7	51.0	14.6	13.0	53.3	6.8
35-65	34.8	38.8	81.4	90.1	34.0	45.8	14.2	13.5	62.7	37.4	29.4	15.6	40.3	40.7	35.2	97.4	44.1	46.0	76.4	74.6	26.7	70.7	46.3	56.7	11.9	13.3	58.9	9.7
Over 65	41.7	49.9	90.5	90.1	52.1	54.7	10.2	25.0	79.8	39.7	50.4	18.4	49.7	48.3	27.9	97.8	60.6	41.9	84.4	65.8	28.5	72.6	58.0	67.9	16.4	14.8	72.7	5.5

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.13: Estimated probabilities of financial burden of medical care controlling for covariates

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	31.8	44.1	88.9	94.0	38.5	40.8	17.9	14.0	68.8	32.7	32.3	15.3	31.7	47.1	32.2	97.2	42.1	42.7	75.0	73.3	25.8	68.0	46.0	58.0	15.6	15.4	62.9	6.4
35-65	34.4	39.6	83.7	90.4	36.3	47.0	15.8	15.2	64.7	36.6	32.7	15.9	41.8	41.9	33.5	97.2	45.9	44.4	77.0	73.9	30.0	70.9	47.3	60.6	13.5	13.6	60.3	9.5
Over 65	38.7	41.4	81.7	87.3	37.0	46.3	7.5	13.3	73.3	42.0	35.4	16.0	42.4	40.1	36.5	98.0	44.5	43.9	73.4	64.5	18.9	70.0	52.2	55.8	9.4	12.4	58.6	6.4

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.14: Estimated probabilities of the financial burden of medicines

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	26.9	29.3	80.6	89.8	51.9	39.0	13.4	12.9	57.6	55.0	28.9	8.2	39.8	52.1	32.3	88.6	41.1	36.1	66.3	76.6	18.2	95.0	39.5	47.5	21.6	46.7	65.4	11.8
35-65	33.8	33.5	85.5	88.8	61.4	45.7	15.1	25.3	56.8	55.3	34.7	10.1	49.8	56.0	34.7	87.9	60.3	36.1	75.0	72.4	26.7	96.7	48.8	52.1	19.1	52.0	68.4	12.6
Over 65	51.7	48.8	94.4	90.7	82.4	57.9	18.4	52.7	78.8	62.2	62.3	12.0	68.1	71.0	36.2	93.9	86.3	43.9	89.3	61.7	35.9	98.5	72.2	64.6	26.6	54.9	86.4	1.7

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.15: Estimated probabilities of the financial burden of medicines controlling for covariates

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	31.6	36.1	85.6	91.6	60.5	45.4	14.1	21.6	64.9	58.2	33.8	9.5	54.9	57.8	34.3	89.8	52.5	42.2	76.2	80.7	22.6	96.6	50.1	53.9	23.7	47.3	75.4	10.9
35-65	34.5	34.6	87.2	88.8	64.0	47.1	18.0	29.0	60.0	55.2	38.6	10.4	52.6	58.2	34.3	88.7	63.1	34.8	76.4	70.8	30.4	96.6	51.3	55.6	22.3	51.2	70.0	11.6
Over 65	43.6	38.4	88.8	88.2	66.9	47.6	12.2	29.3	68.3	60.7	44.3	9.8	55.3	58.4	35.3	91.6	69.1	40.8	76.9	63.9	22.2	97.1	59.8	52.8	15.0	48.9	71.3	3.1

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.16: Estimated probabilities of affording health care services with difficulty

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	18.9	22.4	41.5	77.5	28.3	11.5	16.2	31.1	88.4	26.8	14.2	15.5	39.6	77.0	42.0	51.6	14.3	20.8	50.2	37.0	24.7	32.5	37.3	34.8	15.1	24.6	54.5	14.2
35-65	25.4	25.2	45.9	71.7	30.8	15.5	18.2	45.7	89.3	24.3	11.6	23.1	38.5	72.5	44.6	57.1	21.5	20.0	64.0	46.7	25.4	34.7	48.1	41.7	16.9	27.7	58.6	15.1
Over 65	27.8	27.3	51.9	68.6	44.8	14.4	16.4	58.3	91.7	23.7	14.8	24.5	47.9	79.0	36.1	53.7	15.4	15.4	76.7	51.0	25.7	34.9	50.8	54.9	18.1	32.9	74.2	8.1

