Labour market situation and social inclusion of migrants

Research note no. 8/2016

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Abstract

This Research Note is divided into two parts. The first part examines the income of migrants relative to the native-born population and how it changed over 2007-2013, a period in which economic recession was followed by at best low growth in most parts of the EU. It considers, in particular, those on low income and the potential reasons why more of them are both in the bottom income quintile and at risk of poverty than the native-born, specifically with regard to their age structure, their employment situation, their education level and their household circumstances. It examines also their access to social protection, in specific, to unemployment benefits and healthcare, and their housing conditions, in both cases in relation to the native-born population and how the situation has changed over recent years. The main focus is on whether there is any evidence of their income and living conditions converging towards those of the native-born since 2007.

The second part examines social attitudes of migrants, again in relation to those of the native-born population, including their trust in institutions and people; their social values, their voting patterns and other forms of civic and political participation, the extent to which they feel part of society and their perception of the extent of discrimination; and social belonging. The analysis is based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS). As in the first part, a particular interest is in the way that these aspects have changed in recent years and the extent to which they have come closer to the native-born in these respects.

Part 1 – Trends in living conditions among migrants

This Research Note covers two broad issues. The first concerns the income and living conditions of migrants in the EU relative to the native-born population, the second concerns social attitudes among migrants in relation to the attitudes of those born in EU Member State. In both cases, a primary aim is to examine the changes which have occurred over the past few years in order to see whether there is evidence of any convergence in living conditions and attitudes of migrants towards those of the rest of the population in the EU Member State in which they are resident. The focus in the first part is on migrants of working age who constitute the bulk of those living in the EU.

The aspects considered in the first part of the study relate to:

- the age structure of the migrant population of working age, migrants being defined as those living in a Member State and who were born outside the EU, as compared with that of the native-born population and how it has changed over recent years – specifically over the crisis period;
- the level of household income of migrants as compared with that of the native-born population, focusing on the proportion of migrants with low income, defined as those in the bottom 20% of households ranked in terms of disposable income, and the changes over the period 2007 to 2013 (the latest year for which data are available);
- potential factors contributing to income differences between migrants and the native-born population, specifically age, whether they are in work or not, their education level and their household composition;
- the composition of household income of the two groups and the extent to which more or less of the income of migrants comes from employment or social benefits than in the case of the native-born population and the changes which occurred over the 6-year period;
- the proportion of migrants at risk of poverty in relation to those born domestically and the extent to which it changed over the period;
- the relative number of migrants who are among the 'working poor', in the sense that they are employed but have an income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold;
- the proportion of migrants defined as being materially deprived according to the indicator used to measure this in the EU relative to the native-born population and the changes in this over the 6-year period ;
- the access of migrants to medical and dental care as compared with those born in the country concerned.
- the differences in housing conditions of migrants as compared with those of the native-born population, including in the state of repair of the houses concerned and in the size of the houses in relation to the number of people living in them as well as in the environmental problems in the areas in which they live.

The main source of data is the EU-SILC, specifically for the years 2008 and 2014, which relate, respectively, to the income years 2007 (i.e. before the onset of the economic and financial crisis – data for earlier years are of uncertain reliability) and 2013. The analysis covers all the EU Member States for which the requisite data are available and for which there are sufficient observations for the data to be reliable[1].

[1] It should be emphasised that although the EU-SILC is based on a relatively small sample of respondents, especially in the case of migrants, the sample size should be sufficient to give a reasonably reliable indication of their situation. Where the number of observations is too small to be reliable, which is the case in countries with a relatively small number of migrants, the data are not included in the tables and figures below. Where the number falls within the range (20-49) regarded by Eurostat as implying a relatively wide margin of error, this is indicated when the data are presented. It should be noted that the EU-SILC data may give a slightly different indication of the relative number of migrants and their employment status than the LFS which is based on a larger sample size. The former is used here instead of the latter because of concern with the income and living conditions

The above aspects are considered below in turn but, first, here is a brief review of the existing relevant literature.

Literature review

While extensive background literature exists for some of the issues examined here (e.g. on the earnings of migrants), there have been few recent studies on other issues such as material deprivation or the work intensity of migrant households.

Access to labour market and sources of income

The composition of migrant income is a function of their access to the host country labour market as well as of their eligibility for social benefits. Most existing literature points to multiple barriers in accessing labour markets and social welfare (Barrett and Maitre, 2013; Sainsbury, 2012; Eurofound, 2007a; OECD, 2015; cf. Beenstock, Felsenstein and Rubin, 2015) and European Commission, 2016. A large variation in labour market outcomes and welfare take-up exists across both countries and migrant groups, depending on their legal status, duration of presence in the country and the country or region of origin.

Lelkes, Sierminska and Zolyomi (2013) show that third country migrants are nearly twice as likely to live in households with low work intensity than natives (16.3% versus 9.3%, 2010 EU SILC data). Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2011) show that third country migrants, as well as people without EU citizenship, have significantly lower participation rates and higher unemployment rates than the native-born in most EU Member States. They also find that longer presence in the host country typically leads to increased participation rates and lower barriers to employment (see also OECD, 2015).

Dustmann and Frattini (2011) analyse the composition of migrant inflows into 15 West European countries and the degree of migrant labour market integration using European Labour Force Survey data. They find different levels of disadvantage as regards employment and the occupational distribution of the migrant labour force across different countries. Bisin et al. (2011) analyse data from the European Social Survey (ESS) on cultural and economic integration of migrants in Europe focusing on ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of third country migrants in Europe. Similar to the above studies, they find an employment penalty and higher probability of unemployment for migrants with a strong ethnic identity (measured by the strength of attachment to religion and to traditions and the language spoken at home).

Zimmermann et al. (2012), in their analysis of the situation of migrants with regard to social assistance and social services, reject the welfare-magnet hypothesis on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of EU-SILC data and other data sources. While descriptive analysis shows that migrants are more likely to be recipients of unemployment and family-related support, they show on average lower rates of welfare receipt once differences in demographic characteristics are considered in the regression analysis. More specifically, they find that out of the 19 countries examined, migrants have higher rates of receipt of social support only in 7 of these countries If only unemployment benefits are considered, no country shows higher rates for migrants (though in this case, migrants may be less likely to meet the qualifying conditions for entitlement, which in most countries are based on the person's prior employment or contributions record).

A more detailed analysis of social assistance take-up in the UK, based on UK Labour Force Survey data, finds that no generalisations are possible as regards the receipt of benefits and tax credits by various migrant groups in the UK. Australasian and US migrants are the least likely to claim benefits while much higher rates of benefit claims were found in the late-2000s for Asian migrants and migrants from other parts of Europe. The level of benefit take-up is found to be inversely related to the level of education, those with lower levels of education being more likely to rely on benefits, as in the case of the native-born

of migrations rather than with their labour market situation as such. It should also be noted that not data are available for Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia.

(Drinkwater and Robinson, 2013). The effect of education is largest for migrants from non-EU European countries and smallest among migrants from the countries that joined the EU in 2004.

With respect to earnings, various studies document that migrants earn on average significantly less than the native-born and that this disadvantage does not diminish with the length of time in the host country (e.g. Winter-Ebmer (1994) on Austria; Venturini and Villosio (2000) on Italy; Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) on Germany; Eurofound, 2007a). More concretely, Barrett and McCarthy (2007) find that the hourly earnings of migrants are 18% lower than those of other employees, controlling for factors such as education and experience. At the same time, they find that if occupation is also controlled for, the migrant effect is no longer evident, though they put this down to data limitations rather than to an absence of such an effect. (In practice, the result could signify that migrants have less access to higher level occupations.) Most of the difference, they find, is evident for non-English speaking migrant groups. Ramos, Matano and Nieto (2013) analyse wage gaps between migrants and the native-born population in EU countries using 2004-2010 EU SILC data. They group the countries by the types of policy towards migrants and find that, although migrants earn significantly less than comparable native-born across the EU, migrant earnings are closer to the latter in countries with more favourable policies.

Poverty and material deprivation

The poverty gap relative to the native-born is among the most marked indicators of the disadvantage faced by migrants in the EU. Lelkes (2007), using 2004 EU SILC data for 14 Member States, found that migrants face a 6-15% higher risk of poverty than the native-born, controlling for individual characteristics (age, education, gender, labour market participation, household composition and health) as well as for country-specific effects. A recent OECD report found that the migrant households face twice as high poverty rates as other households (OECD, 2015).

There are several country-specific studies on the risk of poverty among migrants. Obućina (2014) analysed longitudinal data to study transition rates in and out of poverty in Sweden. She found that migrants remain at risk of poverty longer than comparable native-born, but the degree of disadvantage varies greatly across migrant groups. A longer time in the country and having a Swedish-born partner help to shorten the at-risk-of-poverty spell. Kesler (2014) compares poverty gaps and at-risk-of-poverty rates in three countries, Germany, Sweden and the UK. He finds the largest poverty gaps to be in Sweden as a result of the largest differences in labour market participation. At the same time, fewer migrants in Sweden have poverty-levels income than migrants elsewhere, in spite of higher levels of inequality relative to the native-born.

Evidence shows that migrants also suffer disproportionately from in-work poverty. Migrants in employment are twice as likely as their native-born counterparts to live in a household with income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (OECD, 2015). The incidence of in-work poverty is especially high among migrants in Southern European countries, where a relatively large share of migrants are employed in low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Higher rates of at-risk-of-poverty among migrants documented in various studies suggest that welfare systems are failing to support migrant income sufficiently, including in some of the most generous and universal welfare regimes (such as Sweden) (Barrett and Maitre, 2013; Lelkes, 2007).

Housing

Housing of migrants is a central issue affecting their quality of life (Eurofound, 2007b). In a report comparing the situation in several countries, Harrison et al. (2006) find that migrants generally live in worse housing conditions and poorer residential neighbourhoods than the native-born and that their housing is less secure. Some of most serious housing issues consist of lack of access to drinking water and sanitation, overcrowding and exploitation on the rental market as well as homelessness. An overview of more recent Eurostat data, (Housing Europe (2015) confirms that the migrant population has distinctly

different housing patterns than the native-born population. Two-thirds of migrants in the EU rent their accommodation as compared with only one third of the native-born. In addition, 27% of them are likely to live in overcrowded households as against 17% of the native-born. The overcrowding problem is particularly pronounced in Italy (affecting 48% of all migrants), Croatia (46%), Greece (45%) and Hungary (42%). More migrants also report being overburdened by housing costs (1 in 4 as against one in 10 among the native-born).

A similar finding emerged from a recent OECD study which showed that across OECD countries migrants are more than twice as likely to live in overcrowded accommodation as their native-born peers (19% as against 8%). This might be related to their lower incomes and the fact that migrant households are on average larger than native households (OECD, 2015).

Drinkwater and Robinson (2013), in their study of the take-up of social assistance and social services by migrants in the UK, show that some migrant groups (Australasians, Americans) are less likely to get housing/council tax allowance than others (e.g. Asians, Africans and other Europeans). Fougere et al. (2013), analysing the link between social housing and the locational choices of migrants in France, found that migrants more often live in social housing than comparable French-born.

Many of the above findings are picked up and confirmed in the analysis below, where they are examined on the basis of data that are more recent, cover more countries or go into more detail. Moreover, as indicated above, a primary aim is to see whether and to what extent there have been changes in the relative situation of migrants over time, or at least between 2007-2008 and 2013-2014, a period which coincides with the economic and financial crisis, with relatively little net job creation and high levels of unemployment across much of the EU. As noted above, the analysis is based on the EU-SILC, specifically the surveys conducted in 2014, the latest one for which microdata are available, which collected data on the 2013 income year, and 2008, which covered the 2007 income year.

The share of migrants in working-age population

According to the EU-SILC, 7% of the population aged 16-64 in the EU (or more accurately in the countries for which data are available) in 2014 were migrants, in the sense of being born in a country outside of the Union. This compares with a figure of 6% in 2008 (Figure 1). The proportion ranged from less than 0.5% in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria to around 10-11% in Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden and Luxembourg and 13% in Austria.

Figure 1 Proportion of people aged 16-64 living in EU Member States and born outside the EU, 2008 and 2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata. Note: No data are available for the missing Member States.

The countries of origin of the people concerned, however, vary markedly. In Austria, many migrants come from neighbouring countries in Europe, in Spain, from countries in North Africa, whereas in the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden, they tend to come from further afield, from South-East Asia in particular. Moreover, the characteristics of the migrants

differ too. For example, in Sweden, a large proportion of migrants are refugees or asylum seekers, which is less the case elsewhere.

In the 6 years 2008-2014, the proportion of migrants in the population aged 16-64 increased in most countries. It declined only in Spain, which, after a substantial increase over the preceding 8 years, saw many migrants returning home as a consequence of the crisis and the subsequent significant reduction of employment. (The proportion of migrants is also shown to have declined in France and Hungary, but in the former, the fall is within the margin of error, and in the latter, the numbers are too small to be reliable.)

The increase in the proportion over the 6 years was pronounced (over 2 percentage points) in a number of countries – in Ireland, Italy, Belgium, the UK, Sweden, Luxembourg and, above all, in the Netherlands (6 percentage points).

In Ireland, Cyprus and the UK, the increase was accompanied by a large rise in the number of people coming from other EU Member States – mainly from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the EU in 2004 – over the same period (the proportion in the population increasing by almost 5 percentage points in Ireland, to over 14% of the total aged 16-64, and around 3 percentage points in Cyprus and the UK).

The age structure of migrants

The age structure of migrants of working age in the EU differs from that of the native-born population. In particular, there is a smaller proportion of migrants in the younger age group under 30, a much larger proportion in the middle age group aged 30-44 and a smaller proportion in the older age group of 45-64 (Figure 2). More specifically, 42% of working-age migrants in the EU were aged 30-44 in 2013 as opposed to 32% of the native-born population, a difference of 10 percentage points, compensated by the share of those aged 16-29 and those aged 45-64 being 5 percentage points smaller for migrants in each case.

Figure 2 Age breakdown of migrants aged 16-64 in 2013 and 2007 (% total)

2013



Source: Eurostat: EU-SILC microdata. Note: Data for missing Member States not reliable

2007



Source: Eurostat: EU-SILC microdata. Note: Data for missing Member States not reliable

This pattern was common to all Member States for which there are reasonably reliable data[2], apart from Croatia and Lithuania, where a much larger proportion of migrants than the native-born were aged 45-64. This almost certainly reflects the different nature of migrants in these two countries. In Croatia, they are likely to be predominantly from neighbouring countries in the former Yugoslavia, and in Lithuania, from Russia. In both cases, migrants are likely to be older on average than migrants in other EU countries. In Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK, the proportion of working-age migrants in the age group 30-44 was 14-15 percentage points larger than for the native-born population; in Denmark and Cyprus, the proportion was 21-22 percentage points larger. By the same token, the proportion of migrants aged 16-29 was smaller than for the native-born in all but four countries and in these four the difference was less than 3 percentage points (except in Spain, where it was 5 percentage points).

This difference in age structure has implications for relative levels of household income. Those aged 30-44 tend to have a slightly lower income than those aged 45-64 but a significantly higher income than those aged 16-29. It implies that, other things being equal, migrants should have a higher income than the native-born because fewer among them are in the youngest age group. Alternatively, it implies that, if their age structure were the same as that of the native-born, their income would be lower than it actually is. The effect of this difference is examined below.

The difference in age structure has widened rather than narrowed in recent years, reflecting the slowdown in inward migration up to 2015 (since when, of course, it has risen dramatically). Accordingly, since new migrants tend to be relatively young on average – mostly under 35 – the reduction in inward flows means that their weight among total migrants diminished between 2007 and 2013 with a consequent shift in the age structure towards the older groups. Such a shift is likely to have been reinforced by more younger people than older ones moving out of EU countries over the crisis period because they were less well settled and more 'footloose'.

Over these 6 years, the average proportion of migrants aged 16-29 in the EU declined by 6 percentage points, over 4 percentage points more than for the native-born population. There were only two Member States, the Czech Republic and Ireland, where the proportion for the native-born declined more than for migrants. In Portugal, the decline in share was much the same for the two groups (Figure 3).

The lower average income of the 16-29 age group than of those older implies that, other things being equal, the income of migrants should have increased by more over the period than for the native-born simply because of the shift in age structure. Moreover, it is plausible that those returning to their countries, or going somewhere else in the world, tended to be those who had lost their job, while those who remained were better-placed on the labour market. This could also imply an increase, on average, of migrant earnings. This too is examined below.

[2] Because of the small number of observations, data are not reliable for Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, while there are no data for Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia and data for Croatia are available only from 2010.

Figure 3 Change in age breakdown of working-age population for migrants and the native-born, 2007-2013 (percentage point change)

Migrants



Source: Eurostat: EU-SILC microdata

Native- born



Source: Eurostat: EU-SILC microdata

Migrants living with people born in the country of residence

The majority of migrants in the EU in 2014 (57%) lived in households where at least one person was born in the country of residence, the person being either their spouse or partner or their children who were born after they moved into the country concerned (Figure 4 – note that the figure is restricted to those of 16 and over so it excludes children younger than this.

Figure 4 Proportion of migrants aged 16-64 living with native-born people, 2008 and 2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Again, the figures vary markedly across the EU, the proportion ranging from over 80% in Lithuania, to around 40% in Spain and Italy and a third in Greece. Apart from the latter three countries and Ireland, over half of migrants in all EU Member States lived with native-born people.

In most countries, there was relatively little change in the proportion over the preceding 6 years. The main exceptions were Ireland and Luxembourg, where the proportion declined significantly over this period, reflecting the steep increase in the number of migrants (and accordingly in the number of migrants who had not been in the country long enough to have children), and Spain, where the number increased markedly, reflecting the reduction in the number of migrants (leaving a disproportionate number with children or with native-born spouses or partners behind).

The number of second-generation migrants

In 2014, 10% of those aged 16-34 living with their parents in the EU were either first or second-generation migrants, Indeed, more of them were second generation (59%) than first (Figure 5, in which 'Non-EU-born' are first generation and 'Domestically-born' are second generation).[3]

Figure 5 Proportion of first- and second-generation migrants among people aged 16-34 living with their parents, 2014 and 2008 (% total living with parents)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

The overall proportion ranged from 18-20% in the UK, Austria and Sweden to only around 5% in Ireland and Finland and less than 2% in the Czech Republic. The relative number of second generation (domestically-born in Figure 5) also varied widely, reflecting the rate of increase in migration over recent years and the proportion of migrants who had lived in the EU long enough to have children aged 16 and over.