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.17: Estimated probabilities of affording health care services with difficulty controlling for covariates

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	19.7	27.8	45.9	79.9	34.6	13.6	16.4	40.6	91.0	29.7	16.5	16.9	45.5	78.8	41.3	54.8	16.1	25.4	59.9	46.2	27.0	37.3	40.4	37.9	16.0	26.6	64.2	13.5
35-65	26.1	26.9	46.6	72.2	32.2	16.3	20.4	47.6	89.9	25.0	14.0	22.8	39.2	73.1	43.6	58.1	21.1	20.0	64.7	49.0	30.1	34.0	48.8	42.9	20.0	28.2	60.3	14.0
Over 65	24.2	18.4	47.3	61.0	33.5	10.7	10.5	38.5	89.1	19.6	7.7	23.4	43.9	73.2	43.2	48.3	15.6	11.4	65.2	40.4	17.8	32.5	46.9	50.3	10.3	24.6	59.8	12.3

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.18: Estimated probabilities of affording formal education with difficulty

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	35.0	27.2	69.8	80.7	49.8	17.6	22.1	44.3	86.6	62.4	8.6	11.6	66.0	88.9	70.6	65.4	67.6	32.2	49.3	48.9	31.8	47.2	61.1	72.2	17.8	53.4	59.1	32.8
35-65	35.7	29.8	77.1	81.9	49.4	13.8	24.6	42.2	89.4	54.7	18.7	22.8	76.9	74.3	61.0	62.2	76.1	27.9	74.9	50.3	24.0	58.2	65.5	78.2	12.4	57.7	58.4	50.8
Over 65	35.0	27.2	69.8	80.7	49.8	17.6	22.1	44.3	86.6	62.4	8.6	11.6	66.0	88.9	70.6	65.4	67.6	32.2	49.3	48.9	31.8	47.2	61.1	72.2	17.8	53.4	59.1	32.8

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data

Tab. A4.19: Estimated probabilities of affording formal education with difficulty controlling for covariates

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	EL	ES	FI	FR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	UK
15-34	29.3	24.7	67.9	78.1	48.0	12.8	15.5	50.1	86.9	55.9	6.1	11.0	64.4	89.0	66.3	61.9	63.9	29.6	50.9	51.5	28.2	47.0	54.5	77.5	17.9	50.7	58.5	31.2
35-65	37.3	30.0	77.5	82.4	49.7	15.1	25.5	39.9	89.0	55.3	21.1	23.1	77.1	74.0	61.1	62.3	76.0	28.6	74.2	49.5	26.6	59.0	66.0	77.5	12.9	56.1	58.6	49.0
Over 65	29.3	24.7	67.9	78.1	48.0	12.8	15.5	50.1	86.9	55.9	6.1	11.0	64.4	89.0	66.3	61.9	63.9	29.6	50.9	51.5	28.2	47.0	54.5	77.5	17.9	50.7	58.5	31.2

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data. Covariates included: gender, citizenship, education, quintiles of equivalised disposable income, household size, household type, health status,

Tab. A4.20: Descriptive statistics of disposable income

	DE		FR		IT	
	2006	2017	2006	2017	2006	2017
Median	17661.0	22772.0	16436.0	22220.0	15104.0	16844.0
Gini	30.1	30.2	26.6	28.0	31.9	33.4
Between age-groups inequality	2.3	1.6	3.1	3.4	2.3	2.3
Within age-groups inequality	97.7	98.4	96.9	96.6	97.7	97.7
Relative poverty	15.5	15.9	13.2	13.4	19.5	20.3

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data. (*) Monetary values are expressed in PPP constant 2010 Euros

Tab. A4.21: Descriptive statistics of disposable income by age class

	DE: 2006			FR: 2006			IT: 2006		
	Median	Gini	Relative poverty	Median	Gini	Relative poverty	Median	Gini	Relative poverty
Less than 25	16659.0	27.9	16.7	15099.5	25.6	17.1	13925.8	32.1	24.2
25-34	18333.3	29.6	16.8	17080.0	22.1	9.4	16423.6	29.8	16.4
35-44	19133.3	29.5	11.1	16868.0	25.2	11.2	15821.5	31.5	18.2
45-54	20204.0	30.8	13.6	17956.5	28.0	13.2	16536.7	31.8	16.2
55-65	17762.7	33.3	17.5	18898.7	28.5	9.0	16888.0	33.3	14.6
Over 65	15693.0	27.8	16.8	15050.0	27.4	13.4	13288.0	30.2	22.6
	DE: 2017			FR: 2017			IT: 2017		
Less than 25	21920.4	30.2	16.3	20300.0	26.4	19.6	14780.5	33.4	26.2
25-34	23509.0	28.6	17.2	22305.6	23.0	11.4	16761.7	32.5	21.9
35-44	24648.9	29.5	11.4	22507.7	25.6	12.9	17282.0	31.3	20.4
45-54	25600.7	29.7	12.4	23468.0	28.2	12.9	17532.0	33.1	19.8
55-65	23495.5	32.4	18.1	24390.0	31.2	9.9	18958.7	37.0	17.5
Over 65	19766.7	28.0	18.8	22870.0	29.2	8.2	16918.5	30.7	15.3

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data. Notes: Monetary values are expressed in PPP constant 2010 Euros

Tab. A4.22: Descriptive statistics of the extended disposable income

	DE		FR		IT	
	2006	2017	2006	2017	2006	2017
Median	30290.1	35725.6	28098.2	32253.9	24972.9	22824.0
Gini	20.7	20.1	17.2	18.4	20.7	21.8
Between age-groups inequality	2.1	1.8	2.5	2.0	2.8	2.2
Within age-groups inequality	97.9	98.2	97.5	98.0	97.2	97.8
Relative poverty	7.8	7.5	3.5	3.1	6.5	8.2

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data. (*) Monetary values are expressed in PPP constant 2010 Euros

Tab. A4.23: Descriptive statistics of the extended disposable income by age class

	DE: 2006			FR: 2006			IT: 2006		
	Median	Gini	Relative poverty	Median	Gini	Relative poverty	Median	Gini	Relative poverty
Less than 25	30228.5	19.1	8.0	27185.1	16.4	4.7	23892.2	19.6	7.2
25-34	31993.3	20.6	11.3	29701.2	14.6	2.5	27166.3	18.9	4.9
35-44	32278.2	20.4	5.4	28566.2	16.1	2.1	25761.8	20.3	5.2
45-54	32042.9	21.8	7.6	29200.6	18.3	3.5	26376.8	20.9	5.9
55-65	29497.1	23.0	7.6	30242.7	18.8	1.9	27047.5	22.4	4.6
Over 65	26998.9	18.4	7.5	25398.3	17.9	4.8	22342.8	20.2	9.4

	DE: 2017			FR: 2017			IT: 2017		
	Median	Gini	Relative poverty	Median	Gini	Relative poverty	Median	Gini	Relative poverty
Less than 25	36286.9	20.1	7.2	30863.5	17.0	4.5	21352.9	20.7	10.9
25-34	37592.2	19.7	10.2	33819.6	15.0	2.8	23544.1	20.3	8.3
35-44	38799.3	19.4	4.4	32576.8	16.7	2.3	23061.5	20.2	8.5
45-54	37380.5	20.1	6.6	32675.9	18.9	3.3	23306.3	21.7	8.2

55-65	35097.4	21.8	9.5	33819.6	21.2	2.5	24902.1	25.2	8.0
Over 65	31830.9	17.6	6.9	31599.8	20.0	2.0	22428.3	21.0	5.0

Source: elaborations on EU-SILC data. (*) Monetary values are expressed in PPP constant 2010 Euros

Annex to Chapter 5

Methodological note 5.1: Simulating revenue-neutral reform scenarios

All reform scenarios presented in this chapter were calculated to be revenue neutral. This means that all scenarios redistribute income across individuals or households without changing the overall size of the public budget. In other words, the scenarios show what governments could have achieved without taking on additional debt. To calculate revenue-neutral reform scenarios, we first simulated the three revenue-generating policies – pension indexation reduction 1, pension indexation reduction 2, and top decile income tax – for each country and year to calculate what additional funds they generate.

In the second step, these funds were used to finance the expenditure-side policies. For example, for the child benefit all the additional income generated was distributed evenly across all eligible individuals <18 years. Consequently, the level of the benefit differs across countries and calendar years, depending on the revenue-generating policy change it is combined with. For example, the child benefits for EL in 2009 financed by the first and second pension reduction were 15.75€ and 18.25€ per child and year, respectively. For 2014, the respective values are 41.05€ and 46.11€.