The two main features of comparing the situation of this age group in 2014 with that 6 years earlier are, first, the overall proportion of those living with their parents, who were

[3] The proportions in the table are calculated by first identifying in the EU-SILC the households in which those aged 16-34 were living with their parents, secondly, identifying those where at least one of the parents was born outside the EU and, thirdly, identifying those aged 16-34 who were domestically-born whose parents were born outside the EU.

first- or second-generation migrants, increased both in the EU as a whole (from 8% to 10%) and in most Member States.

Secondly, the relative number of second-generation migrants (those born in the country of residence) increased relative to the number of first-generation migrants in most Member States. The only exceptions were Lithuania, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK, where the proportion of second-generation among the total remained much the same between the two years, and Ireland, where the proportion declined appreciably (from 51% to 33%). (On average, the proportion increased from 55% to 59% in the EU.)

Disposable income of migrants

The median income of working-age migrants, measured in terms of the equivalised disposable income of the households in which they live[4], was on average, in 2013, only 78% of that of people born in the country concerned (Figure 6). It was lower in all countries, apart from the Czech Republic (where the figure is subject to significant degree of uncertainty because of the small number of observations). This was especially the case in Greece, Spain, Austria, Italy and Belgium, in each of which, income of migrants was only around two-thirds or less of the income of the native-born.

Figure 6 Median Household disposable income of migrants aged 16-64 relative to that of the native-born population, 2007 and 2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC. Note: For CZ, the figure is 156% in 2013

Moreover, the income of migrants declined on average relative to that of the native-born between 2007 and 2013, both overall and in the majority of Member States. Only in Belgium, Finland, Denmark and the Czech Republic did their income increase in relative terms over this period.

The change in the age structure of migrants relative to the rest of the population, described above, should have narrowed the gap in income between migrants and the native-born over this period, if other things had remained equal, which clearly they did not. Similarly, on an age-adjusted basis, the gap in 2013 would be even wider both on average and in most countries. The analysis below examines the factors potentially underlying the lower income of migrants relative to the native-born, including, in particular, differences in wage levels.

The relative income level of migrants before and after transfers

On average, over the EU as a whole, the difference in average disposable income between migrants and the native-born population was much the same after transfers as before, though there were significant differences between countries. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden, the effect of social transfers was to narrow the difference between the two groups. In Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus, the effect

[4] Equivalised for differences in household composition and assuming that each household member receives an equal share of the income so calculated.

of social transfers was to widen the difference, especially in the first two countries. The effect in the last three, however, was less in 2013 than in 2007.

Income of migrants by education level

The difference in income levels between migrants and the native-born in 2013 was similar for all education attainment levels. Although the difference was less for those with tertiary-level education ('high' in the table), it was only slightly so. Equally, there was a similar reduction in the average income of migrants over the 6-year period for those with the different levels of education. (Table 1).

Table 1 Average (mean) income of migrants aged 16-64 relative to that of the native-born population by education level, 2007 and 2013 (%)

	2008				2014			
	Low	Medium	High	Total	Low	Medium	High	Total
BE	65.2	67.5	69.2	63.3	62.8	65.7	81.0	67.3
DK	81.1	81.1	72.3	77.9	88.2	84.8	98.8	92.2
IE	80.3	78.9	67.9	86.3	71.3	65.8	71.4	75.6
EL	84.6	67.6	65.7	69.1	68.4	60.4	61.2	58.6
ES	76.3	74.7	74.4	73.1	67.7	56.5	63.4	60.7
FR	73.3	94.8	90.9	82.0	72.3	82.6	94.6	81.6
HR					83.9	91.3	103.3	88.2
IT	82.7	73.7	71.6	75.3	74.6	65.0	66.1	66.9
CY	85.0	90.0	70.2	82.0	79.5	74.8	74.9	76.3
LT	106.9	108.5	91.5	104.1	72.1	92.8	98.8	91.5
LU	68.9	69.6	77.1	74.6	67.7	69.0	70.4	69.4
NL	89.6	85.7	86.6	86.4	84.4	82.1	77.6	80.0
AT	74.3	68.3	65.5	66.3	72.4	75.1	60.6	66.4
PT	94.5	92.4	80.6	94.0	91.8	92.5	82.0	95.0
FI		74.6	61.8	71.9	65.9	83.2	71.8	78.3
SE	71.9	79.3	69.8	74.1	68.8	78.7	74.5	73.5
UK	80.6	87.6	97.5	95.1	81.0	99.4	88.2	91.9
EU	80.1	82.4	82.7	80.4	77.2	77.3	80.4	• 78.0

Note: Data for the Czech Republic is unreliable. No data for Croatia in 2007. Low relates to ISCED 0-2 (i.e. lower secondary education or below), medium to ISCED 3-4 (upper secondary or pre-tertiary), high to ISCED 5 and 6 (tertiary education).
The shaded figures denote instances where migrants' income rose in relative terms over the period
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

In 2013, there was only one country, Croatia, which is a special case, where the average income for any education group was higher for migrants than for their counterparts among the native-born population.

There were only 4 countries – Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and Finland – where the average income of migrants increased by more than for the native-born population over the 6 years 2007-2013. In half the countries for which there are data (8 of the 16), however, the average income of the tertiary-educated among migrants increased by more than for their native-born counterparts, though still leaving the level significantly below that of the latter in most cases.

For those with upper secondary level education ('medium' in the table), there were only 4 countries where the average income of migrants was higher relative to that of the native-born population in 2013 than in 2007; for those with only basic schooling ('low' in the table), this was the case in only one country (Denmark).

The implication is that, over the crisis period, the average income of migrants declined relative to that of the native-born, and that the gap between the two widened. The possible reasons for this are examined below, in particular, whether migrants were more likely than the native born to lose their jobs during the crisis, less likely to receive social benefits or more likely to experience a lower increase in wages.

Composition of income of migrants

Income from employment

Much the same share of income of migrants comes from wages and salaries as for the native-born population – around 62-63% in 2014 (Table 2). The share, however, varies markedly between countries. In the four southern EU15 countries, in particular, as well as in Luxembourg, the share is larger for migrants than for the native-born population. In the other countries, the reverse is the case, in many of them substantially so.

Over the 6 years 2007-2013, the share of income of migrants accounted for by wages and salaries declined by more than that of the native-born population. This was the case in all countries, apart from Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the UK, reflecting in part the larger jobs losses among migrants over the crisis period.

Table 2 Average share of income of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 from wages and salaries, 2007 and 2013 (% total income)

	Native-born		Migrants		Change 2007-13	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	Native-born	Migrants
BE	66.0	66.6	50.9	50.2	0.6	-0.7
CZ	63.6	64.8	57.5	41.6	1.2	-15.9
DK	73.2	71.8	62.0	64.3	-1.4	2.3
IE	58.2	55.2	63.7	53.1	-3.0	-10.6
EL	50.4	43.7	77.3	63.6	-6.7	-13.8
ES	69.1	60.6	84.8	63.1	-8.5	-21.7
FR	65.3	65.4	57.3	59.7	0.1	2.4
HR		63.1		58.9		
IT	55.3	55.9	67.0	65.9	0.6	-1.1
CY	68.1	64.1	61.4	58.8	-4.0	-2.7
LT	71.7	68.1	76.1	60.6	-3.6	-15.5
LU	70.6	68.9	71.1	73.4	-1.7	2.3
NL	70.9	69.3	65.6	57.0	-1.6	-8.6
AT	65.2	65.6	65.0	63.0	0.4	-2.1
PT	66.4	65.0	74.3	70.5	-1.4	-3.8
FI	68.0	67.3	53.5	53.3	-0.6	-0.1
SE	74.3	77.9	60.7	61.3	3.5	0.6
UK	69.7	66.7	63.4	63.6	-3.0	0.3
EU	64.4	63.0	68.1	62.3	-1.5	-5.8

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

The share of income from self-employment was either much the same or smaller than for the native-born in most countries in 2014. The share was larger only in three countries, the Czech Republic, Ireland and Lithuania (Annex Table A.1). On average across the EU as a whole, it was around 2 percentage points less for migrants than for the native-born (just over 8% as against just over 10%), implying that total income from employment (i.e. from self-employment as well as wages and salaries) was almost 3 percentage points smaller as a share of overall income for migrants than for the native-born.

The smaller share of income of migrants from self-employment reflects the fact that fewer among them tend to be self-employed than among the native-born (12% of those in employment in the EU as opposed to 15% of the native-born, according to the EU-SILC), with the share being larger in only 5 Member States (Croatia, Lithuania, the UK, Ireland and, most especially, the Czech Republic, where half of the migrants in work were self-employed).

Over the period 2007-2013, there was little change in the share overall for both migrants and the native-born population, though this was not the case in all Member States. In Ireland and Spain, for example, as well as the Czech Republic, the share for migrants increased while that for the native-born fell or remained much the same, and in Greece

and Portugal, it declined less. (This is broadly in line with the change in the proportion of self-employed among migrants in work, which increased in all of the former three countries mentioned.) In Belgium, Denmark and Austria, the share declined by more for migrants than the rest of the population. (The proportion of migrants who were self-employed also declined in Denmark, while in Austria it remained much the same, as it did for the native-born; in Belgium it increased, while for the native-born, it remained unchanged, implying a decline in the average income of the self-employed relative to that of the native-born over the period.)[5]

Income from social transfers

The share of income that migrants receive from social transfers tends to be more than for the native-born population, reflecting their smaller share of income from employment. In 2014, 24% of the gross household income of migrants of working age came from social transfers of all kinds (i.e. including old-age pensions, though these are relatively small for people of working age) as compared with 22% for the native-born population (Table 3). However, reflecting the differing shares of income from employment, the situation varied markedly between countries. In Belgium, France, Lithuania, Austria, Finland and Sweden, the share was much larger for migrants than the native-born population; in the southern EU15 countries, as well as in the Czech Republic, it was smaller.

Table 3 Average share of income of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 from social transfers, 2007 and 2013 (% total income)

	Native-born		Migrants		Change 2007-13	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	Dom-born	Migrants
BE	22.2	22.7	41.1	41.1	0.5	0.0
CZ	21.8	19.7	16.1	10.3	-2.0	-5.8
DK	17.1	19.4	26.6	23.7	2.3	-3.0
IE	28.9	33.8	25.6	33.6	4.9	8.0
EL	17.5	25.3	7.0	18.4	7.9	11.5
ES	17.8	25.5	8.1	25.0	7.6	16.9
FR	22.7	22.4	33.7	31.7	-0.3	-2.0
HR		24.7		29.4		
IT	18.7	18.7	11.0	13.8	-0.1	2.7
CY	14.3	20.1	16.7	23.4	5.8	6.7
LT	17.5	21.9	17.2	28.8	4.3	11.7
LU	19.7	21.9	22.6	22.0	2.2	-0.5
NL	14.7	13.5	19.8	23.6	-1.2	3.8
AT	19.6	19.9	26.4	29.8	0.3	3.4
PT	19.7	25.2	14.9	17.1	5.5	2.2
FI	19.9	21.3	36.2	37.0	1.3	0.8
SE	19.7	17.4	33.9	34.2	-2.3	0.3
UK	19.7	21.8	25.4	22.3	2.1	-3.1
EU	20.6	21.8	20.4	24.1	1.1	3.7

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Over the 6 years 2007-2013, the share of income from social transfers increased by more for migrants in the EU as a whole than for the native-born population, reflecting the larger reduction in the share of income from work and, underlying this, the larger fall in employment. This was also the case in the majority of countries.

Although the share of income from social transfers was larger for migrants than the native-born in 2013, this reflects the lower level of income of migrants, as shown below, rather than the higher level of social benefits. Indeed, both the proportion of migrants receiving social benefits and the average amount of benefit they received were much the same in the EU overall as for the native-born population (see Annex Table A.2). Moreover, in the

[5] Across the EU, the proportion of migrants in work who were self-employed increased by around 2 percentage points between 2007 and 2013, according to the EU-SILC, while for the native-born, it rose only marginally.

majority of countries both the proportion in receipt and the average amount received was smaller than for the latter.

Accordingly, overall across the EU, migrants accounted for much the same share of those in receipt of social benefits as their share of working-age population – around 7% of the total – and only in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria was it much above 10% (in the first three, 11-12% and in the last, 14%). In the first three of these countries, as in the EU overall, the share was more than in 2007 (in Austria, it was much the same), reflecting both the increased number of migrants in the population and a slightly larger proportion of them receiving social benefits because of the smaller number in employment, as indicated below.

The relative income level of migrants

On average the income of migrants is significantly less than that of the native-born population. In 2013 (the year reported by the EU-SILC for 2014), 37% of migrants in the EU had income in the bottom quintile of the distribution of household disposable income in their country of residence, almost twice the proportion that would be expected if migrants were evenly spread across the income distribution (Figure 7). In 10 countries, the proportion was around 40% or more – in Belgium it was over 50%. In only two countries was the proportion less than 25%.

Over the 6 years 2007-2013, the proportion of migrants with income in the bottom quintile increased by 5 percentage points in the EU as a whole. The proportion declined in only 4 countries and increased, or remained much the same, in all the others. The increase in the proportion was especially large in Ireland, Spain and Greece. This might, for example, have occurred because of an increase in the proportion of migrants who are relatively young, but this was not in fact the case. Indeed, the widespread increase in the share of migrants with income in the bottom quintile is contrary to what might have been expected given the increase in the average age of migrants relative to the population as a whole.

Figure 7 Proportion of migrants aged 16-64 with household disposable income in the bottom quintile, 2007 and 2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Further analysis shows that the odds of a migrants having income in the bottom quintile were greater in 2013 than in 2007 in the EU as a whole as well as in most Member States and that this was the case for income before as well as after social transfers.

The following sections examine the potential reasons underlying the disproportionate number of migrants with income in the bottom quintile, specifically, their age structure, their employment status, their education level and their household composition. In the case of employment and education, the analysis is confined to those aged 25-64 who in nearly all cases should have finished their education – or more precisely who by 25 are likely to have attained their highest level of education and unlikely to be combining employment with education. In practice, focusing on this age group rather than those aged 16-64 does not affect the results significantly.

The effect of differences in age structure on income levels

The differences in the age structure of working-age population can be taken into account explicitly when comparing the income of migrants and the native-born – or, specifically the relative number of the two groups in the bottom 20% of the income distribution, i.e. the bottom quintile. This can be done by calculating the proportion of migrants with income in the bottom quintile assuming that their age structure was the same as the native-born population.

The calculation shows that, on this assumption, the relative number of migrants in the bottom quintile in the EU would be higher than the actual number, but only marginally so (Figure 8). Most importantly, it shows that differences in age structure with the native-born are not a factor contributing to the relatively large proportion of migrants with low income but, if anything, a factor working in the opposite direction, tending to reduce the proportion rather than to increase it. There are only three countries where the reverse is the case, Denmark, Cyprus and, to a lesser extent, Spain, where age standardisation reduces the proportion with income in the bottom quintile, excluding those countries where the difference is less than 1 percentage point[6].

On the other hand, there are 6 countries where the proportion of migrants with income in the bottom quintile would be larger rather than smaller if their age structure was the same as that of the native-born., again excluding those countries where the difference is less than 1 percentage point. These are the Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Figure 8 Proportion of migrants aged 16-64 with income in the bottom quintile, actual and standardised for differences in age structure relative to native-born, 2013 (% migrants)



Source: Eurostat: EU-SILC microdata

The change in the age structure of migrants over the period 2008-2014 tended to reduce rather than increase the proportion of migrants with income in the bottom quintile, if only a little on average (Figure 9). In the EU as a whole, if the age structure had remained unchanged over the period, then the proportion would have increased by 2 percentage points, whereas in practice it increased by just over 1.5 percentage points. There are only three countries in which the increase would have been less or the reduction more – Denmark, Spain and Portugal (excluding the countries for which the difference between the actual and the standardised was less than 1 percentage point). Conversely, there are four countries – the Czech Republic, Austria, the Netherlands and Greece – where the increase would have been larger or the reduction smaller than it actually was if the age structure had not changed.

[6] In Denmark, it is because of the increased proportion in the standardised estimate of those aged 45-64 who have a relatively low probability of having income in the bottom quintile; in the Czech Republic it is because of the reduced proportion of those aged 30-44 who have a relatively high probability of having income in this quintile.

Figure 9 Change in the proportion of migrants aged 16-64 with income in the bottom quintile, actual and standardised for differences in age structure relative to native-born, 2007-2013 (Percentage point change)



Source: Eurostat: EU-SILC microdata

In the great majority of countries, therefore, the change in the age structure over the period either had the effect of reducing the increase (e.g. in the Netherlands and Greece) in the relative number of migrants with income in the bottom quintile or of increasing the reduction (e.g. in the Czech Republic), or it had little effect at all. In only three countries (Denmark, Spain and Portugal, as noted above) did it contribute significantly to the increase or reduction that occurred.

The employment status of migrants with low income

Since age does not appear to be a factor contributing to the disproportionate number of migrants with income in the bottom quintile, it is possible that their employment status is a factor, in the sense that many of them might not be in employment, or at least, fewer of them than the rest of the population.

In practice, however, there is little difference between migrants and the native-born population overall in the proportion of those with income in the bottom quintile who were in employment during the income year – or, more specifically, for whom employment was their main status during the year (Table 4). Almost the same proportion of migrants in the bottom quintile in the EU were employed in 2013 as the native-born. In the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Portugal, significantly more were employed. Only in the Netherlands, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Greece and Finland was the opposite the case. Moreover, the proportion that were unemployed, in the sense of out of work but actively looking for a job, was also similar overall though there were marked differences in a number of countries.

The difference between migrants and the native-born in the change in the proportion employed over the period 2007-2013 was also relatively small. Although there was a slight increase for the native-born, there was a marginal decline among migrants.

For most countries, therefore, differences in employment status as such were not a contributory factor to the disproportionate number of migrants among those with low income, nor are they a reason for the increase in the proportion of migrants in the bottom quintile of the income distribution over the 2007-2013 period. This conclusion holds even if account is taken of the extent to which migrants and the native-born worked during the year. As indicated below, the average number of months that the two groups were in employment was much the same in most countries. However, there is a difference in the relative number of migrants and native-born employed in part-time jobs.