In simulating revenue-neutral reform scenarios, there are important differences between the individual perspective and the equivalised income perspective. The calculations to achieve revenue neutrality are based on individual income as it represents the relevant income level equivalent to budget revenues and expenditure. The “income-inflating” effect of the household perspective would mean that reform scenarios which are budget neutral on an individual level are not (necessarily) budget neutral from an equivalised income perspective. The household perspective amplifies the effects of taxes and benefits influencing the income of individuals living in (large) households, while the effects of policies on individuals living alone remain the same.

Additional tables and figures

Tables A5.1 and A5.2 below summarise the effects of the reform scenarios on the income of different generations. Both tables contain the same data, but presented differently. The results in table A5.1 are grouped by income generating policy, the results in table A5.2 are grouped by expenditure policy.

Tab. A5.1: Change in disposable income under the reform scenarios relative to the baseline scenario (2011, unweighted averages across AT, BG, EL, HU, IE, LV, PL, ES, SE)

Reform scenario	Individual income perspective						Equivalised income perspective					
	0-17	18-24	25-54	55-64	65-75	75+	0-17	18-24	25-54	55-64	65-75	75+
1. pension 1 & child ben	72,8%	1,1%	-0,1%	-1,1%	-2,6%	-2,7%	2,20%	0,46%	0,65%	-0,88%	-2,11%	-2,18%
2. pension 2 & child ben	68,9%	0,9%	-0,1%	-1,0%	-2,2%	-2,0%	1,89%	0,38%	0,59%	-0,87%	-1,85%	-1,69%
3. pension 1 & UB <25	0,0%	17,0%	0,1%	-1,1%	-2,6%	-2,7%	0,45%	3,38%	0,47%	-0,63%	-2,10%	-2,12%
4. pension 2 & UB <25	0,0%	14,5%	0,1%	-1,0%	-2,2%	-2,0%	0,39%	3,04%	0,41%	-0,64%	-1,83%	-1,65%
5. pension 1 & SIC reduction	0,1%	2,0%	0,9%	-0,6%	-2,5%	-2,7%	-2,61%	0,54%	-0,96%	-0,49%	-2,03%	-2,09%
6. pension 2 & SIC reduction	0,1%	1,8%	0,8%	-0,6%	-2,1%	-1,9%	-2,67%	0,44%	-1,04%	-0,55%	-1,78%	-1,64%
7. pension 1 & anti-pov. ben	9,1%	2,5%	0,5%	-0,5%	-2,1%	-2,0%	-1,31%	9,96%	-0,65%	-1,03%	-0,40%	-0,01%
8. pension 2 & anti-pov. ben	8,6%	2,2%	0,4%	-0,6%	-1,8%	-1,3%	-3,74%	0,19%	-1,56%	-0,41%	-0,22%	0,03%
9. tax & child ben	223,5%	3,0%	-3,4%	-2,7%	-0,6%	-0,1%	-2,36%	0,64%	-1,17%	-0,57%	-1,75%	-1,62%
10. tax & UB <25	0,0%	54,3%	-2,8%	-2,7%	-0,6%	-0,1%	-2,50%	0,55%	-1,21%	-0,64%	-1,56%	-1,17%
11. tax & SIC reduction	0,1%	2,7%	0,0%	-0,7%	-0,4%	-0,1%	4,50%	-0,12%	0,03%	-1,86%	-0,46%	-0,19%
12. tax & anti-pov. ben	28,7%	8,0%	-1,4%	-0,8%	1,0%	2,1%	-2,99%	1,37%	-2,28%	-0,60%	0,75%	1,65%

Tab. A5.2: Change in disposable income under individual policies relative to the baseline scenario (2011, unweighted averages across AT, BG, EL, HU, IE, LV, PL, ES, SE)