Table 4 The division of the native-born population and migrants aged 25-64 in the bottom income quintile by employment status, 2007 and 2013

	Native-born						Migrants					
	2007			2013			2007			2013		
	Empl	Un-empl	In-active	Empl	Un-empl	In-active	Empl	Un-empl	In-active	Empl	Un-empl	In-active
BE	35.4	27.2	37.4	28.2	26.3	45.5	26.2	24.4	49.4	25.2	21.5	53.3
CZ	44.9	22.4	32.7	47.2	25.4	27.4	*65.4*	*20.5*	*14.2*	*54.1*	*10.9*	*34.9*
DK	44.3	8.5	47.2	34.4	14.6	51.0	53.1	5.8	41.1	34.9	22.3	42.7
IE	32.1	14.7	53.2	23.8	26.3	49.9	36.0	16.8	47.1	38.3	14.4	47.2
EL	52.9	12.9	34.2	32.5	40.8	26.7	56.7	11.5	31.8	28.2	42.0	29.8
ES	45.3	17.3	37.4	29.1	52.9	18.0	61.0	12.3	26.8	37.8	44.4	17.8
FR	54.0	16.2	29.8	50.3	20.8	28.9	39.0	21.6	39.4	43.8	16.3	39.9
HR				20.4	49.1	30.6				20.5	44.6	35.0
IT	36.5	15.3	48.2	33.7	29.3	37.0	54.9	11.8	33.3	46.6	26.2	27.2
CY	47.8	5.1	47.1	33.3	30.8	35.9	74.3	4.2	21.5	68.4	21.5	10.1
LT	50.3	13.0	36.7	40.0	33.8	26.1	32.7	15.6	51.7	39.1	39.7	21.2
LU	49.8	3.6	46.6	54.0	9.6	36.4	50.3	21.4	28.3	62.0	11.7	26.3
NL	46.7	20.0	33.3	43.8	25.0	31.3	40.4	34.7	24.9	24.9	40.1	35.0
AT	50.7	12.8	36.5	47.4	13.7	39.0	49.3	11.9	38.7	46.2	18.0	35.8
PT	55.2	13.0	31.8	38.6	35.9	25.5	57.6	15.9	26.5	49.9	32.7	17.4
FI	42.0	19.1	38.9	31.9	28.7	39.4	30.9	21.7	47.4	26.0	45.7	28.3
SE	66.4	6.4	27.2	57.1	9.8	33.1	47.5	12.8	39.7	43.6	19.0	37.4
UK	48.7	6.2	45.1	47.3	12.8	39.9	44.9	9.9	45.3	48.7	11.0	40.3
EU	47.1	14.3	38.5	42.1	26.1	31.8	48.3	15.3	36.4	41.3	25.6	33.2

Note: No data for Croatia in 2007. Figures in italics indicate data of uncertain reliability because of small number of observations. Employment status is defined as the most frequent situation of people during the income year, based on what they reported their main status to be each month[7].
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

A more detailed examination indicates that there is a difference, though small, between migrants and the native-born in the proportion of men and women in employment for those with low income. Whereas for men a larger proportion of migrants with income in the bottom quintile were employed than in the case of the native-born (53% as opposed to 50% in the EU as a whole), the reverse was the case for women (just over 34% as against just under 31%). For both men and women, however, there was a slightly bigger decline between 2007 and 2013 in the number in employment among migrants with low income than among the native-born (suggesting that the crisis had a bigger effect on the former).

The main conclusion, however, is that there is little difference in the employment status of migrants and the native-born and only minor difference in the change in employment status between 2007 and 2013. This implies that the reason for the disproportionate number of migrants in the bottom quintile is them having lower income than the native-born rather than them being in a less favourable labour market situation.

The difference in the income of those in employment arises, in part, from a larger proportion of migrants than the native-born being employed in part-time rather than full-time jobs. In 2014, at the time of the EU-SILC survey, just over 21% of migrants in employment worked part-time as opposed to 14% of the native-born (Annex, Figure A.1). Part-time working was more prevalent among migrants in all but 5 Member States, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Austria, where the proportion was much the same as for the native-born,

[7] In nearly all cases, this means that those recorded as being in employment were employed for the majority of the year. In the analysis below, which is concerned with those in employment, the focus is on those who were employed for at least 7 months of the year.

and Portugal and the Netherlands, where it was smaller. It was also the case for both men and women (almost 12% of men in work in the EU being employed part-time among migrants as against just over 6% for the native-born, while for women, the proportions were 33% and 23%, respectively).

The proportion of migrants working part-time increased between 2008 and 2014 in all but three (the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Portugal) of the 13 Member States for which data are available and by almost 6 percentage points overall (as opposed to an increase of just over 1 percentage point for the native-born). This is likely to have contributed significantly to the decline in the median income of migrants relative to the native-born population over the period.

There was little difference, however, in the average number of months that migrants in employment worked over the 2013 income year. On average across the EU, the figure for migrants was 11.2 months, only marginally less than the 11.4 months worked by the native-born. There were only 5 countries – Belgium, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Finland – where the difference was more than 0.3 of a month (in 6 countries, the average months worked was larger for migrants than for the native-born).

The income of migrants in work

In practice, a much larger proportion of migrants in work – some 25% on average – had income in the bottom quintile in 2013 than was the case for the native-born (10% on average) (Figure 10). This was true of all Member States, the difference being particularly large in Belgium, Spain, Austria, Luxembourg and Cyprus, in the last of which almost 40% of migrants in work had income in the bottom quintile.

Figure 10 Proportion of working native-born and migrants aged 25-64 with income in the bottom quintile, 2013 and 2007 (% total employed of each group)

2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata

2007



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata

This was also the case in 2007, when the proportion of migrants in employment (defined as those in work for at least 7 months of the year) with income in the bottom quintile was much the same as in 2013 in the EU as a whole, while the proportion for the native-born was slightly larger. There was, therefore, a reduction in the proportion of the native-born in work in the bottom quintile between the two years (by 1.5 percentage points on average), which was common to all Member States, apart from the Czech Republic, France and Luxembourg, where the proportion remained much the same. For migrants, on the other hand, there was an increase in the proportion in 6 countries, the UK, Spain, France, Lithuania, Ireland and Cyprus, which was particularly large in the last three (7-8 percentage points).

This has obvious implications for the extent of in-work poverty among migrants and the way that it has changed over recent years, both of which are examined below.

As indicated above, a larger proportion of migrants in work are employed in part-time jobs than among the native-born. It is also the case that in the bottom quintile of the income distribution more migrants are employed part-time than the native-born. On average, 31% of migrants in work with income this low were employed part-time in 2013 as opposed to 23% of the native-born, though there were as many countries (7) in which a smaller proportion of migrants worked in such jobs as countries in which a larger proportion did (See Annex Figure A.3).

On the other hand, as for the total in employment, there was little difference between migrants and the native-born in the average number of months worked by those in the bottom quintile who were employed (migrants worked on average 10.5 months in 2013, the native-born 10.4). There were only two countries, Finland and Greece, where migrants worked significantly fewer months (the difference was 1.5 months in the former and 1.2 months in the latter.)

Part-time working is a significant factor underlying the larger proportion of migrants in employment with income in the bottom quintile than the native-born, but, except in Finland and Greece, the number of months worked during the year is not.

The education level of migrants with low income

Across the EU as a whole, there is not much difference between the average education level of migrants and that of the native-born population. While a slightly larger proportion of migrants have tertiary education than the native born, more of them also have only basic schooling. The situation, however, varies across Member States. In 6 Member States (Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland, the UK and, most notably, the Czech Republic and Ireland), a larger proportion of migrants had tertiary-level education in 2013 than the native-born, whereas in 9 Member States, the opposite was the case (most especially in Greece, Lithuania and Austria); in three countries (Denmark, Cyprus and Sweden), there was little difference (see Annex, Figure A.2).

Despite the similarity in education attainment levels, the education level of migrants with income in the bottom quintile in 2013 was higher on average than for the native-born population and in some countries, substantially so, even in countries where the overall education level was lower. In the EU as a whole (or in those Member States for which data are available), 21% of migrants with income in this quintile had tertiary education as against just 12% of the native-born, while 47% had only basic schooling, only slightly larger than the 45% for the native-born (Table 5). The proportion of migrants in the bottom quintile with tertiary education was larger than for the native-born in all Member States, apart from Denmark and Croatia, where it was smaller, and Spain, France and Lithuania, where it was much the same. The difference was particularly large in Ireland, Finland and the UK (around 20 percentage points or more).

Table 5 Native-born and migrants aged 25-64 with income in the bottom quintile by education attainment level, 2007 and 2013 (% of each group in bottom quintile)

	Native-born						Migrants					
	2007			2013			2007			2013		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
BE	50.9	34.4	14.6	43.5	36.6	19.9	55.1	29.1	15.8	50.9	27.9	21.1
CZ	21.1	74.5	4.4	14.9	78.5	6.7	*18.2*	*55.1*	*26.8*	*18.5*	*72.4*	*9.1*
DK	32.9	39.8	27.3	23.7	44.0	32.3	26.8	44.3	28.9	38.5	34.8	26.7
IE	68.7	23.1	8.2	50.5	32.8	16.7	*21.7*	*23.6*	*54.7*	18.7	31.1	50.2
EL	62.2	30.1	7.7	47.2	42.7	10.1	43.2	42.7	14.1	39.5	48.3	12.2
ES	71.2	15.3	13.6	68.0	15.7	16.4	59.8	25.6	14.7	56.2	27.3	16.4
FR	41.7	46.7	11.6	29.9	55.6	14.5	65.3	23.3	11.4	49.2	36.6	14.2
HR				36.4	57.9	5.7				46.6	49.3	4.1
IT	69.3	25.8	4.9	60.8	30.3	8.8	56.2	34.2	9.6	46.4	44.1	9.5
CY	58.5	34.3	7.2	50.5	37.1	12.4	36.9	39.2	23.9	31.1	45.0	23.9
LT	23.0	67.9	9.1	16.8	71.8	11.4	18.1	65.1	16.9	11.1	77.5	11.4
LU	51.7	43.6	4.7	45.3	43.5	11.2	61.2	23.7	15.1	52.7	28.6	18.8
NL	40.2	41.2	18.5	32.7	46.1	21.2	39.8	41.4	18.8	23.2	47.4	29.4
AT	23.1	63.5	13.4	22.0	60.3	17.6	49.7	37.1	13.2	45.6	33.3	21.1
PT	93.4	4.9	1.7	85.7	9.8	4.5	84.0	10.1	5.8	54.2	32.1	13.8
FI	32.5	52.4	15.2	23.2	57.6	19.2	0.0	56.0	44.0	0.7	55.2	44.1
SE	16.5	59.7	23.8	16.9	53.4	29.7	30.2	41.2	28.5	40.0	25.4	34.6
UK	28.8	55.0	16.2	48.5	32.2	19.4	39.4	29.4	31.2	47.5	14.8	37.7
EU	47.5	43.0	9.5	44.6	43.3	12.1	53.8	29.9	16.3	46.6	32.6	20.8

Note: No data in 2007 for Croatia. Figures in italics indicate data of uncertain reliability because of small number of observations. Low relates to ISCED 0-2 (i.e. lower secondary education or below), medium to ISCED 3-4 (upper secondary or pre-tertiary), high to ISCED 5 and 6 (tertiary education).

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Over the 2007-2013 period, the proportion of migrants with tertiary education increased to much the same extent as for the native-born in the EU as a whole. However, there were only three countries (Belgian, Denmark and Portugal) where the proportion for migrants increased by more than for the native-born as against 10 countries where the opposite occurred (see Annex, Figure A.2).

For those with income in the bottom quintile, again, the increase in the proportion of migrants with this level of income was more than would be expected from the overall change relative to that for the native-born. On average, the proportion with tertiary education increased by more among migrants than among the native-born over the 2007-2013 period (by 2 percentage points more). This was also the case in 5 countries (the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and the UK) and in 9 countries, either the increase was smaller among migrants or the proportion for migrants declined while that for the native-born increased. The proportion for the native-born increased in all Member States while it declined for migrants in 5 countries.

In most cases, the level of education does not appear to be a reason for the relatively large proportion of migrants with low income or for the proportion increasing over recent years.

The income of migrants with tertiary education

The difference between migrants and the native-born in the relationship between education levels and income is emphasised by the contrast between the proportion of the two with tertiary education who have income in the bottom quintile. In 2013, 24% of migrants in the EU aged 25-64 with this level of education had income in this quintile as compared

with just 7% of the native-born (Figure 11) [8]. The proportion for migrants was around 35% in the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland and over 45% in Austria; there were only 4 countries (the Czech Republic, Croatia, Lithuania and Portugal), where it was below 15%, while for the native-born, it was above 10% only in Denmark, and then only marginally.

There are a number of possible reasons for this difference which are examined below, but it implies that many highly-qualified migrants are earning a lower level of income than similarly qualified non-migrants. This suggests perhaps that they are not achieving their full potential and, in turn, that their potential to contribute to the economy is not being made full use of.

Figure 11 Proportion of the native-born and migrants aged 25-64 with tertiary education with income in the bottom quintile, 2013 and 2007 (% total with tertiary education)

2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2007



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

One possible reason for the difference is that fewer migrants with tertiary education might have spouses or partners with the same level of education than is the case for the native-born, which would mean that their earnings potential, and therefore, their likely contribution to household income would be correspondingly less. In practice, this was the case in 9 of the 18 countries for which the relevant data are available, most especially in Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, where the difference between migrants with tertiary education whose spouses or partners also had tertiary education and the native-born was around 10 percentage points or more in 2013 (see Annex Figure A.4). It was not the case on average across the EU (the average proportion was slightly larger for migrants than the native-born – just over 65% as against just under 64%) or in the

[8] This is in line with the finding in the Employment and Social Development Report of 2015 that migrants are much more likely to be over-qualified for the job that they do than the native-born population, in that a larger proportion of those with at least upper secondary qualifications are in low-skilled jobs and equally significantly more of them report being over-qualified than the native-born. See European Commission (2016).

other 9 countries, especially in Croatia, the Czech Republic, the UK and Ireland, where the difference was also over 10 percentage points but in the opposite direction.

Over the 2007-2013 period, the proportion of migrants with tertiary education who had income in the bottom quintile increased both at the EU level (by just over 2 percentage points) and in most Member States (there were only 5 in which it declined) (Figure 11). The proportion of the native-born with tertiary education with income in the bottom quintile, on the other hand, remained much the same at the EU level and increased in only 5 countries. Indeed, there are only 4 countries (the Czech Republic, Italy, Belgium and Finland) where the difference in the proportion between migrants and the native-born narrowed over the period.

Household composition of migrants

The composition of households in which migrants live is another possible reason for the disproportionate number of them with low levels of income. In particular, if the income generated from employment, from social transfers or from other sources is spread across a large number of dependents or if those living alone need to support their children then the equivalised level of household income, which is how income is defined here, would be reduced as a result. Indeed, both are important reasons for households having a low level of income, irrespective of the country of birth of the people concerned.

In practice, a relatively large proportion of migrants with low income have large families, or at least, live in couple households with three or more children. Comparatively few of them are lone parents.

At EU level, 17% of migrants with income in the bottom quintile lived in households with three of more children in 2013, over twice the proportion for the native-born, the proportion being around a third in Ireland and almost a quarter in Denmark, Luxembourg and the UK (Table 6). Only in Croatia and Cyprus was the proportion for migrants smaller than for native-born people.

In the case of lone parents, however, the relative number in the bottom quintile was very similar for migrants as for the native-born; there were only three countries – Lithuania, Portugal and Finland – where it was significantly larger.

Between 2007 and 2013, the proportion of migrants in the bottom quintile with three or more children increased slightly on average while it declined for the native-born. Indeed, there were 10 Member States in which the proportion for migrants increased by more than 3 percentage points, most notably in the UK and Ireland (by over 10 percentage points in the first and 20 percentage points in the second) as well as in the Czech Republic (though the relatively small number of observations for the last means that there is some uncertainty about the scale of the increase).

Accordingly, the relatively large size of families of migrants seems to contribute to the disproportionate number of them with income in the bottom quintile, while the increase in the proportion with low income over the 2007-2013 period may also owe a little to this factor, especially in Ireland and the UK.

Table 6 Proportion of the native-born and migrants aged 16-64 with income in the bottom quintile who are lone parents or couples with three of more children, 2013 (% total of each group)

	Native-born				Migrants			
	Lone parent		Couple with 3+ children		Lone parent		Couple with 3+ children	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	2007	2013	2007	2013
BE	13.8	18.1	13.9	9.8	7.9	11.9	16.3	19.4
CZ	*12.3*	*11.1*	*8.3*	*9.4*	*1.8*	*0.0*	*0.9*	*13.1*
DK	10.9	10.6	4.7	6.8	12.5	10.1	17.8	22.6
IE	17.7	12.3	10.5	13.1	12.5	10.6	14.2	34.2
EL	1.5	2.0	2.4	3.7	2.6	2.5	4.5	9.3
ES	2.5	4.5	6.0	4.3	4.0	5.3	18.6	16.8
FR	10.9	14.5	12.8	8.8	8.2	11.1	24.1	19.4
HR		2.1		10.1		4.0		9.2
IT	4.9	6.3	7.9	4.8	6.8	4.2	8.5	11.7
CY	7.6	4.8	18.5	10.2	7.8	5.3	6.5	9.9
LT	12.5	11.5	11.4	7.5	10.0	23.9	2.7	9.3
LU	10.0	14.6	3.8	9.0	8.1	7.9	27.0	23.1
NL	9.6	9.1	15.9	11.0	13.3	7.9	13.0	14.3
AT	8.7	6.9	8.9	10.0	5.7	8.2	16.1	13.1
PT	4.4	6.0	4.7	5.3	3.2	13.2	7.7	11.4
FI	9.7	9.6	8.7	8.2	2.8	15.1	17.9	10.2
SE	17.0	10.7	8.8	5.0	7.7	12.6	18.6	16.8
UK	13.5	12.3	9.9	8.8	17.0	8.1	12.4	23.4
EU	7.6	8.0	9.6	7.9	8.3	7.7	15.9	17.1

Note: No data for Croatia for 2007. . Figures in italics indicate data of uncertain reliability because of small number of observations.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

The risk of poverty among migrants

As implied by comparisons of income and as indicated by previous studies, the risk of poverty is much greater among migrants than in the rest of the population (Table 7).