Policy		Individual income perspective						Equivalised income perspective					
		0-17	18-24	25-54	55-64	65-75	75+	0-17	18-24	25-54	55-64	65-75	75+
Child benefit financed by	pension 1	72,8%	1,1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2,4%	0,7%	0,9%	0,2%	0,1%	0,1%
	pension 2	68,9%	1,0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2,0%	0,6%	0,8%	0,1%	0,1%	0,1%
	tax	223,5 %	3,7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7,6%	2,3%	2,9%	0,4%	0,4%	0,3%
Unemployment benefit for young people financed by	pension 1	0%	17,0%	0,2%	0%	0%	0%	0,6%	3,6%	0,7%	0,4%	0,1%	0,2%
	pension 2	0%	14,5%	0,1%	0%	0%	0%	0,5%	3,2%	0,6%	0,3%	0,1%	0,1%
	tax	0%	54,9%	0,4%	0%	0%	0%	1,8%	12,4%	2,2%	1,2%	0,4%	0,5%
SIC reduction for low incomes financed by	pension 1	0,1%	2,0%	1,0%	0,6%	0,1%	0,0%	0,8%	1,1%	0,9%	0,7%	0,3%	0,2%
	pension 2	0,1%	1,8%	0,8%	0,4%	0,1%	0,0%	0,7%	1,0%	0,8%	0,6%	0,2%	0,2%
	tax	0,1%	3,4%	3,4%	1,9%	0,2%	0,0%	2,8%	3,0%	3,1%	2,1%	0,7%	0,6%
Anti-poverty household benefit financed by	pension 1	9,1%	2,6%	0,6%	0,6%	0,6%	0,7%	1,1%	1,2%	0,7%	0,6%	0,6%	0,7%
	pension 2	8,6%	2,2%	0,5%	0,5%	0,4%	0,6%	0,8%	1,1%	0,6%	0,5%	0,4%	0,6%

tax	28,7%	8,7%	2,0%	1,9%	1,7%	2,3%	3,5%	4,2%	2,3%	1,9%	1,7%	2,2%
Pension reduction 1	0,0%	-0,1%	-0,1%	-1,1%	-2,6%	-2,7%	-0,2%	-0,3%	-0,3%	-1,1%	-2,2%	-2,3%
Pension reduction 2	-0,5%	-0,6%	0%	-0,9%	-2,7%	-2,2%	0,2%	-0,2%	-0,2%	-0,9%	-2,5%	-2,1%
Additional top income tax	0%	-0,6%	-3,4%	-2,7%	-0,6%	-0,1%	-3,3%	-2,5%	-3,0%	-2,4%	-0,9%	-0,5%

Additional figures comparing the effect of reform scenarios over time

Fig. A5.1: Scenarios 1 & 2 equivalised income perspective



Fig. A5.2: Scenarios 3 & 4, individual income perspective



Fig. A5.3: Scenarios 3 & 4, equivalised income perspective



Fig. A5.4: Scenarios 5 & 6 individual income perspective



Fig. A5.5: Scenarios 5 & 6 equivalised income perspective



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD
*excluding FR

Fig. A1.6: Scenarios 7 & 8 individual income perspective



Source: EU-SILC, own calculation in EUROMOD
*excluding FR

Fig. A5.7: Scenarios 7 & 8 equivalised income perspective



Annex to Chapter 6

Additional tables

Tab. A6.1: Cohort estimates of attitudes to equality (Question: “Government should reduce differences in income levels”, Scale “5= Strongly Disagrees, and 1 “Strongly Agrees”)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Ordered Probit
age30	-0.0454***	-0.0171	-0.0414**	-0.0604***
	(0.0155)	(0.0248)	(0.0156)	(0.0175)
age40	-0.0568***	-0.0438	-0.0551**	-0.0789***
	(0.0196)	(0.0323)	(0.0202)	(0.0223)
age50	-0.129***	-0.123***	-0.129***	-0.158***
	(0.0250)	(0.0419)	(0.0260)	(0.0281)
age60	-0.145***	-0.108**	-0.140***	-0.171***
	(0.0310)	(0.0493)	(0.0321)	(0.0351)
age70	-0.143***	-0.0654	-0.133***	-0.159***
	(0.0330)	(0.0528)	(0.0343)	(0.0373)
age80	-0.0302	0.0160	-0.0241	-0.0336
	(0.0320)	(0.0470)	(0.0320)	(0.0346)
Observations	311,937	51,139	363,076	363,076
R-squared	0.027	0.034	0.028	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.2: Cohort effects on attitudes to childcare attitudes ("Question: Childcare services for working parents are governments' responsibility, Scale "10= Entirely governments responsibility, and 1 "Entirely individuals' responsibility")