In 2013, the proportion of migrants at risk (defined in the conventional way as having equivalised household disposable income of less than 60% of the median in their country of residence) was over twice as large in the EU as a whole as for the native-born population. The proportion at risk was larger for migrants than for the native-born in all Member States; only in Lithuania, Portugal and Denmark was the difference less than 10 percentage points. In Belgium and Greece, the difference was over 30 percentage points and in Spain, only slightly less.

Moreover, over the 6 years 2007-2013, the proportion at risk increased more among migrants than among the rest of the population in all but 5 countries (Denmark, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland for which the figures are shaded in Table 7, where the difference between migrants and the native-born in the proportion at risk of poverty narrowed over the period).

Table 7 Proportion of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 at risk of poverty, 2007 and 2013 (% of each group)

	Native-born		Migrants		Change 2007-13	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	Dom-born	Migrants
BE	9.8	10.5	40.1	44.9	0.7	4.9
DK	10.0	12.9	29.2	21.5	2.9	-7.7
IE	13.4	15.1	17.3	28.5	1.7	11.1
EL	17.6	20.9	31.9	51.6	3.3	19.7
ES	15.6	19.8	31.1	48.3	4.2	17.2
FR	10.3	11.9	28.6	30.0	1.6	1.4
HR		16.9		29.5		
IT	15.7	17.9	26.5	34.1	2.1	7.6
CY	8.6	10.2	29.5	30.3	1.6	0.7
LT	17.4	17.9	11.5	20.8	0.5	9.3
LU	7.2	10.7	36.2	36.8	3.5	0.7
NL	8.9	10.7	20.8	26.3	1.8	5.5
AT	9.4	8.8	33.6	32.1	-0.6	-1.5
PT	16.5	19.2	17.0	22.4	2.6	5.4
FI	11.2	11.8	40.6	28.0	0.6	-12.6
SE	9.1	11.7	30.8	33.9	2.6	3.1
UK	14.5	14.7	21.4	25.3	0.2	3.9
EU	14.0	15.8	27.4	33.3	1.8	5.9

Note: Data for the Czech Republic unreliable; no data for Croatia in 2007. Figures highlighted denote cases where the difference between migrants and the native-born population narrowed over the period.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

In sum, the odds of migrants having income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold was around twice as high in the EU as for the rest of the population in 2013 and was over twice as high in 10 of the 17 countries for which data are available (and reasonably reliable) (Figure 12 – note that the odds ratio also takes account of those born in other EU Member States as well as those born in the Member State concerned). In Belgium, the odds were over three times as high. The odds were greater in 2013 than in 2007 in the majority of countries.

Figure 12 The odds of migrants being at risk of poverty relative to the rest of the population, 2007 and 2013 (odds ratio)



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

This has potential implications for social cohesion in the EU Member States where the odds of migrants having income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold is so high.

Remittances abroad

A possible reason underlying the low income of migrants is a tendency for them to transfer income back to their families in their home country. Since such transfers are taken into

account in the calculation of disposable income, large remittances might explain, at least in part, why migrants on average have lower income than the native-born population and why a disproportionate number of them are at risk of poverty.

In practice, however, remittances for the great majority of migrants are very small, according to the EU-SILC, accounting on average for only 1.5% of the household income of migrants (measured before such transfers) across the EU in 2013 (for the native-born, transfers to other households averaged 0.7% of income). There are only two countries, Spain and Cyprus, where the figure was over 2% of income and in the former, it was less than 3%. In Cyprus, it amounted to 8% on average and for around 17% of households it was over 20% of their income. This would help to explain the relatively high at-risk-of-poverty rate among migrants in these countries, but in other countries remittances are not large enough to be a significant factor.

Moreover, between 2007 and 2013, transfers to other households declined relative to income, both overall and in most countries (in 2007, they averaged 2% of income across the EU), the main exception being Cyprus (where they increased by just over 3 percentage points).

The risk of poverty among migrants in employment

As implied by the evidence on the relatively large number of migrants in employment whose household income is in the bottom quintile, there are a significant proportion of migrants among the 'working poor', i.e. who were in work during the income year, in the sense that they were employed for more than half the year (i.e. 7 months or more), but whose household income is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. In 2013, this was the case for 22% of migrants in employment as against only 8% of the native-born (Figure 13).

Figure 13 Proportion of native-born and migrants aged 16-64 in employment who were at risk of poverty in 2013 and 2007 (% of each group)

2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2007



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

In Luxembourg, Greece and Spain, the proportion was over 30%, and in all countries, it was larger than for the native-born, in most cases substantially so.

Between 2007 and 2013, the proportion of migrants in employment who were at risk of poverty increased by 4 percentage points while the proportion for the native-born remained much the same. In most countries, the difference between the proportion of working migrants at risk of poverty and that of the native-born widened over this period, narrowing in only 5 countries – Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and the Czech Republic (where, as noted, the figures are subject to a relatively high degree of uncertainty)[9]. The widening of the difference was especially marked in Greece and Spain (by 11-12 percentage points in both cases), countries hit particularly hard by the crisis.

Although, as indicated above, a larger proportion of migrants than the native-born had large families to support, which reduces their equivalised household income, it appears that the main reason for the higher at-risk-of-poverty rates of those in work lies in their much lower earnings from employment.

To investigate this directly, the monthly earnings of migrants can be compared with those of the native-born population.

Monthly earnings of migrants

In a few countries, especially in Greece and Finland, the relatively large proportion of migrants with income below 60% of the median is attributable to some extent to them working only part of the year, as indicated above, and in around half the countries, to them working part-time. But the proportion remains large even if this is explicitly allowed for. To do so, earnings can be calculated on a full-time equivalent and monthly basis. The results show that the relative number of migrants with equivalised monthly earnings below 60% of the median remains much larger than that of the native-born. In 2013, just under 27% of migrants had earnings below this level as against just under 16% of the native-born (Table 9). Again, a difference is common to all Member States and for both men and women. It remains substantial in Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Luxembourg (20 percentage points or more).

Between 2007 and 2013, the proportion of migrants with monthly earnings below 60% of the median increased by almost 6 percentage points, while the proportion for the native-born remained virtually unchanged, much the same as in the case of the unadjusted figures. The difference in the proportions, however, narrowed over the period in Belgium, Greece, Cyprus and the Netherlands as well as in Denmark, Luxembourg and Finland.

In sum, a major reason for the relatively large number of migrants with income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold is their low level of monthly earnings as compared with native-born workers. Moreover, over recent years, the earnings of migrants seem to have declined relative to those of the native-born.

The low earnings of migrants, however, might be a result of a number of different factors, in particular, the kind of job that they are employed in or their level of education as well as their age, each of which could reduce their earning capability. The analysis above suggests that age and education levels do not seem to be significant explanations, but an econometric analysis has been carried out in order to allow explicitly for their potential effect on the earnings of migrants relative to those of the native-born population. More specifically, such an analysis enables the effect on monthly earnings of being a migrant as opposed to being born in the country concerned to be isolated from the effect of other factors influencing earnings, including gender as well as occupation, education level and age. The results of the analysis are set out below.

[9] The number of observations is above the lower limit (of 20), below which the data are deemed to be unreliable, but in the range which is considered to mean that the margin of error is likely to be relatively wide.

Table 9 Proportion of native-born and migrants aged 16-64 with full-time equivalised monthly earnings below 60% of median monthly earnings by gender, 2007 and 2013 (% total in work)

	Native-born						Non-EU-born					
	2007			2013			2007			2013		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
BE	11.0	8.1	14.6	8.7	7.0	10.8	20.5	13.7	31.7	17.6	11.2	24.8
DK	12.1	11.1	13.2	9.8	9.4	10.3	29.2	17.6	40.9	15.5	11.4	18.8
IE	17.3	15.0	20.2	19.0	16.9	21.4	19.4	11.8	26.1	26.3	33.1	20.0
EL	19.9	15.5	26.3	18.6	15.6	22.9	26.6	19.1	41.3	24.6	21.9	29.9
ES	13.7	9.5	19.5	17.1	13.9	21.1	20.1	10.4	31.7	39.2	37.3	41.4
FR	11.1	8.6	13.9	13.1	10.1	16.2	14.3	10.6	18.9	16.9	14.8	19.6
HR				11.5	9.2	14.4				13.9	10.7	17.9
IT	12.2	9.7	15.9	15.1	12.9	18.4	24.7	13.0	44.1	35.0	26.9	46.2
CY	13.0	4.7	24.4	11.7	8.0	15.9	52.1	21.8	70.7	50.4	32.3	59.3
LT	21.1	13.9	28.2	19.5	15.6	23.6	17.4	13.3	22.4	22.7	17.4	28.6
LU	13.7	9.8	19.5	14.8	12.5	17.8	47.8	31.3	64.6	45.6	42.4	49.6
NL	16.0	8.9	24.6	15.8	11.4	21.1	21.3	11.8	31.6	19.8	14.5	25.1
AT	18.8	12.6	26.8	17.3	12.7	23.4	27.1	22.0	35.5	30.3	22.6	38.7
PT	13.3	10.5	16.7	9.5	7.5	11.7	14.7	11.9	17.8	11.4	10.3	12.3
FI	12.9	11.3	14.6	10.5	9.2	11.9	35.4	31.8	39.6	15.9	15.0	16.8
SE	15.3	12.9	18.0	14.9	12.5	17.5	22.8	24.0	21.4	26.8	20.9	32.9
UK	18.7	10.7	27.1	19.6	14.2	25.6	23.0	23.3	22.6	24.5	21.0	28.9
EU	15.4	11.5	20.3	15.5	12.5	19.0	21.1	14.7	29.5	26.6	22.3	31.7

Note: No data for Croatia for 2007. Figures in italics indicate data of uncertain reliability because of small number of observations. The figures show annual earnings adjusted to a monthly basis to allow for employment for only part of the year and to a full-time equivalent basis to allow for part-time working.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Multivariate analysis of the variation in monthly earnings

The regression model constructed to assess the effect of migrant status on monthly earnings is in the standard form of:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \cdots \beta_n x_{in}$$

where y is earnings, β_0 is the intercept; and β_1 *to* β_n are the coefficients of each independent variable. The analysis is restricted to those aged 18-64 working as employees in full-time jobs during the income year and who did not experience any recent job change prior to the survey date. Two different variables to represent earnings were used. For individual countries, it was the natural logarithm (*ln*) of monthly gross earnings of full-time employees, calculated from the data on annual earnings and dividing these by the number of months worked by the individual. This is then related in each country to the average earnings of the reference group, which consists of native-born men employed as managers (in the ISCO 1 1-digit occupation group) with tertiary education. For the EU average, earnings were expressed in terms of deciles in the different countries in order to overcome the difficulty of earnings varying markedly between countries, which could well distort the results. The analysis was carried out for the 2013 income year.

The independent variables included in the model are gender, occupation (ISCO-2008 1-digit groups), the highest education level attained (i.e. basic, upper secondary or tertiary) age (divided into 5-year age groups), country of birth (the country concerned, another EU country or a non-EU country) and, in the case of migrants, the length of time in the country, migrants being divided into two groups, those who had been in the country for less than 5

years and those who had been there longer. The age variable is continuous while all the other independent variables are categorical[10].

For almost all the countries for which data are available and reasonably reliable, the coefficients for gender, age, occupation and education level all have the expected sign and are highly statistically significant (i.e. at the 0.1% level). Specifically, women had earnings which were more than 10% less than those for men in all countries, after allowing for the effect of the other factors included in the model, and over 25% less in the Czech Republic, Portugal and Lithuania. Earnings tended to increase with age in all countries as well as with education attainment levels and the 'level' of occupation. For the last, although there are some differences across countries, for the most part, managers tend to earn more than professionals (ISCO 2), who in turn tend to earn more than associate professionals and technicians (ICSO 3), who tend to earn more than clerks or office workers (ISCO 4), who tend to earn more than skilled and semi-skilled manual workers (ISCO groups 7 and 8) who have similar earnings on average. The latter tend to have higher earnings than sales and service workers (ISCO 5) who tend to have higher earnings than agricultural workers and elementary workers (ISCO groups 6 and 9), who also have similar earnings levels (see Annex Table A.4 for details of the full regression results).

After allowing for the effect of these factors on earnings, employees from non-EU countries still tended to have lower earnings than the native-born. In the EU as a whole, the monthly earnings of migrants were, on average, 6 percentiles (i.e. 0.6 of a decile) less than those of native-born employees (Table 10). In 5 Member States – Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Luxembourg – migrant earnings are significantly below those of the native-born at the 0.1% confidence level (i.e. there is only one in 1,000 chance that this is not the case) and by between 15% and 30% (according to the value of the coefficients), even after taking account of the influence of the other factors.

In Belgium, Ireland, France, Austria and Sweden, migrant earnings are also significantly less than those of the native-born, though the degree of confidence is slightly less (i.e. 5% rather than 0.1%). The extent of the difference is also smaller, at only 5% in France but 9-13% in the other 4 countries. In Lithuania, there is a difference between the earnings of migrants and those of the native-born which is significant at the 5% level too, but in this case migrants' earnings are higher rather than lower.

In most of the other countries, there is little difference in the earnings of migrants relative to the native-born once the other factors are allowed for, except in the Czech Republic and Finland, though the level of significance is only 10%.

The monthly earnings of employees from other EU countries were also less than those of the native-born on average across the EU, though by only around half as much as for migrants from third countries. In three countries, Italy, Cyprus and Luxembourg, the difference is significant at the 0.1% level – the extent of the difference being particularly large in Italy, where most workers from other EU countries come from Romania and Bulgaria – and in another, two, Spain and Ireland, it is significant at the 5% level. This is also the case in the Czech Republic, but here migrants tended to have higher earnings than the native-born. In the other countries, the difference is small in most cases and only significant at the 10% level.

[10] It should be noted that the relatively small size of the sample in some countries has been explicitly taken into account by excluding the countries where the number of observations creates reliability problems from the analysis. In addition, 'complex sample' regression techniques specifically prepared for the EU-SILC which take account of the sampling design and size of the sample in individual countries have been used.

Table 10 The effect of being a migrant or born in another EU Member State on monthly earnings of full-time employees, after allowing for the effect of gender, age, occupation and education level – value of regression coefficients, 2013

	Non-EU migrant	Born in another EU country	Arrived in last 5 years
BE	-0.11**	+0.07*	+0.01*
CZ	+0.27*	+0.14**	+0.03*
DK	+0.01*	+0.05*	+0.08*
IE	-0.13**	-0.07**	-0.22**
EL	-0.15***	+0.06*	+0.16*
ES	-0.15***	-0.24**	+0.22*
FR	-0.05**	+0.05*	-0.32*
HR	+0.00*	+0.02*	-0.14**
IT	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.09*
CY	-0.34***	-0.10***	-0.23***
LT	+0.17**	-0.09*	-1.64*
LU	-0.32***	-0.16***	-0.08**
NL	-0.02*	-0.01*	+0.01*
AT	-0.11**	-0.05*	-0.06*
PT	-0.03*	+0.01*	+0.10*
FI	-0.10*	-0.04*	+0.00*
SE	-0.09**	-0.01*	-0.33*
UK	+0.01*	+0.01*	+0.11*
EU	-0.61***	-0.33***	+0.25*

*Note: *** significant at the 0.1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level*
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

The length of time migrants had been in the country was also included in the regression model. The results indicate that being in the country for less than 5 years reduced the earnings significantly at the 0.1% confidence level only in Cyprus and at the 5% level only in Ireland, Croatia and Luxembourg[11]. In most of the other countries, migrants who have been in the country for less than 5 years tend to have either higher earnings than others or similar levels and, in any case, where they have lower earnings, the degree of significance is relatively low. Except in a few countries, therefore, there is no strong evidence that the number of years that a migrant has been in a country reduces the extent of the difference between their earnings and those of the native-born.

The extent to which earnings of migrants are lower than those of the native-born seems either to have remained much the same or to have increased over the crisis period in most countries where a comparison can be made. Applying the same model to the 2007 data, therefore, indicates that the value of the coefficient for migrant status was slightly lower than in 2013 for both the EU average and for Spain and Italy, while for Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Austria it was very similar (Table 11 – note that it was not possible to include the length of time migrants had been in the country in the regression model for 2007, so the value of the coefficients for 2013 are slightly different from those in Table 10). Only in Ireland and Cyprus did it decline.

[11] The EU-SILC data do not allow migrants who have been in the country for only one or two years to be identified, only those who have been here for less than 5 years.

Table 11 The effect of being a migrant on monthly earnings of full-time employees, after allowing for the effect of gender, age, occupation and education level – value of regression coefficients, 2007 and 2013

	2007	2013
BE	-0.11**	-0.11***
CZ	-0.13	+0.27**
DK	-0.16*	+0.03
IE	-0.22**	-0.15**
ES	-0.08**	-0.16***
FR	-0.05*	-0.06**
IT	-0.09***	-0.21***
CY	-0.48***	-0.38***
LT	+0.06	+0.00
LU	-0.31***	-0.33***
NL	-0.02	-0.02
AT	-0.13**	-0.12**
PT	+0.03	-0.01
UK	+0.10**	+0.02
EU	-0.43***	-0.58***

*Note: No data for EL, HR, FI and SE in 2007. ***=significant at 0.1% level; **=significant at 5% level; *=significant at 10% level*

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC

It is possible to carry out a similar analysis using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, for which the sample size is much bigger than for the EU-SILC and for which, therefore, the results should be more reliable. However, the data for monthly earnings relate to take-home pay rather than gross earnings and are given in terms of deciles rather than actual money amounts. In addition, all employees aged 15-64 (rather than 18-64) are included in the analysis regardless of whether they work full-time or part-time, but in order to control for the effect on monthly wages of working part-time hours, a dummy variable is included in the regression model to identify those employed part-time.

The results support the above analysis in that the countries in which migrant earnings were less than those for the native born after taking account of gender, age, occupation and education level according to the EU-SILC data, also show lower earnings for migrants on the basis of the LFS data. In addition, a number of countries where this was not the case, using EU-SILC data show significantly lower earnings for migrants if the LFS data are used instead. This is so for Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and the UK. It is also true for Estonia and Slovenia for which the sample size in respect of the EU-SILC data is too small for the results to be reliable (see Annex, Table A.5).

Migrants earnings are also significantly different from those of the native-born population in Germany, for which there are no EU-SILC data. But in this case, migrants' earnings are higher rather than lower. However, the earnings of migrants who have been in the country for less than 5 years are significantly lower than those who have been there longer. This is the case for Cyprus, Croatia and Luxembourg as well, confirming what the EU-SILC data show, but it is also the case for Italy, France, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.

In sum, the LFS data suggest that the disadvantage in earnings suffered by migrants is more widespread than the EU-SILC data indicate and that, with only a few exceptions, it occurs generally across the EU. The disadvantage is particularly large for migrants who have been in the country for less than 5 years. This is perhaps to be expected given that they have had less time to become accustomed to social norms and ways of doing things. They may also be less likely to know the language well and be employed in temporary jobs which tend to carry lower wages.

The disadvantage indicated by the regression analysis is compounded further by the fact that migrants are more likely to be over-qualified for the job that they do, as noted above,

and, accordingly, to be in occupations which pay less than their qualifications seem to merit. Migrants are, therefore, doubly disadvantaged: they are more likely than the native-born both to be in occupations with relatively low earnings and to earn less in the occupation they are in.

How far this reflects discrimination against migrants is difficult to say. There are other more objective reasons for the findings, such as the educational qualifications of migrants, their experience being harder to verify than those of the native-born or not being formally recognised, or language difficulties. But discrimination cannot be ruled out.

Material deprivation among migrants

As implied by their relative income levels, migrants are also more likely to be materially deprived than their native-born counterparts. In the EU in 2014, just over a third (34%) of migrants were identified as being materially deprived (in the sense of being unable to afford three of 9 items covered by the EU-SILC)[12] as compared with just under 20% of the native-born population (Table 12). In none of the countries was the proportion of migrants materially deprived smaller than for the native-born population and in most cases, it was substantially larger.

Table 12 Proportion of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 materially-deprived, 2007 and 2013 (% of each group)

	Native-born		Migrants		Change 2008-14	
	2008	2014	2008	2014	Dom-born	Migrants
BE	9.2	9.9	43.4	34.4	0.7	-8.9
DK	5.2	8.0	17.8	21.9	2.7	4.1
IE	12.6	22.8	20.5	36.8	10.2	16.3
EL	18.0	37.1	45.5	73.1	19.1	27.5
ES	7.5	15.7	32.9	42.2	8.3	9.4
FR	12.1	11.5	28.2	27.3	-0.7	-0.8
HR		33.9		40.2		
IT	14.5	20.9	31.4	46.6	6.3	15.3
CY	22.7	38.4	35.1	43.8	15.7	8.7
LT	19.5	25.1	26.4	32.1	5.6	5.7
LU	1.9	3.6	11.2	12.2	1.7	0.9
NL	4.9	7.6	15.1	26.8	2.7	11.7
AT	9.5	6.5	32.7	25.4	-3.0	-7.4
PT	20.8	24.8	30.1	38.5	4.0	8.4
FI	8.9	8.3	19.0	21.1	-0.6	2.1
SE	3.6	2.5	14.1	11.8	-1.1	-2.3
UK	10.4	16.6	21.7	22.8	6.2	1.1
EU	17.4	19.6	28.9	34.0	2.2	5.2

Note: Shaded cells denote instances where the increase in the rate of material deprivation increased by less for migrants than for the native-born population or declined by more.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Over the 6 years 2008-2014[13], the proportion increased by more for migrants than for the rest of the population both on average and in most Member States, the only exceptions being Cyprus and the UK, where the reverse was the case. In Austria, the proportion of migrants materially deprived declined by more than for the native-born and in Belgium, the proportion of migrants declined whereas it increased slightly for the native-born.

As in the case of the risk of poverty, the odds of migrants being materially deprived were greater than for the rest of the population (again including people from other EU Member States). In 10 countries, migrants were at least twice as likely to be deprived as other people living in the country concerned – in Sweden, over three times as likely (Figure 14).

[12] Include list of the 9 items.

[13] Note that material deprivation is measured at the time of the survey whereas income and the risk of poverty is measured for the preceding year.

However, in 7 countries the odds declined over the 6 years 2008 to 2014 and in only three (Finland, Austria and Sweden) was there much of an increase. (In both Finland and Sweden, it should be noted, the increase for migrants in the odds of being materially deprived occurred at the same time as the odds of them being at risk of poverty declined significantly.) Nevertheless, the odds of migrants being materially deprived either increased or remained much the same over the 6-year period in the majority of countries..

Figure 14 The odds of migrants being materially deprived relative to the rest of the population, 2008 and 2014 (odds ratio)



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Severe material deprivation among migrants

There is an equally marked difference in the rate of severe material deprivation – defined as not being able to afford four of the 9 items included in the EU-SILC – between migrants of working age and the native-born population. In 2014, 18% of migrants in the EU were identified as being severely materially deprived as compared with just under 10% of those born in the country concerned (Table 13). Again, there was no country in which the rate of severe deprivation was less for migrants than for the rest of the population, though in Cyprus, the rate was the same.

Table 13 Proportion of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 materially-deprived, 2007 and 2013 (% of each group)

	Native-born		Migrants		Change 2008-14	
	2008	2014	2008	2014	Dom-born	Migrants
BE	4.0	4.7	28.6	23.1	0.7	-5.4
DK	1.8	3.4	8.5	9.2	1.6	0.7
IE	5.7	8.8	7.7	17.8	3.1	10.1
EL	8.8	20.3	28.2	51.2	11.5	23.1
ES	2.2	5.9	14.1	20.4	3.8	6.2
FR	5.1	4.6	14.2	12.9	-0.4	-1.3
HR		13.4		20.5		
IT	6.7	10.4	15.9	26.6	3.8	10.7
CY	7.7	17.3	17.8	17.3	9.5	-0.6
LT	10.9	12.2	17.1	17.3	1.4	0.2
LU	0.2	1.2	2.3	3.5	1.0	1.2
NL	1.3	2.2	7.1	14.5	0.9	7.3
AT	4.2	2.6	18.8	11.1	-1.6	-7.7
PT	8.4	9.8	20.6	18.2	1.4	-2.3
FI	3.5	3.1	10.4	10.7	-0.4	0.3
SE	1.1	0.5	5.6	3.3	-0.6	-2.2
UK	4.4	8.3	13.1	11.6	3.9	-1.5
EU	8.7	9.6	15.0	17.9	0.9	2.9

Note: Shaded figures denote instances where the increase in severe material deprivation among migrants was less than for the native-born population or the reduction was more.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

There was, however, less of a difference between migrants and the native-born population in the change in severe material deprivation rates over the 6 years 2008-2014 than in the case of material deprivation. In 7 countries the increase was less for migrants, or the reduction was more, and in only 5 the reverse was the case.

The odds of migrants being severely deprived relative to the rest of the population living in EU Member States declined between 2008 and 2014 in 10 countries for which data are available and increased only in Ireland, Finland and Sweden (Figure 7).

Figure 15 The odds of migrants being severely materially deprived relative to the rest of the population, 2008 and 2014 (odds ratio)



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Nevertheless, migrants remained more likely to be severely deprived than other people of working age in 2014 in all countries, apart from Cyprus, and again over twice as likely in 10 countries. In Finland and Belgium, migrants were over three times as likely to be severely deprived and in the Netherlands and Sweden, over 4 times as likely However, it should be noted that in all four countries, the proportion of people who were severely deprived was very small.

Migrants living in low work-intensity households

The relative number of migrants in the EU living in very low work intensity households also tended to be higher than for the native-born population, though the difference was less pronounced than for the risk of poverty or material deprivation[14]. In 2013, just under 20% of migrants, on average, lived in households with very low work intensity as against just under 16% of the native-born population (Table 14). There were three countries – Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal – where the proportion of migrants living in such households was less than for the native-born population, in the first two markedly so, while in a fourth, Spain, the proportion was much the same. By contrast, in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, the proportion for migrants was over twice as large as for the native-born. This is of course one of the reasons behind the income of migrants being lower than for the native-born population, since low work intensity is associated with a significantly higher risk of poverty.

Over the 6 years 2007-2013, the proportion of migrants living in very low work intensity households increased by more than for the native-born population in most countries, the only exceptions being France, Luxembourg and the UK, where in each case the proportion for migrants declined while that for the native-born increased. The increase for migrants was especially marked in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Lithuania and, relative to the change for the native-born population, in the Netherlands and Finland. The reduction in

[14] A very low work intensity household is defined as one in which employment among members is less than 20% of what it would be if all members were employed throughout the year in full-time jobs. This could be because some members of the household are not working at all, or work only very short hours or are employed for only part of the year.

employment which occurred over this period was, therefore, concentrated disproportionately among migrants.

Table 14 Proportion of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 living in very low work-intensity households, 2007 and 2013 (% of each group)

	Native-born		Migrants		%-point change 2007-13	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	Dom-born	Migrants
BE	16.1	17.1	33.4	36.6	1.0	3.2
DK	16.5	19.4	19.5	23.5	3.0	4.0
IE	15.9	23.9	15.7	31.0	8.0	15.3
EL	12.0	23.4	5.5	26.1	11.4	20.6
ES	9.7	20.6	4.5	21.2	10.9	16.7
FR	14.9	17.0	22.9	21.3	2.1	-1.6
HR		17.7		23.3		
IT	14.4	16.4	8.5	11.9	1.9	3.3
CY	6.6	12.0	6.2	14.0	5.3	7.8
LT	8.8	12.2	8.9	20.5	3.3	11.6
LU	11.9	12.8	10.9	7.2	0.9	-3.7
NL	14.8	14.0	22.4	28.1	-0.8	5.7
AT	11.8	12.5	14.8	19.3	0.7	4.5
PT	8.7	15.9	6.9	14.9	7.2	8.0
FI	12.3	14.1	21.5	29.8	1.9	8.4
SE	8.5	8.1	17.6	20.2	-0.4	2.6
UK	13.3	14.8	23.8	17.4	1.5	-6.4
EU	13.0	15.5	14.6	19.6	2.5	5.1

Note: Shaded figures denote instances where the increase in low work-intensity among migrants was less than for the native-born population or the reduction was more.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Access of migrants to social protection

In recent year, the access of migrants to social benefits has been a political issue in a number of EU countries and has been used in arguments for curbing immigration, with the term 'benefit tourism' being coined to describe the alleged phenomenon of migrants choosing to migrate to a particular country because of the social benefits on offer. As indicated above, there is little difference in the proportion of migrants in receipt of social benefits and that of the native-born population, which seems to be evidence against this phenomenon being a reality. However, this in itself does not indicate whether or not migrants make similar use of the social protection system, or indeed have similar access to it, as the native-born when in a situation of need since it is not straightforward to identify when such a need occurs. The EU-SILC, however, provides some means of examining the issue in the form of data on the receipt of unemployment benefits and on the self-reported unmet need for healthcare. These data are examined in turn below.

Access of migrants to unemployment benefits

Access to social benefits when a person is unemployed depends, first, on whether or not they comply with the conditions for entitlement to social insurance-based payments, which typically require that sufficient contributions have been paid over a prior period or that a person has been employed for a minimum number of months over a given period. These conditions vary markedly across countries, as does the likely ease or difficulty of complying with them. Migrants who have been in the country for a relatively short time, or who are in non-stable employment, will tend to have the most difficulty in doing so[15].

[15] See 'Non-standard employment and access to social benefits', Research Note, Social Situation Monitor, 2015 for a review of the access to benefits of those in such jobs in EU countries.

It is not possible from the data available to check how far those reporting themselves as unemployed in the EU-SILC meet the conditions for entitlement to unemployment benefits, which are usually insurance-based and dependent on a the requisite amount of social contributions having been paid[16]. But it is possible to identify how many of the unemployed – defining these as those reporting to have been unemployed for at least two months during the year in order to exclude those who might have been unemployed for too short a time to claim benefit[17] – were in receipt of unemployment benefits.

These data show that, on average in the EU, 43% of migrants aged 25-64 (in order to exclude those younger who in some cases may not be eligible for benefit) who were unemployed received unemployment benefit in 2013, which is the same as for the native-born similarly unemployed (Figure 16). The aggregate figures, however, are somewhat misleading. In 12 Member States, the proportion for migrants was significantly smaller than for the native-born, while in only two (Italy and Lithuania) was it larger. In Greece and Portugal, it was much the same.

In most EU countries, therefore, migrants who are unemployed seem to have less access to insurance-based unemployment benefits than the native-born. The same was the case in 2007, when there was only one country, the UK, where the proportion of migrants who were unemployed and in receipt of unemployment benefits was larger than for the native-born population (though this result is of uncertain reliability because of the relatively small number of observations on which it is based and the much small figure for 2013 raises doubts about the reliability – see Table A.3 in the Annex).

Figure 16 Proportion of migrants and native-born aged 25-64 unemployed for 2+ months in receipt of unemployment benefits, 2013 (% of each group)



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

In cases where the unemployed do not qualify for insurance-based benefits, access to income support depends on the nature of the social assistance, or minimum income guarantee, system in operation and on the conditions for entitlement which apply. These also vary markedly across Member States. In general, however, such benefits are means-tested. This means that entitlement depends on income being below a certain level and in most countries, accumulated savings, or assets, must also be below a minimum level. It

http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?advSearchKey=ssonotes&mode=advancedSubmit&langId=en&policyArea=&type=0&country=0&year=2015

[16] It is not possible to tell from the information given in the EU-SILC which measures are included under the term 'unemployment benefit' and how far it is confined to insurance-benefits.

[17] Countries vary in the promptness with which unemployment benefits are paid and in the conditions which .need to be met in order for payment to be made. From the EU-SILC data, it is possible only to identify those who were mainly unemployed in a particular month and not the number of days during the month they were unemployed. Moreover, unemployment is defined on a self-assessed basis which might differ from how the authorities in the country in question define unemployment for purposes of determining those eligible for benefits. The exclusion from the analysis of those unemployed for only one month during the year is in order not to include those who may have been unemployed for too short a period either to claim benefit or to receive payment. Accordingly, it excludes those who ought not to have received benefit under the arrangement in place. In practice, it makes little difference to the results.

means, in addition, that those who consider themselves entitled must claim them from the relevant office. It is possible that migrants may be less likely to do so because of language difficulties or having less access to the necessary information.

As in the case of unemployment benefits, it is not possible from the data available to check how far those reporting themselves to be unemployed in the EU-SILC qualify for income support from social assistance or minimum income guarantee schemes (which in the statistics are grouped together under the term 'social exclusion benefits'). But, again, it is possible to examine the relative number of the unemployed who were in receipt of such benefits.

In 2013, only 13% of migrants in the EU who were unemployed – restricting these again to those out of work for at least two months – received social exclusion benefits (Figure 17). This, however, was more than the proportion for the native-born unemployed (9%). The relative number of migrants receiving social exclusion benefits was also larger than for the native-born in 10 of the 15 Member States for which a comparison is possible; only in one country, Portugal, was the reverse the case. Nevertheless, although the proportion in receipt of support was larger for migrants, it still means that the absolute numbers involved were small. It implies that only 2% of migrants of working-age across the EU were in receipt of such support.

Figure 17 Proportion of migrants and native-born aged 25-64 unemployed for 2+ months in receipt of social exclusion benefits, 2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

The situation was slightly different in 2007, when the overall proportion of migrants who were unemployed in the EU and receiving social exclusion benefits was much the same as for the native-born. However, in 6 Member States the proportion of migrants was larger than for the native-born, and in three the opposite was the case.

Since the two benefits are not mutually exclusive but those in receipt of unemployment benefits during a particular year might also have received social assistance (either to top their income up to a given level or because their entitlement to unemployment benefits had become exhausted), the two ought arguably to be considered together. Combining the two benefits, there were 9 countries in 2013 in which the proportion of migrants who were unemployed and in receipt of either of the benefits or both was smaller than for the native born as against only 6 (Croatia, Italy Lithuania, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) where it was larger (Table A.3 in the Annex which shows the relative numbers receiving different combinations of support from the two transfers). In only three of the latter, moreover (Italy, Sweden and Lithuania), was the difference more than 3 percentage points. By contrast, there were 6 countries (Denmark, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Austria and the UK) where the proportion of native born receiving benefits was over 6 percentage points larger than for migrants.

Unmet need for healthcare among migrants

Although the data included in the EU-SILC on the unmet need for healthcare – or, more specifically, for medical examination or treatment – are based on the subjective views of

respondents, they may well be indicative of the differential access of migrants to this. Overall, some 7% of migrants in the EU reported that they had experienced an unmet need for healthcare in 2014, 1 percentage point more than the native-born (Figure 18, in which the replies are adjusted for the difference in age structure between migrants and the native-born). A larger proportion of migrants reported an unmet need in all Member States, except the Netherlands, Finland and the UK, where the reverse was the case, and Austria and Luxembourg, where the two proportions were similar. Much the same difference is evident for both men and women, though for both population groups more women than men tended to report an unmet need[18].

Figure 18 Proportion of native-born population and migrants, aged 16-64, reporting an unmet need for medical examination or treatment in past year (adjusted for age differences), 2014 and 2008 (%)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Note:dat not reliable for missing

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Note:dat not reliable for missing

The more limited access of migrants seems particularly evident in Denmark and Greece, where the proportion of migrants reporting an unmet need for care was 7 percentage points larger than for the native-born.

Much the same difference was evident in 2008. In only two countries, Portugal and the UK, was the proportion of migrants reporting an unmet need was less than for the native-born, though there were three others, Luxembourg, Belgium and Denmark, where the proportions for the two groups were similar. In Portugal, therefore, the unmet need for healthcare among migrants increased over the period relative to that among the native-born, as it did in Belgium and, most notably, in Denmark. It also increased markedly in Greece and by much more than among the native-born population. There were only three countries in which the proportion of migrants reporting an unmet need declined: Austria,

[18] The small size of the sample means that for many countries, the data by age group for migrants are not reliable for men and women separately.

where the proportion was very small, the Netherlands, where the decline was only marginal, and Sweden, where it was also marginal and smaller than for the native-born.

In most countries, access to healthcare is guaranteed to residents, mostly either free of charge or highly subsidised. In a few Member States, however, access to free or low-cost treatment is not fully universal or charges need to be paid before people are reimbursed. Costs in these cases can represent a barrier to access.

In 2014, inability to afford treatment was the main reason reported by respondents with an unmet need for healthcare. Some 3.5% of migrants of working age in the EU gave this as the reason, around half of those reporting an unmet need (Table 15)[19]. This was 1 percentage point more than for the native-born population. Those reporting not being able to afford treatment were largely concentrated in 6 Member States (Belgium, Ireland, France, Cyprus and, above all, Italy and Greece). In each of these countries a larger proportion of migrants reported this than the native-born, except in France and Cyprus where the figures for the two groups were similar.