VARIABLES	(1) No recession	(2) Recession	(3) Total	(4) Ordered Probit
age30	0.287***	0.235***	0.259***	0.142***
	(0.0513)	(0.0493)	(0.0390)	(0.0217)
age40	0.177**	0.108	0.141**	0.0828***
	(0.0705)	(0.0697)	(0.0558)	(0.0277)
age50	0.0729	0.0621	0.0705	0.0517
	(0.0793)	(0.0915)	(0.0753)	(0.0361)
age60	0.0538	0.0326	0.0492	0.0383
	(0.0848)	(0.104)	(0.0859)	(0.0409)
age70	-0.0540	-0.0613	-0.0501	-0.0154
	(0.101)	(0.139)	(0.108)	(0.0497)
age80	-0.254	-0.230	-0.236*	-0.0969
	(0.153)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.0638)
Observations	43,343	51,214	94,557	94,557
R-squared	0.007	0.007	0.007	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.3: Cohort effects on attitudes to social services for equality (Question: “Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society.”, Scale “5= Strongly Disagrees, and 1 “Strongly Agrees”)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Ordered Probit
age30	0.0686***	0.0397**	0.0515***	0.0483***
	(0.0187)	(0.0161)	(0.0127)	(0.0136)
age40	0.0808***	0.0494**	0.0620***	0.0611***
	(0.0212)	(0.0197)	(0.0161)	(0.0169)
age50	0.0628**	0.0642**	0.0612***	0.0605***
	(0.0279)	(0.0257)	(0.0197)	(0.0208)
age60	0.0923***	-0.0110	0.0366	0.0377
	(0.0309)	(0.0312)	(0.0244)	(0.0260)
age70	-0.00151	0.0167	0.00396	0.00634
	(0.0421)	(0.0408)	(0.0348)	(0.0368)
age80	-0.0865*	-0.0278	-0.0599	-0.0561
	(0.0426)	(0.0463)	(0.0387)	(0.0407)
Observations	42,526	49,914	92,44	92,44
R-squared	0.003	0.002	0.002	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.4: Age Cohort estimates of attitudes to on banning political parties questioning democracy (Question: Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy, Scale “5= Strongly Disagrees, and 1 “Strongly Agrees”)

VARIABLES	(1) No recession	(2) Recession	(3) Total	(4) Ordered Probit
age30	-0.0364**	-0.0486*	-0.0392**	-0.0419***
	(0.0168)	(0.0242)	(0.0157)	(0.0141)
age40	-0.0707***	-0.0625*	-0.0688***	-0.0717***
	(0.0194)	(0.0342)	(0.0208)	(0.0184)
age50	-0.101***	-0.0756**	-0.0950***	-0.0957***
	(0.0238)	(0.0331)	(0.0240)	(0.0220)
age60	-0.148***	-0.0834*	-0.133***	-0.131***
	(0.0307)	(0.0408)	(0.0310)	(0.0286)
age70	-0.162***	-0.0718	-0.141***	-0.138***
	(0.0318)	(0.0511)	(0.0336)	(0.0310)
age80	-0.135***	-0.0576	-0.117***	-0.115***
	(0.0327)	(0.0568)	(0.0339)	(0.0313)
Observations	170,953	48,555	219,508	219,508
R-squared	0.003	0.003	0.003	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.5: Age Cohort effects on attitudes to migrants (Question: Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority, Scales 1= Allow many to come, and 4=Allow none)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Ordered Probit
age30	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.154***
	(0.0119)	(0.0203)	(0.0120)	(0.0151)
age40	0.118***	0.0960***	0.115***	0.143***
	(0.0127)	(0.0274)	(0.0133)	(0.0172)
age50	0.105***	0.0797***	0.102***	0.125***
	(0.0182)	(0.0270)	(0.0186)	(0.0247)
age60	0.116***	0.0600	0.108***	0.132***
	(0.0260)	(0.0399)	(0.0263)	(0.0346)
age70	0.136***	0.0761	0.127***	0.155***
	(0.0330)	(0.0587)	(0.0343)	(0.0454)
age80	0.167***	0.0841	0.155***	0.187***
	(0.0394)	(0.0674)	(0.0411)	(0.0548)
Observations	307,361	50,321	357,682	357,682
R-squared	0.051	0.056	0.051	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.6: Cohort effects on attitudes to pensions (Standard of living of pensioners “Extremely good (1), …Extremely bad (10))