In each of these 6 countries too, except Cyprus, the proportion of migrants reporting not having access to medical treatment because of the cost, increased between 2008 and 2014, especially in Greece and Italy. The proportion of the native-born reporting this problem also increased in each of the 6 countries. However, the increase was smaller, except for Cyprus.

Table 15 Proportion of native-born and migrants, aged 16-64, reporting not being able to afford medical examinations or treatment because of the cost, 2008 and 2014

	Native-born		Migrants	
	2008	2014	2008	2014
BE	0.5	2.0	0.7	5.7
DK	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.6
IE	1.4	3.0	1.9	5.1
EL	2.9	8.0	5.9	13.5
ES	0.1	0.4	0.7	1.1
FR	1.6	2.3	4.2	4.5
HR		1.1		1.8
IT	3.5	5.5	4.7	9.5
CY	2.4	4.8	4.9	4.7
LT	1.1	0.7	5.0	1.4
LU	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.5
NL	0.0	0.4	0.3	1.3
AT	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.5
PT	0.9	3.0	0.7	2.4
FI	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.0
SE	0.6	0.4	2.0	1.9
UK	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0
EU	1.9	2.4	2.1	3.5

Note: Data unreliable for the Czech Republic. No data for 2008 for Croatia.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

[19] This was by far the most common reason selected by respondents to the LFS, the second most common being 'other', i.e. other than the reasons suggested – long waiting lists, travel difficulties, not being able to get time off work or because of caring responsibilities as well as not being able to afford treatment or it being too expensive.

Unmet need for dental care

There is a larger difference between migrants and the native-born population in respect of access to dental care and it is more widespread across the EU. Overall, just over 11% of migrants reported an unmet need for dental examination or treatment in 2014, almost 4 percentage points more than for the native-born (Figure19, where the figures are adjusted for differences in the age structure of the two groups, in the same way as for healthcare). The proportion was larger for migrants in all countries, except Cyprus and the UK, the difference being particularly large in Belgium, Sweden and Italy. The figures were similar for both men and women.

The proportion of migrants reporting an unmet need increased between 2008 and 2014 both overall and in 10 of the 16 countries for which data are available, declining only in Austria and Sweden, while it remained much the same in the other four. The proportion of native-born also increased in most countries, though in the majority of cases by less than for migrants.

In most countries too, the large majority of the people reporting an unmet need did so because of cost reasons, because they considered dental care too expensive for them. The proportion averaged 84% for migrants in 2014 as against 66% for the native-born, with the proportion exceeding 90% in Belgium, Ireland, Spain and Italy. The proportion was also larger than in 2008, by around 17 percentage points. The increase was similar for the native-born, indicating perhaps the effect of the crisis on the ability to afford dental treatment or a reduction in the subsidisation of care.

Figure 19 Proportion of native-born population and migrants, aged 16-64, reporting an unmet need for dental treatment in past year, adjusted for age differences, 2008-2014 (%)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Note: Data not reliable for missing

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Note: Data not reliable for missing

Housing conditions of migrants

Migrants do not only have lower income than the native-born population and suffer more from material deprivation. More of them also tend to live in lower standard housing, in need of repair and/or with not enough light[20], insufficient space and located in areas with environmental problems. These aspects are considered in turn below.

Migrants living in housing in need of repair and/or with insufficient light

Some 27% of migrants of working age across the EU in 2014 reported living in housing with a leaking roof, damp walls or floors or rot in the window-frames or floors and/or with insufficient light as against 19% of the native-born (Figure 20). Although the proportion for migrants varies markedly across countries, reaching 42% in both Italy and Portugal, it was larger than for the native-born in all of them apart from the Czech Republic and Cyprus, in the last of which it was much the same. The difference was particularly large (15-17 percentage points) in Belgium and Italy.

Figure 20 Proportion of native-born and migrants aged 16-64 living in housing with leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundations or rot in window frames or floors and/or with insufficient light, 2014 and 2008 (%)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Between 2008 and 2014, the overall proportion of migrants across the EU reporting these kinds of problem remained much the same, whereas it declined for the native-born. Nevertheless, in 9 out of the 17 countries for which data are available, the proportion for

[20]The issues of housing being in need of repair and not having sufficient light are two separate questions in the EU-SILC but they are combined here partly to reduce the length of the Research Note but mainly because in most cases housing which is in need of repair also suffers from having insufficient light so that the differences between the two sections of the population considered here as regards one are very similar to the differences as regards the other.

migrants fell and in 8 of these, the fall was larger than for the native-born so that the difference between the two narrowed. This was especially so in Austria, Ireland, Greece and the UK. However, the difference widened in 6 countries where the proportion for migrants increased, particularly in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

In sum, in the majority of countries, the housing situation seems to have improved for migrants over this 6-year period and in almost all by more than for the native-born. In a significant minority of countries, the housing situation worsened, and more than for the native-born in nearly all of these. This was particularly so in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Migrants living in overcrowded housing

According to the indicator devised for determining whether there are sufficient rooms in a house to accommodate the people living there (see Box)[21], 26% of migrants live in overcrowded housing in the EU as compared with 20% of the native-born (Figure 21).

Indicator of housing over-crowding

Minimum requirements for housing to be considered as having sufficient space:

- one room for the household;
- one room per couple in the household;
- one room for each single person aged 18 or more;
- one room per pair of single people of the same gender between 12 and 17 years of age;
- one room for each single person between 12 and 17 years of age and not included in the previous category;
- one room per pair of children under 12 years of age

The proportion for migrants was larger than for the native-born in all Member States apart from Lithuania. It was especially so in Denmark, Austria (where the proportion of migrants living in overcrowded housing was over 40%), Italy and Greece (in both of which the proportion was over 50%), in each of which the difference between the two proportions was over 20 percentage points.

Overall, the relative number of migrants living in overcrowded housing declined between 2008 and 2014 and by marginally more than for the native-born. A decline occurred in 11 of the 17 countries for which there are data, most notably in Lithuania (though the scale of the decline for the native-born as well as migrants raises a question mark over the comparability of the data in the two years). In 9 of these countries, moreover, there was a narrowing of the difference in the proportion between migrants and the native-born.

In three countries – Denmark, the Netherlands and Greece – there was little change in the proportion of migrants living in overcrowded housing (though in Denmark, the proportion was already close to 30% and in Greece over 50%) and in all of these, the difference in the proportion relative to the native-born narrowed, if only a little.

In three countries, however – Sweden (though only slightly), Ireland and Italy – a larger proportion of migrants lived in overcrowded housing in 2014 than 6 years earlier. In Sweden and, more especially in Italy, the increase was more than for the native-born, while in Ireland, the proportion for migrants increased whereas that for the native-born fell.

[21] The indicator is not entirely satisfactory in that it takes no account of the size of rooms in the house, so, for example, a couple living in a large open-plan space would be considered as living in overcrowded conditions. But this weakness of the indicator is unlikely to affect the comparison between migrants and the native-born significantly.

Figure 21 Proportion of native-born and migrants living in over-crowded housing, 2014 and 2008 (%)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

In most countries, therefore, overcrowding among migrants declined over the 6 years and more so than for the native-born, though it still remained more widespread among migrants in all countries apart from Lithuania. This has potential implications not only for the well-being of the people concerned but also for the future life chances of the children, who, for example, may not have a quiet room at home to study.

Migrants living in an area with environmental problems

In addition to more migrants living in lower standard housing than the native-born, more also live in areas with environmental problems, in the form of pollution or grime from traffic or industry. However, this is less the case than in respect of poor quality housing. Overall, around 14% of migrants reported living in such areas in 2014, only just over 1 percentage point more than for the native-born (Figure 22). In 9 countries, the proportion for migrants was larger than for the native-born, but in 6 countries, the reverse was the case and in another three, there was little difference between the two.

The relative number of migrants living in polluted or grimy areas was especially high in Greece and Belgium (close to 25%), though in Greece, this was much the same as for the native-born, while in Belgium, it was substantially higher. This was also the case in France, where almost 20% of migrants lived in such areas, 8 percentage points more than the native-born.

In sum, the environmental conditions in which migrants live seem to have improved over the 6 years in most countries; in the majority they improved also in relation to the conditions for the native-born population. Nevertheless, in 2014 a larger number of people among the migrant population lived in areas with environmental problems than among the native-born population across the EU as a whole, especially in France and Belgium.

Figure 22 Proportion of native-born and migrants living in a polluted environmental area in 2014 and 2008 (%)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Concluding remarks

According to the latest data available, the average income of migrants of working age is lower than that of the native-born in all EU Member States for which data are available, in most of them significantly so. The Czech Republic is the only exception but the figures are subject to some uncertainty because of the small number of observations. Over the 6 years between 2007 and 2013, the income of migrants declined in relative terms in most countries. This occurred despite changes in the age structure of the migrant population which should have increased their relative income (essentially the share of those aged 30-44 in working-age population increasing over this period and the share of those aged 16-29 declining).

In line with this, the proportion of migrants in the bottom quintile of the income distribution is larger than that of the native-born in all Member States (including the Czech Republic), in most of them substantially so. In most countries, too, the proportion increased between 2007 and 2013, the increase being especially large in Ireland, Spain and Greece.

One of the main aims of the above analysis was to examine the reasons underlying this development and, in particular, to see to what extent it was a result of the labour market status of migrants – i.e. of a smaller proportion of migrants being in work – their household characteristics, their level of education (which affects their earnings potential), the jobs that they do and the wages or salaries that they are paid.

In practice, the relatively large number of migrants with low income seems to be linked only to a small extent to more of them being out work or to their age structure – indeed, as noted above, the latter tends to push up their relative income rather than to reduce it.

Nor is their low income linked to their education level. There are more migrants with tertiary level education with income in the bottom quintile than native-born and the average level of income of the tertiary-educated is as much below that of the native-born as for those with lower levels of education. It is, however, linked to some extent to the larger size of migrant families, with more of them in the bottom quintile having three children or more, which means that income needs to be shared among more household members.

But this is a relatively small part of the explanation. Instead, the low income of migrants seems to be predominantly a result of them having lower earnings from work. Accordingly, a much larger proportion of migrants than the native-born had full-time equivalent monthly earnings below 60% of the median in 2013 and this was the case for both men and women. Moreover, the share increased across the EU as a whole in the 6 years leading up to 2013, while the share for the native-born remained much the same.

In a few countries, Greece and Finland, in particular, migrants have low earnings partly because more of them work only part of the year. In around half the counties for which data are available, it is partly because a larger proportion of migrants than the native-born are employed part-time rather than full-time, and this is the case as much among men as among women.

A large part of the reason, however, lies in the low rates of pay that migrants receive compared with the native-born. To some extent, this is linked to the types of job that they do. Past research indicates that more migrants than native-born tend to be over-qualified for their job, which implies that, given their capabilities, they are more likely to fall short of their earning potential. But even if explicit account is taken of the kinds of job that they are employed in, as well as their age and education, their earnings remain less than their native-born equivalents in many countries, specifically in Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Luxembourg and, to a lesser extent, in Belgium, France, Ireland, Austria and Sweden. While this does not necessarily imply that discrimination is the underlying cause, it is suggestive.

To the extent that discrimination is present, it hinders the labour market – and social - integration of migrants and, accordingly, reduces the return on investment which has been made in providing programmes to help them in this respect and to improve their employability. It equally reduce their chances of escaping from the relatively vulnerable situation that many of them are in when they arrive in the EU.

As the large proportion of migrants with income in the bottom quintile implies, the at-risk-of-poverty rate among them was higher than for the native-born in all countries and the odds of a migrant being at risk were, on average, twice as great as for the rest of the population of working-age. The proportion at risk as well as the odds also increased in most countries between 2007 and 2013.

The at-risk-of-poverty among migrants in employment was equally higher than among the native-born and also increased in the EU as a whole between these two years while it remained unchanged for the native-born. This was also the case in all but 5 Member States. As implied above, this is mainly because of low pay rates or more migrants being in part-time jobs rather than a consequence of larger household size or of more migrants being lone parents.

In addition, both the material deprivation rate and the severe material deprivation rate were higher among migrants than the native-born in all countries, apart from Cyprus in the case of severe deprivation, if to varying extents. In the majority of countries, the difference between the two groups in the rate of material deprivation widened between 2008 and 2014. On the other hand, the reverse was the case for the rate of severe material deprivation, which narrowed in most countries. Nevertheless, in 2014 there were still many more severely deprived among migrants than among the native-born.

Much the same was true of the relative number of migrants living in very low work intensity households. This was higher than for the native-born in all but four countries; it also

increased more than for the native-born between 2007 and 2013 in all but three Member States.

As well as being more at risk of poverty and social exclusion, migrants seem to have less access to unemployment benefits and social assistance in the majority of countries, even though in the EU as a whole, the proportion of the unemployed in receipt of social support seems to be much the same as for the native-born population according to the latest data (for 2013). They also seem to have less access to health care and dental treatment in most countries. There is, in addition, little evidence that their access has improved over recent years relative to the native-born population.

Moreover, a larger proportion of migrants than the native-born live in low-quality housing, i.e. in need of repair, with insufficient light and not enough space, in all but one or two Member States. However, the relative position of migrants seems to have improved in most countries over the period 2008-2014 at least with regard to the light and space in their housing.

There is a less of a difference between migrants and the native-born across the EU as regards the environmental nature of their areas in which they live, only a slightly larger proportion than among the native-born reporting problems of pollution and grime in their areas. Moreover, in most countries, environmental conditions are reported to have improved between 2008 and 2014 and more so for migrants than the native-born.

Overall, migrants across the EU are in a more disadvantageous position than the native-born population in terms of their labour market situation, their income, their access to healthcare and their housing. Moreover, their relative position does not appear to have improved over recent years and for many aspects it appears to have worsened over the crisis period. This situation has obvious implications for policy: it is not only likely to lead to a sense of alienation among the migrants concerned but it implies that migrants are not fulfilling their potential and contributing to both the economy and society as much as they might do. It points, therefore, to a need to improve the economic and social integration of migrants across the board and to consider how far their disadvantageous position is a reflection of discrimination.

The second part of this Research Note explores these issues further by examining the attitudes of migrants towards society and the institutions in their host countries in order to obtain an indication of the extent of their social and political integration and how far it tends to change over the years with the length of time they live in the EU.

Part 2 – Social attitudes among migrants

This part examines socio-political outcomes of the integration of migrants including their trust in institutions and people, their values, their voting behaviour and other forms of civic and political participation, their social belonging and their perception of discrimination. A relatively large body of literature exists on the economic integration of migrants, in terms of their participation in the labour market and welfare programmes and their skills and education as well as their income, risk of poverty and housing situation. The first part of this Research Note is a contribution to this literature.

Less information is available about the civic and political integration of migrants, their values and attitudes. Data issues, such as small sample sizes of the migrant population in surveys often restrict cross-national empirical analysis. In addition, studies tend to vary across the migrant groups they analyse and use different methods and data, which limits how far overall conclusions on the extent of the socio-political integration of migrants in the EU can be drawn.

The analysis here is based on data from the European Social Survey (ESS)[22] a cross-national survey that has been conducted since 2001 and which is the main source of statistical data on social attitudes in Europe. An overview of the indicators used in the analysis, including a detailed description of the survey items used for data collection, is presented in Table 16 below.

Table 16: Overview of indicators from the ESS

Domain	Description of survey item
Trust	**Institutional trust** On a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions: - Trust in the legal system - Trust in the police - Trust in politicians *Values and categories: 0=No trust at all / 10=Complete trust*
	Generalised trust Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? *Values and categories: 0=You can't be too careful / 10=Most people can be trusted*
Human values	Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you: **Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities** She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. **Important to understand different people** It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when she/he disagrees with them, she/he still wants to understand them. **Important to help people and care for others well-being** It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She /he wants to care for their well-being.

[22] This paper uses data from ESS Round 7 2014 Edition 2.0., as of May 26th 2016. NSD-Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

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	Important to care for nature and environment She/he strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to her/him. *Values and categories:* *1. Very much like me* *2. Like me* *3. Somewhat like me* *4. A little like me* *5. Not like me* *6. Not like me at all*
Domain	**Description of survey item**
Civic participation	Voted in the last national election *Values and categories:* *1. Yes* *2. No* *3. Not eligible to vote*
	- Worked in a political party or action group during the last 12 months - Worked in another organisation or association during the last 12 months *Values and categories: 1. Yes 2. No*
	- Political system allows people to have influence on politics - Confident in own ability to participate in politics - Able to take active role in political group *Values and categories: 0=Not at all / 10=Completely*
Discrimination	Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country? *Values and categories*: 1. *Yes* 2. *No*
Social connectedness	Socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues *Values and categories*: *1. Never* *2. Less than once a month* *3. Once a month* *4. Several times a month* *5. Once a week* *6. Several times a week* *7. Every day* Having people with whom to discuss intimate and personal matters *Values and categories*: *1. None* *2. 1* *3. 2* *4. 3* *5. 4-6* *6. 7-9* *7. 10 or more* Felt lonely over past week *Values and categories*: *1. None or almost none of the time* *2. Some of the time* *3. Most of the time* 4. *All or almost all of the time*
Sense of belonging	Feel close to country *Values and categories*: *1. Very close* *2. Close* *3. Not very close* 4. *Not close at all*

The survey covers both EU and non-EU countries with nationally representative samples of the population aged 15 and over. The analysis here is confined to EU countries only and is restricted to the adult population (people aged 18 and over). It should be noted that Malta is not covered in any of the survey rounds and a number of other countries are not included in particular years (see Table A.6 in the Annex). The analysis is based on data for the year 2014, the latest available, which cover 18 EU countries and include a total of 33,630 respondents aged 18 and over.[23]

ESS contains data both on country of birth and citizenship. As in the previous part, migrants are defined using country of birth as an indicator. It should be emphasised that the movement of people within the European Union constitutes an essentially different experience than migration from third countries. In particular, people from other EU countries are likely to be better integrated, both economically and politically, due to their greater familiarity with the host environment (which may have a similar institutional structure and legal framework) (Fleischmann & Donkers, 2010). Those from inside and outside the EU may also be perceived differently, with negative sentiment directed mainly against those coming from outside the EU (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Quillian, 1995).

This difference in experience and the different characteristics of different migrant groups can be expected to affect the factors that are investigated here. In the ESS, it is possible to distinguish both between EU-born and non-EU-born migrants and between first and second generation migrants. Based on this information, the following categories have been created for the analysis: (1) native-born with both parents native-born; (2) native-born with at least one parent EU-born[24]; (3) native-born with at least one parent non-EU-born; (4) EU-born and (5) non-EU-born. The last two categories refer to first generation migrants, while categories 2 and 3 are intended to capture immediate descendants of migrants differentiating between those from inside the EU and those from outside.