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Ordered Probit
age30	-0.359***	-0.306***	-0.333***	-0.138***
	(0.0567)	(0.0854)	(0.0586)	(0.0265)
age40	-0.331***	-0.198**	-0.256***	-0.106***
	(0.0767)	(0.0906)	(0.0701)	(0.0308)
age50	-0.298***	-0.337***	-0.310***	-0.131***
	(0.0885)	(0.109)	(0.0850)	(0.0369)
age60	-0.380***	-0.339**	-0.337***	-0.144***
	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.112)	(0.0481)
age70	-0.0185	-0.217	-0.0995	-0.0454
	(0.129)	(0.164)	(0.132)	(0.0565)
age80	0.0932	0.147	0.154	0.0637
	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.141)	(0.0596)
Gender	-0.260***	-0.214***	-0.240***	-0.103***
	(0.0497)	(0.0468)	(0.0427)	(0.0169)
Years of educ.	0.0717***	0.0766***	0.0794***	0.0331***
	(0.0176)	(0.0179)	(0.0176)	(0.00743)
Observations	43,33	51,381	94,711	94,711
R-squared	0.018	0.023	0.022	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.7: Cohort effects on attitudes to unemployment (Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job, 1= strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Ordered Probit
age30	-0.0529**	0.00866	-0.0144	-0.0170
	(0.0244)	(0.0230)	(0.0161)	(0.0152)
age40	-0.00196	0.0991***	0.0575**	0.0498**
	(0.0266)	(0.0294)	(0.0234)	(0.0223)
age50	0.0811**	0.113***	0.101***	0.0902***
	(0.0322)	(0.0397)	(0.0292)	(0.0280)
age60	0.00414	0.0449	0.0275	0.0182
	(0.0457)	(0.0402)	(0.0354)	(0.0332)
age70	-0.0420	-0.0453	-0.0408	-0.0434
	(0.0391)	(0.0426)	(0.0326)	(0.0304)
age80	-0.0123	0.0454	0.0141	0.00738
	(0.0428)	(0.0458)	(0.0384)	(0.0365)
Gender	-0.0167	-0.00629	-0.00931	-0.00849
	(0.0183)	(0.0177)	(0.0128)	(0.0124)
Years of educ.	0.0436***	0.0236***	0.0315***	0.0290***
	(0.00744)	(0.00605)	(0.00562)	(0.00556)
Observations	42,921	51,093	94,014	94,014
R-squared	0.025	0.011	0.016	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.8: Standard of living for the old, governments' responsibility (1= strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree).

VARIABLES	(1) No recession	(2) Recession	(3) Total	(4) Ordered Probit
age30	0.154***	0.0872**	0.119***	0.0859***
	(0.0496)	(0.0409)	(0.0371)	(0.0241)
age40	0.134**	0.0903	0.106**	0.0773***
	(0.0620)	(0.0554)	(0.0467)	(0.0297)
age50	0.189**	0.172***	0.167***	0.116***
	(0.0768)	(0.0578)	(0.0559)	(0.0343)
age60	0.216***	0.213***	0.186***	0.129***
	(0.0734)	(0.0693)	(0.0582)	(0.0358)
age70	0.139	0.177*	0.129*	0.0971**
	(0.0992)	(0.0905)	(0.0746)	(0.0433)
age80	0.129	0.150*	0.101	0.0871**
	(0.106)	(0.0793)	(0.0721)	(0.0412)
Observations	43,719	51,844	95,563	95,563
R-squared	0.007	0.009	0.010	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.9: Standard of living of children, governments' responsibly (1= strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree).

VARIABLES	(1) No recession	(2) Recession	(3) Total	(4) Ordered Probit
age30	0.287***	0.235***	0.259***	0.142***
	(0.0513)	(0.0493)	(0.0390)	(0.0217)
age40	0.177**	0.108	0.141**	0.0828***
	(0.0705)	(0.0697)	(0.0558)	(0.0277)
age50	0.0729	0.0621	0.0705	0.0517
	(0.0793)	(0.0915)	(0.0753)	(0.0361)
age60	0.0538	0.0326	0.0492	0.0383
	(0.0848)	(0.104)	(0.0859)	(0.0409)
age70	-0.0540	-0.0613	-0.0501	-0.0154
	(0.101)	(0.139)	(0.108)	(0.0497)
age80	-0.254	-0.230	-0.236*	-0.0969
	(0.153)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.0638)
Observations	43,343	51,214	94,557	94,557
R-squared	0.007	0.007	0.007	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.10: Social benefits/services make people less willing care for one another (1= strongly agree, 5= strongly disagree).

VARIABLES	(1) No recession	(2) Recession	(3) Total	(4) Ordered Probit
age30	-0.0665**	-0.0527**	-0.0555***	-0.0536***
	(0.0312)	(0.0197)	(0.0184)	(0.0180)
age40	-0.0855***	-0.0904***	-0.0866***	-0.0821***
	(0.0295)	(0.0220)	(0.0202)	(0.0201)
age50	-0.0980***	-0.113***	-0.107***	-0.102***
	(0.0313)	(0.0279)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)
age60	-0.131***	-0.193***	-0.167***	-0.159***
	(0.0274)	(0.0335)	(0.0225)	(0.0227)
age70	-0.205***	-0.212***	-0.213***	-0.200***
	(0.0257)	(0.0489)	(0.0326)	(0.0336)
age80	-0.173***	-0.247***	-0.222***	-0.213***
	(0.0425)	(0.0523)	(0.0405)	(0.0403)
Observations	42,477	50,288	92,765	92,765
R-squared	0.013	0.008	0.009	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, gender, years of education, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.11: Age effects on self -reported income difficulties ('Feeling about household's income Nowadays')

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Probit
age30	0.0565***	0.0441***	0.0550***	0.0556***
	(0.00723)	(0.00825)	(0.00701)	(0.00795)
age40	0.0528***	0.0314***	0.0497***	0.0497***
	(0.00892)	(0.00951)	(0.00862)	(0.00982)
age50	0.0459***	0.0340*	0.0439***	0.0424***
	(0.0133)	(0.0180)	(0.0136)	(0.0155)
age60	0.0251	0.0109	0.0226	0.0180
	(0.0200)	(0.0274)	(0.0205)	(0.0225)
age70	0.0208	0.00689	0.0182	0.0101
	(0.0228)	(0.0314)	(0.0232)	(0.0247)
age80	-0.0275	-0.0548*	-0.0323	-0.0392**
	(0.0197)	(0.0286)	(0.0203)	(0.0197)
Gender	0.0562***	0.0562***	0.0564***	0.0581***
	(0.00805)	(0.0106)	(0.00814)	(0.00828)
Years of educ.	-0.0222***	-0.0276***	-0.0231***	-0.0241***
	(0.00241)	(0.00259)	(0.00239)	(0.00241)
Observations	318,261	52,12	370,381	370,381
R-squared	0.045	0.066	0.048	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust S.E. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tab. A6.12: Gender attitudes towards the family ('Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family – Disagree)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	No recession	Recession	Total	Ordered Probit
age30	-0.112***	-0.0432	-0.0882***	-0.0829***
	(0.0188)	(0.0311)	(0.0187)	(0.0168)
age40	-0.0724**	0.00503	-0.0457*	-0.0424*
	(0.0277)	(0.0340)	(0.0265)	(0.0246)
age50	-0.117***	-0.0851*	-0.105***	-0.0962***
	(0.0329)	(0.0453)	(0.0336)	(0.0314)
age60	-0.243***	-0.211***	-0.231***	-0.210***
	(0.0388)	(0.0599)	(0.0432)	(0.0406)
age70	-0.385***	-0.342***	-0.369***	-0.337***
	(0.0447)	(0.0694)	(0.0506)	(0.0470)
age80	-0.430***	-0.369***	-0.408***	-0.377***
	(0.0484)	(0.0756)	(0.0542)	(0.0499)
Gender	0.0617***	0.0784***	0.0673***	0.0617***
	(0.0221)	(0.0259)	(0.0213)	(0.0195)
Years of educ.	0.0498***	0.0620***	0.0543***	0.0495***
	(0.00461)	(0.00662)	(0.00499)	(0.00467)
Observations	96,803	51,354	148,157	148,157

R-squared	0.054	0.072	0.060	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

(*) Controls include constant, ethnicity, citizenship. Robust S.E. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annex to Chapter 7

Additional figures

Fig. A7.1: Share of essential workers by main workers' characteristics



Source: elaborations from Gallo and Raitano (2020)