An important limitation of the analysis, which needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results, is that migrants are likely to be underrepresented in the survey. The problem of coverage concerns undocumented migrants in particular as they are typically not captured by national surveys, as well as migrants who have arrived in the host country only recently and are consequently missed from the sampling frame. Asylum seekers and migrant workers living in collective accommodation are generally excluded from the survey since it covers only people living in private households. Migrants are also assumed to have a higher risk of non-response than the overall population (Eurostat, 2011). This may be explained by language barriers or by refusal to participate in the survey, because, for example, of a fear of being exposed (Jacobs et al, 2009; Amelina et al, 2013). The issue of small sample size is problematic with the number of observations, especially for those from within the EU, being small in most countries. Since it is not possible to analyse the situation of asylum seekers based on the data, the literature review offers a brief overview of recent empirical findings.

[23] For the year 2014, no data are available for Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania and Slovakia. Data for Latvia is yet to be released.

[24] Defined as persons who are native-born with both parents EU-born or with one native-born parent and one EU-born parent.

Migrants in the ESS

The share of migrants, including both first and second generation, in the EU countries covered in the 2014 ESS ranges from 4.5% in Hungary to 45% in Estonia (see Table A.7 in the Annex for the number of observations).

Share of migrants among the population aged 18 and over, %, 2014



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0

Second generation immigrants account for more than half of the adult migrant population in Lithuania, France and Estonia, and for more than two-thirds in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. In Hungary, they are mostly of Hungarian ethnic background with the parents born in Romania, while in the two Baltic countries the overwhelming majority of second generation migrants with a non-EU background are of Russian origin. In the case of the Czech Republic, where a relatively large share (60%) of second generation migrants has at least one EU-born parent, Slovakia is the most frequently reported country of birth of parents.

With the exception of Ireland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, those born outside the EU tend to account for a larger proportion of first generation migrants. This is the case in 11 of the 18 EU countries and most notably in Estonia (again predominantly Russian-born), the UK, France and in the Netherlands. The share of the two migrant groups is almost the same in Belgium, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Poland.

The following sections, first, analyse differences in the levels of institutional and generalised trust and in human values between migrants and the native-born population. It then considers how second and first generation migrants compare to the native-born in terms of civic and political participation. Finally, it explores the extent to which time spent in the host country affects the attitudes and outcomes of first generation migrants as compared with the native-born population. It begins with a review of the literature.

Literature review

A number of studies show that immigrants exhibit higher trust in political and social institutions than natives (Weaver, 2003, Michelson, 2003, Wenzel 2006 for the US; Bilodeau and Nevitte, 2003 for Canada; Maxwell, 2008, Saggar et al, 2012 for the UK, Röder and Mühlau 2010, 2012, Aleksynska and Algan, 2010 for Europe). This initial higher trust, however, appears to be eroded over time whether this is measured by longer stay

in the host country, generational status or language and citizenship. Studies on Mexican immigrants in the US find that foreign-born Mexican Americans are more trusting than Mexican-Americans born in the US (Weaver, 2003; Michelson, 2003; Wenzel 2006). Bilodeau and Nevitte (2003) in their analysis of political trust of migrants in Canada show that trust among migrants diminishes the longer the residence in the receiving country. Similarly, a recent study from the Migration Advisory Committee in the UK (Saggar et al, 2012) shows that newly arrived migrants are very positive about British political institutions, but over time they adopt a more cynical view, bringing them closer to the native-born population. As against 70% of non-EEA migrants who had arrived in the past seven years, 53% of longer term residents had trust in Parliament (ibid).

These findings are confirmed for the European context by Röder and Mühlau's study (2012) using the ESS. They show that the level of trust in public institutions (measured by a four-item scale of trust in the legal system, police, politicians and national parliament) is higher among foreign-born first generation migrants than among the native-born population and second generation migrants. Applying multi-variate analysis, they find strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the higher trust of first generation migrants in institutions is mostly due to their lower expectations of institutional performance and is less related to the actual quality of the host and home country institutions. Their finding that trust among first generation migrants diminishes with time spent in the host country further supports this. The authors also find that migrants who speak a different language at home than the official language of the host country report more trust in institutions than those using the official language at home. Furthermore, migrants who acquired citizenship are less confident than immigrants who are not citizens of their country of residence. According to their results, social status, measured by education and main source of income, is not significantly related to institutional trust for first generation migrants, and the relationship is also considerably weaker for migrants than for natives. Aleksynska and Algan (2010), who also base their analysis on the ESS, find that more recent migrants have higher trust in both national and EU parliaments and politicians than the native-born. In addition, they find that satisfaction with democracy is highest among first generation migrants, followed by the native-born population and second generation migrants.

One possible explanation that has been provided for the higher institutional trust among migrants focuses on the difference in values and the importance migrants and the native-born attach to them. For instance, migrants from countries with less political stability or with poor democratic institutions, are found to exhibit more authoritative values, are more supportive of strong government (McAllister and Makkai 1992), relate more to values emphasising the salience of tradition and security and tend to be more religious than natives (Röder and Mühlau, 2012). At the same time, migrants on average are just as likely as the native-born to support openness to difference and change. There is also an indication that differences in value orientation between migrants and the native-born population are reduced in subsequent migrant generations and with longer time spent in the host country (ibid). As regards the link between values and institutional trust, Röder and Mühlau (2012) find differences in values is a weak explanatory factor for the difference in trust levels between the native-born and migrants, between first and second generation migrants and between recent and more settled migrants.

The literature on discrimination and sense of belonging provides contradictory findings on the attitudes and perceptions of different migrant groups on these dimensions. One observation that clearly emerges from the research on discrimination is that migrants in general feel far more exposed to it than natives and also experience it more often. Portes (1984), Portes and Zhou (1993) for the US and Reitz and Banerjee (2009) for Canada find that second generation migrants are more likely to experience discrimination than first generation, foreign-born migrants. In line with these findings, Fleischmann and Donkers (2010) find that second generation migrants report higher rates of discrimination than the foreign-born in the EU, suggesting that children of immigrants are affected more by this.

Aleksynska and Algan (2010) and André et al (2010) both base their analysis on the ESS. The former shows that in Europe, first generation migrants are the most likely to feel

discriminated against, followed by second generation migrants and the native-born. They find nationality, colour, race and religion the most frequently reported reasons for feeling discriminated against. The study by André et al (2010) finds no difference between the two migrant groups. One interpretation they offer to explain this relates to 'contact theory' whereby the increased contact of the second generation with the native-born population is neutralised by their greater awareness of discrimination and their expectation to be treated as the native-born. A similar argument is put forward by Reitz and Banerjee (2009) for the lower discrimination experienced by first generation migrants and for recent migrants by Portes (1984). In their case, it is argued, that as newcomers these two groups have lower awareness of ethnic stereotypes and anti-immigration sentiments and are less reactive to racial inequalities.

The above cited literature also provides evidence that individual factors, such as language, education, citizenship, having a native-born parent, as well as factors related to country of origin, are important (e.g. migrants coming from more affluent nations are less likely to perceive discrimination than those from poorer ones). Less information is available on migrants' sense of belonging. Drawing on data from the Canadian Census and the cross-sectional Ethnic Diversity Survey, Wu et al (2010) measure sense of belonging in terms of sense of belonging to the country and feeling out of place. They find that sense of belonging diminishes from the first to the second generation whereas feeling out of place is more often reported by first than second and third generation migrants. The effect appears much more pronounced for visible minorities than for whites hinting at race status as a potential obstacle to social integration. Saggar et al (2012) show that migrants in the UK, especially those with longer than 7 years' residence, are more likely to feel that they strongly belong to the country than the native-born.

Lastly, research on migrants' involvement in civic and political activities reveals that while integration is taking place in respect of some aspects, it is not the case for others. In terms of electoral participation, findings from a number of studies indicate that immigrants in Europe lag behind the native-born. Most of the literature tends to focus on the country or city level and on particular sub-groups of immigrants (e.g. Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in Brussels in Fennema and Tillie, 1999; immigrants in Amsterdam in Tillie, 2004; immigrants in Malmö in Odmalm, 2004; second generation immigrants in Denmark in Togeby, 2004). All find a strong country of origin effect on migrants' voting participation.

A comparative study of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (Koopmans, 2004) suggests that between-country differences are larger than variations within the countries. A recent study by André et al (2014) employs a European comparative approach using ESS data and finds significant differences across the 24 countries examined. Their results show that immigrant participation in national elections is lowest in the Czech Republic, Switzerland and Estonia and highest in Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium. Aleksysnska (2007) also uses the ESS to explore the different factors that could underlie the lower civic and political engagement of migrants in Europe. Her analysis reveals that unemployment has twice the negative effect on the participation of migrants as on the native-born, while years of schooling and income appears to have less of an effect on them than on the native-born.

Morales (2011), DeSipio (2011) and Martniello (2009) show that beyond voting participation, migrants engage in various ways in the local community as well as in national and transnational organisations. Giugni and Morales (2011) identify three main factors influencing the political and civic participation of migrants: individual characteristics, such as education and income, and contextual and institutional factors including the approach to integration of the host country. The above studies suggest that more established, higher educated and wealthier migrants are more active in transnational associations, while lack of language proficiency remains a key barrier especially to involvement in neighbourhood and local organisations.

As is the case with other migrant groups, integration of refugees is affected by past experience and future expectations with respect to the situation in the country of origin, but also by experience on the migration journey. Hynes (2003) shows that there is a lower level of trust in institutions and people among refugees and that it is shaped by the different

stages of flight, arrival and settlement in the new country. Their high level of mistrust in institutions and people appears to persist after arrival and dispersal, hindering their social inclusion and integration (Hynes, 2003, 2010).

A large qualitative study on refugees in the EU15 by Mestheneos and Ioannidi (2002) investigates the main barriers to integration. They find age, language, social class and access to housing and employment to be the most important factors. For instance, young people tend to be more able to adapt to the new environment and find it easier to integrate, while those with a higher education level tend to find it more difficult to adjust and express more reluctance to start a new life from the bottom. Above all, language appears to be a major barrier to integration as indicated in a number of national studies (e.g. Kraler et al, 2013, for Austria; Brahmbbatt et al, 2007, for the UK). Cheung and Phillimore (2014) use the Survey of New Refugees to study social capital and the labour market situation in the UK. They find that language proficiency, pre-migration qualifications and length of time in the host country are the most important predictors of accessing employment. Their findings also indicate a strong relationship between time spent in the host country, language proficiency and the size of social networks.

Many asylum seekers and refugees build strong networks themselves and actively engage in local community organisations and ethnic associations (Spicer, 2008; Aspinall and Watters, 2010). But there are some groups (women, older and disabled refugees and asylum seekers), who are more likely to encounter difficulties in doing this and as a result they are more likely to feel isolated (ibid). Opportunities for social interactions are also found to be limited due to refugees' temporary accommodation and having to move home frequently (Rutter et al, 2007). A further influence is access to services and facilities e.g. public transport, community and recreational facilities and healthcare, in particular mental health care (Bell and Zech, 2009; WHO, 2015).

Institutional and generalised trust

Institutional trust

Comparing the three forms of institutional trust across our migrant categories, it appears that on average first generation EU- and non-EU-born migrants tend to report the highest levels of trust (Figure 23). In contrast, trust among second generation migrants is the lowest, below that of the native-born population. This finding corroborates previous studies which have shown that higher levels of institutional trust among first generation immigrants relative to the native-born tends to diminish in the second generation bringing them closer to the level of the native-born population (Röder & Mühlau, 2010, 2012; Wenzel, 2006; Michelson, 2003; Bilodeau and Nevitte, 2003).

One explanation for the higher trust levels of first generation migrants is offered by the 'opportunity structure' argument which points to the dual influence of host and sending country experiences on migrants' expectations (Röder & Mühlau, 2012; Maxwell, 2010, 2013). For first generation migrants, the perceived greater opportunities (both in economic and political terms) offered by the host country in comparison with their home country are argued to be able to offset potentially negative experiences related to immigration and so result in increased trust in institutions. Children of immigrants, on the other hand, have no such strong reference point as their parents or their first generation peers in terms of evaluating opportunities available to them. At the same time, they may still face discrimination or exclusion which could reduce their trust in institutions (Maxwell, 2013; Alba, 2005). The lower level of institutional trust among the second generation has also been linked to the erosion of social capital in children of immigrants, leading to weaker educational and occupational outcomes, as well as to the assimilation process (Michelson, 2003).

Figure 23: Trust in institutions, 2014 (Average score)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Note: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level.

Differences in institutional trust according to the region of origin can also be observed. Second generation migrants from within EU are less likely to express trust in the legal system and in the police than those with a parent from outside the EU. Among the first generation, variations between the EU- and the non-EU-born are significant only regarding trust in the police and politicians.

Looking at country differences reveals that institutional trust among migrants is highest in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria and lowest in the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe (see Table A.8 in the Annex). Differences between the migrant groups and the native-born population also tend to be less pronounced in those countries where institutional trust is generally higher. Research shows that citizens' support for public institutions is generally higher in stable than in new democracies and in transition countries even when controlling for various confounding factors (Listahug and Aardal, 2003). The top position of the Nordic countries in terms of institutional trust is relatively well-recorded (Listhaug and Ringdal, 2007).

The within- and between-country differences for trust in the legal system are presented below (Figure 24) and show that the level of trust reported by non-EU-born migrants is highest in Denmark, Finland, Germany, the UK, Ireland and Belgium, followed by Sweden and Austria. High trust levels for the EU-born can be observed in these countries as well as in France. The relatively large variation in institutional trust across the countries also points to the importance of country-level factors, including the possible self-selection of migrants to different countries in Europe and the influence of national institutions. For this reason, it is interesting to explore the effect of migrant status after taking account of both individual characteristics and country fixed-effects.

Figure 24: Trust in the legal system, 2014 (Average score)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported. Countries are listed from low to high average scores for native-born with both parents native-born.

Five logistic regressions models are used to estimate differences in the probability of reporting above average trust in the legal system between migrants and the majority population (with the native-born population with both parents native-born used as the reference population). The results, estimated in the form of average marginal effects, are reported in Table 17.

Table 17: Difference in the probability of reporting above average trust in the legal system, % points, 2014

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Native-born /1 parent EU-born	1.89	1.31	-1.69	-1.95	-0.31
Native-born/1 parent non-EU-born	5.30*	4.37	1.11	1.74	-4.16
EU-born	10.70***	9.23***	4.13	4.94*	-12.44***
Non-EU-born	18.38***	17.33***	12.41***	12.36***	10.55
Individual variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	33,355	33,355	33,355	22,764	10,591

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
*Notes: Average marginal effects are calculated with reference to "native-born with both parents native-born". * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001. Individual control variables include age, sex (with men as the reference group) and educational attainment (using two binary variables: one for upper secondary and one for post-secondary and tertiary, with lower secondary and below as the reference category). For the country fixed-effects, a dummy for each country in the dataset was constructed.*

In the first model, the amount of variance attributed to migrant status is examined and shows that, in comparison with the native-born population, migrants are more likely to report higher levels of trust (though the results for the two groups of second generation migrants are not statistically significant). The difference is largest for both EU-born and non-EU-born migrants. With individual controls in place for model 2, the previous effects weaken slightly, while the introduction of country fixed-effects substantially changes the results indicating the importance of geographical and institutional differences.

To further explore these differences, models 4 and 5 replicate the extended model 3 on two subsets of observations. Model 4 is estimated on a sub-sample that includes only EU15 Member States while model 5 is run with observations from the six EU13 countries covered in the sample. The estimate for non-EU-born migrants in model 4 declines to 12.4 percentage points while for the other groups there is still no statistically significant difference relative to the reference native-born population. Results for model 5 show that

EU-born migrants are 12.4 percentage points less likely to report higher levels of trust in the legal system than the native-born in this subsample. Estimates for the other migrant groups are not significant. Bearing in mind limitations because of small sample size, especially for second generation migrants, in most countries, the results from the models indicate that country characteristics are important in explaining differences in institutional trust among migrants.

Generalised trust

Generalised trust (i.e. trust in people in general) between the migrant and the native-born population tends to vary less than institutional trust. While second generation migrants report, on average, lower trust in people than the native-born, the difference is quantitatively important only for those from non-EU countries. The small variation is not unexpected as previous literature shows generalised trust to be closely associated with personality traits and with individual characteristics (Hooghe et al, 2009; Herreros & Criado, 2009; Newton, 2001) – note that the results are adjusted for differences in age, gender and education.

Table 18: Trust in people, 2014

	Mean	95% Confidence interval
Native-born with both parents native-born	5.14	5.11-5.17
Native-born with at least 1 parent EU-born	4.97	4.84-5.11
Native-born with at least 1 parent non-EU-born	4.96	4.85-5.08
EU-born	5.23	5.10-5.37
Non-EU-born	5.09	4.99-5.19

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level.

The level of generalised trust reported by migrants does not vary significantly from that of native-born population in most countries. Exceptions are the non-EU-born in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Austria; second generation migrants with non-EU-born parent(s) in Lithuania and the Netherlands; and those with EU-born parent(s) in Hungary and Poland (Figure 25).

Figure 25 Trust in people, 2014 (Average score)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported. Countries are listed from low to high average scores for native-born with both parents native-born.

Country differences follow more or less the same pattern as in the case of the institutional trust variables, though with some differences –i.e. the highest level of trust in people is reported once again in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and the UK, but also in Estonia.

Higher level of trust in people in general has been identified by previous research on migrant integration as an important factor for establishing mutual feelings of connectedness and solidarity and a sense of belonging (Wu et al, 2010; Ray and Preston, 2009). More frequent social meetings with relatives, friends, or with people from work or the local community, in turn, have been associated with both increased integration and closer social cohesion.

Data from the ESS show that migrants in Europe are more likely to feel lonely, have no one to discuss personal matters with and meet socially less frequently than the native-born population (Figure 26). 14% of those with a non-EU-born parent and 13% of the non-EU-born report that they meet socially less than once a month or never as compared with 11% of the native-born with native parents. These two migrant groups are also almost twice as likely as natives to say that they have no one in their life with whom they can talk to when they need to do so. They also tend to experience loneliness more frequently. It is not possible to infer from the data whether the meetings are with people from their own migrant community or with the native-born. A number of studies suggest, however, that language barriers and spatial segregation represent important obstacles for first generation migrants and for asylum seekers to engage with the culture and people in their new country of residence (Rutter et al, 2007; Musterd, 2011).

Figure 26: Social connectedness, 2014 (%)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level.

Human values

Human values among migrants and the majority population are investigated using four items in the ESS that ask respondents to what extent they identify themselves with values related to the importance of equal treatment and opportunities, understanding different people, helping and caring for the well-being of people as well as for the environment. The proportions of those who feel these values are important to them are shown in Figure 27 for the EU average (see Table A.9 in the Annex for the proportions in individual Member States). Across the four items, equal treatment and opportunities appear to be the most important for all population groups, followed by caring for the environment and helping people. As compared with the native-born population, EU-born and non-EU-born migrants and second generation migrants with EU-born parent(s) are more likely to identify with these values. For second generation migrants with non-EU-born parents no statistically significant difference can be observed for any of the four items.

Figure 27: Proportion of people who identify themselves with the following values, 2014 (%)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level.

These results confirm those from previous studies that find no difference between migrant and native values regarding openness and tolerance. Variations between the native-born population and the migrant groups in the countries reveal a very mixed pattern concerning the importance of equal treatment and opportunities. In some (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Austria, Hungary and to a lesser extent Lithuania), second generation migrants with EU-born parent(s) tend to be the most likely to view this value as important while in France it is more those with a non-EU background. Relative to the native-born and second generation migrants, a larger proportion of first generation migrants identify with this value in Germany, Denmark and Estonia. Second generation migrants with non-EU parents, by contrast, are much less likely than the others to report the idea of equal treatment and opportunities essential to them.

Figure 28: % of people who identify with the statement: Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities, 2014



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported. Countries are listed from low to high average scores for native-born with both parents native-born.

Differences between migrants and the native-born population in the importance of understanding different people are found to be more pronounced in countries with a smaller proportion of the population identifying with this value. The largest proportion reporting this as being important is in Germany where the difference between the native-born and migrants also tends to be the smallest.

Figure 29: % of people who identify with the statement: Important to understand different people, 2014



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported. Countries are listed from low to high average scores for native-born with both parents native-born.

Civic participation

Involvement in civic activities provides an additional insight into the social and political integration of migrants as it constitutes an important step in becoming a full member of the host society. Civic participation of migrants is measured using three indicators: voting participation, being active in a political party or action group and engaging in other civic or voluntary activities. Figure 30 shows that as compared with the native-born population, second and first generation migrants have a lower propensity to participate in national elections. The difference is most significant in the case of first generation migrants. While 77.7% of the majority population report voting in the last national election, the corresponding figure for the EU-born is 57.2% (60.8% for those born outside the EU).

The proportion of those participating in a political party or action group is very small across all of the population groups, especially among the non-EU-born migrants (3.3%). In contrast, a relatively large proportion of migrants engage in other forms of civic action. Second generation migrants with at least one EU-born parent are as likely to work in another organisation as the native-born, whereas those with at least one non-EU-born parent and first generation migrants engage to a significantly lesser extent in this type of activity. The higher rates of involvement in political, voluntary and other organisations among those with EU-born parents could indicate their greater familiarity with institutions and processes and the lower likelihood of facing language and cultural barriers as compared with the other migrant groups. Another possible explanation for the lower reported involvement in voluntary work by first generation migrants is provided by a number of studies which find that while migrants may actively engage in teacher associations and other organisations they do not themselves consider these as work (DeSipio, 2011).

Figure 30: Percentage of people participating in civic action during the last 12 months, 2014 (%)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level. Voting participation refers only to those respondents who responded that they were eligible to vote.

In terms of their confidence and ability to take part in civic action, first and second generation non-EU migrants are more likely than the native-born and those with an EU background to report lacking confidence in their capacity to participate in politics or to have an active role in a political group (Figure 31). They also appear to be less convinced that the political system in their host country is such that it allows people to have an impact on politics. This is particularly the case with second generation migrants with non-EU parents. Their low confidence may hint at possible disengagement and reflect their dissatisfaction with the political system. As mentioned above, the lower values for first generation migrants may stem from their lack of knowledge and language of the host country.

Figure 31: Capacity to participate, 2014 (Average score)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level.

Length of stay and life stage effect

For first generation migrants, it is also possible in the ESS to explore the extent to which the above attitudes and outcomes in the two groups change over time according to the

years they have been in the host country. There is evidence indicating that over time, migrants tend to resemble the native-born population for instance acquiring a more critical view of institutions (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010; Wenzel, 2006; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Although the reasons for this are not fully understood, they have mostly been linked to the acculturation process (Röder and Mühlau 2010, 2012; Wenzel, 2006; Michelson, 2003).

The results in Table 19 indicate that levels of trust among first generation migrants tend to decline as more years are spent in the receiving country. As compared with the native-born population, which is the reference category, migrants with less than 20 years of residence have a significantly higher probability to report higher than average trust in the legal system (+5.7 p.p. for EU-born and +15.5 p.p. for the non-EU-born). After 20 years of residence, this more positive outlook tends to vanish. The difference in probability between the native-born population and the two migrant groups drops substantially to -0.6 p.p. for the EU-born and to +7.9 p.p. for the non-EU-born, though the result is statistically significant only for the latter.

Table 19: Difference in probability between the native-born population and first generation migrants, % points, 2014

		EU-born		Non-EU-born	
		< 20 years of residence	*>20 years of residence*	*< 20 years of residence*	*>20 years of residence*
Trust	Trust in the legal system	5.68*	-0.64	15.46***	7.86**
	Trust in the police	7.34***	-2.14	7.00**	-1.45
	Trust in politicians	8.24***	3.71	16.73***	6.26**
	Trust in people	0.32	-2.99	-3.08	-6.52**
Human values	Important to treat people equally	-1.28	5.60*	8.34***	5.45**
	Important to understand different people	2.74	8.15**	9.10***	5.03*
	Important to help people & care for others	-1.08	4.21	6.57**	5.27*
	Important to care for nature & environment	0.43	4.12	8.19***	5.33*
Civic participation	Voting participation	-19.68***	-13.59***	-21.42***	-7.57**
	Involved in political party or action group	-2.65***	-1.56	-0.66	1.20
	Involved in other organisation	-6.03**	-1.84	-5.34**	-0.15
Social connectedness	Meet socially at least once a month	-1.31	-1.63	-5.56**	0.39
Discrimination	Feel discriminated	4.46**	4.46*	8.04***	18.55***
Sense of belonging	Feel close to country	-0.24	4.94**	2.99**	3.73**

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Average marginal effects are calculated in reference to "Native-born with both parents native-born". Individual characteristics (age, gender, education) and country fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions.
** p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001.*

A similar pattern can be observed for trust in the police and politicians. In contrast to this, the difference in generalised trust between the native-born and migrants appears to increase with more years of residence. Migrants living in the host country for more than 20 years report to have lower trust in people than the native-born population. On the other hand, over time, the EU-born are more likely than natives to share the importance of equal treatment and other human values. Among migrants born outside the EU, the difference moves in the opposite direction, narrowing the difference between them and the native-born.

One conclusion that emerges from this finding is that migrants are more likely to adopt the values prevalent in the host country, the longer they have been there. The significant change in the difference observed for non-EU migrants also suggests that these processes are likely to take place more quickly for migrants who are keen to integrate into the host society. Migrants from EU countries may see integration in the new country as a less important issue for them as they may consider their stay more as being temporary.

Turning to civic participation, the results show that more recent migrants (i.e. those with less than 20 years of residence), especially the non-EU-born, tend to be significantly less active than their native-born counterparts. The difference in voting participation reaches -21.4 p.p. for the EU-born and -19.7 p.p. for EU-born migrants. After 20 years, migrants are still less likely to participate than people born in the country, though the difference is somewhat reduced. There is also some indication of the difference narrowing with regard to other forms of civic engagement (i.e. political groups and other organisations). In terms of social connectedness (i.e. meeting friends, relatives and colleagues), the estimate is quantitatively important only for the recently settled non-EU-born migrants.

What gives rise to concern about the success of integration processes of migrants is the persisting, and in the case of non-EU migrants widening, difference in perceived discrimination. Living in their country of residence for more than 20 years, both EU-born and non-EU-born migrants have a higher probability of feeling discriminated against as compared with the native-born population (+4.5 and +18.7 p.p. respectively). Since perceived discrimination has been shown to reflect the experience of migrants with the attitudes of the native-born population, this finding also hints at the possible failure of their acceptance in the host country (Aleksynska and Algan, 2010). In spite of this, the analysis suggests that as regards a sense of belonging (feeling close to the country), not only do recent non-EU migrants tend actually to score more highly than the native-born, but the difference as compared with the native-born also increases with the time spent in the host country.

The success of immigrants and their pathways of integration into the host society also depend on what stage of their life they are when they come into the country (Wu et al, 2010). Issues related to age at arrival, e.g. language, motivation, outlook and identity, are factors that distinguish migrants in their abilities and willingness to adapt as well as their opportunities to integrate (Rumbaut, 2004). Estimates for average trust in the legal system by age at the time of arrival in the country, for example, suggest that non-EU-born migrants who were younger (18-29) are more likely to report a higher level of trust than the native-born. The difference in probability is smaller than in the case of those who arrived at a later phase of their life (Table 20). For EU-born migrants, the results are statistically significant only for those who were 30 and older at the time of arrival.

Non-EU-born migrants who were under 18 or between 18 and 29 when they arrived appear to attach significantly greater importance to values of equal treatment and environmental and nature conservation than the native-born population. The difference in participation in voting between natives and migrants tends to be larger the later the age of arrival. The opposite is true with regard to perceived discrimination: non-EU-born migrants who were still children when they arrived in the country have the highest probability of feeling discriminated against. The difference with respect to natives is considerably smaller in the case of those arriving at an older age. At the same time, migrants who arrived as children are more likely to express a strong sense of belonging than the native-born. Those who were young adults at the time of arrival also tend to express feeling closer to their host country than the native-born themselves.

There are a number of possible reasons for these findings. In particular, they might not necessarily be directly related to the age of migrants when they arrive but have more to do with the situation they are in when they do so. Their lower level of trust and difficulties to integrate may, for example, reflect them being in a less favourable situation in the labour market or it could be that older migrants have more realistic expectations because

of their greater life experience. The existing literature throws little light on the underlying reasons and more research is needed to develop a better understanding of them.

Table 20: Difference in probability between the native-born population and first generation migrants by age on arrival, 2014 (percentage point differences)

		EU-born			Non-EU-born		
		Age on arrival			*Age on arrival*		
		<18	*18-29*	*30>*	*<18*	*18-29*	*30>*
Trust	Trust in the legal system	-0.04	2.03	13.55**	2.21	16.23***	19.45***
	Trust in the police	-2.50	5.88	6.78	-2.04	2.47	12.64***
	Trust in politicians	1.78	3.85	19.72***	3.90	17.58***	14.15***
	Trust in people	-1.45	-2.66	0.71	-6.21*	-7.55**	3.11
Human values	Important to treat people equally	6.51	0.26	2.62	6.51**	8.15***	5.72*
	Important to understand different people	14.41***	3.74	-5.45	7.72**	5.67*	9.48**
	Important to help people & care for others	5.06	-3.08	0.38	5.07*	4.02	10.77***
	Important to care for nature & environment	5.90	4.71	-5.65	3.89	10.40***	5.59
Civic participation	Voting participation	-5.96	-35.86***	-46.23***	-8.20**	-15.60***	-24.54***
	Involved in political party or action group	-0.88	-1.70	-3.86***	2.11	-0.58	-0.82
	Involved in other organisation	1.42	-3.68	-11.34***	-1.36	-3.53	-4.79*
Social connectedness	Meet socially at least once a month	-1.40	-3.83	-1.79	0.27	-4.84*	-2.22
Discrimination	Feel discriminated	4.93	5.26*	3.41	18.97***	9.80***	8.28***
Sense of belonging	Feel close to country	6.53***	2.67	-3.90	4.30**	4.54***	-1.36

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Average marginal effects are calculated in reference to "Native-born with both parents native-born". Individual characteristics (age, gender, education) and country fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions.
** p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001.*

Attitudes to migrants and their impact on the integration of migrants

The European Social Survey has several items aimed at measuring attitudes to migrants and immigration. In addition to the questions in the main questionnaire, the 2014 survey contains a special module on migrants. For the purpose of this analysis, five items were selected each measured on a scale ranging between 0 and 10 with higher scores denoting more favourable opinions. The mean scores are shown in Figure 32 for migrants and the native-born population. The native-born with native-born parents have the lowest mean values, i.e. the most negative attitudes towards immigration, followed by second and first generation migrants. With the exception of the question: on "Immigration (being) bad or good for the country's economy", it is the first generation migrants from outside the EU that express the most positive attitude towards immigrants. Interestingly, crime appears to be the issue most negatively linked to migrants. The most positive views are reported

in relation to immigrants' contribution to the country's cultural life both among the native-born and migrants.

Figure 32: Attitudes towards immigrants/immigration, 2014 (Average score)



Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results adjusted for differences in age, sex and education level.

The more positive sentiments towards immigrants seem to dissipate over time, at least as far as first generation migrants are concerned (Table 21). Both EU-born and non-EU-born migrants who have lived in the host country for less than 20 years exhibit a significantly more positive attitude to immigrants than the native-born population. With longer time spent in the host country, the difference (as shown by the estimated probabilities) tends to narrow considerably, though the difference with the native-born is not as quantitatively important for EU migrants. The difference between the native-born and migrants appears to be much smaller after 20 years as regards the two economy-related items (immigrants being "good for the economy" and whether they "create jobs") and, for non-EU migrants only, the issue of crime. The findings seem to align with group conflict theory, which argues that as migrants start to resemble the native-born population in their attitudes, they view new immigrants more as an 'outsider group' and perceive them as competition for power and resources (Quillian, 1995).

At the same time, migrants are still more likely than the native-born to view other migrants in a positive light and less likely to see them as competitors for jobs. This implies that there the contact hypothesis is still at work, in the sense that migrants are more likely to have contact with other migrants than the native-born and so a more positive attitude towards them. Moreover, while this positive attitude seems to dissipate a little over time, which lends support to the conflict theory, it can also be seen as supporting the contact theory in the sense that migrants have less contact with other migrants as they become more integrated. Whatever the underlying forces at work, the evidence is that the attitudes of migrants become more similar to those of the native-born population the longer they live in the host country.

Table 21: Difference in probability between the native-born population and first generation migrants, % points, 2014

	EU-born		Non-EU-born	
	< 20 years of residence	*>20 years of residence*	*< 20 years of residence*	*>20 years of residence*
Immigrants make country better place to live	24.30***	8.30**	22.17***	15.99***
Immigration good for country's economy	21.40***	4.38	17.75***	7.60**
Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants	13.34***	4.41	14.13***	12.36***
Immigrants create new jobs	24.58***	8.55**	27.41***	15.12***
Immigrants make country's crime problem better	15.99***	2.58	18.60***	6.04**

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
*Notes: The estimates come from a logistic regression analysis. Average marginal effects are calculated with reference to "Native-born with both parents native-born". Individual characteristics (age, gender, education) and country fixed effects are controlled for in the regressions. * p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001.*

Concluding remarks

One important finding that emerges from this analysis is that there are considerable differences both between the native and the migrant population and within the migrant population in outcomes across the various dimensions considered.

As compared with the native population, migrants generally tend to participate less in national elections, take part less in political party organisations and are less involved in voluntary and other civic organisations. They are more likely than natives to report less confidence in their ability to participate in politics and to take an active role in a political group.

First generation migrants exhibit higher trust in the legal system, the police and politicians in comparison with both the native-born and second generation migrants. No significant difference is found in the level of trust in people between the native-born and first generation migrants. Similarly, there is no significant difference in values concerning openness and tolerance; migrants are just as likely as the native-born to attach importance to and to identify with values of equal treatment, understanding different people and caring for people and the environment. First generation migrants, especially those from outside the EU, express more positive attitudes towards immigrants than second generation migrants and the native-born. The region of origin effect is strongest for the indicators on social engagement. Migrants born outside the EU as well as second generation migrants with at least one parent born in a non-EU country report less frequent social interaction with colleagues, friends and relatives and also feel isolated and lonely more often than first and second generation migrants with EU-born parents and the native-born.

While different groups of migrants tend to have success or better outcomes as regards some aspects and perform worse as regards others, there is no migrant group that does well in all aspects. For all aspects, second generation migrants with non-EU-born parents seem to be the ones who face the most problems. Together with those with EU-born parents, they have the least trust in institutions and in people in general. In addition, they have the lowest level of confidence in their ability to be politically active and appear to be the most disenchanted with national politics and with the possibility of influencing them. This is also reflected in their lower propensity to participate in national elections and in political as well as non-political organisations than second generation migrants with EU-born parents. In addition, they are the least likely to strongly identify with values of equal treatment and equal opportunities and understanding different people.

Length of stay is found to have an important effect on the socio-political integration of migrants. More recent migrants (i.e. those resident for less than 20 years) are more likely to trust in institutions than the native-born, but the difference tends to diminish as longer time is spent in the host country. The same pattern is observed for non-EU-born migrants

with respect to values of equal treatment and understanding difference. Both more recent and more established migrants (i.e. those resident for over 20 years) report lower civic and political participation than the native-born, but the difference tends to be smaller in the case of more established migrants suggesting that longer residence results in better integration outcomes. Results from the analysis for age at time of arrival in the country show that the difference in voting participation between the native-born and migrants tends to be smaller the earlier the age at arrival.

Attitudes of migrants to others migrants also seem to change the longer they have been in the country and tend to become more similar to those of the native-born population. This is line with earlier studies which find a similar change in sentiment towards 'newcomers', which may reflect a fear of competition for jobs, though it equally might reflect migrants becoming more assimilated into local society and being increasingly influenced by the attitudes of the local population.

Both EU-born and non-EU-born migrants have a higher probability of feeling discriminated against as compared with the native-born population regardless of the length of residence. In the case of non-EU-born migrants the difference appears to be more pronounced for more established migrants than for those with less than 20 years of residence. At the same time, the analysis indicates that more recent non-EU-born migrants tend to express a higher sense of belonging than the native-born population and the difference in relation to the native-born also increases with more time spent in the host country.

The results relating to the significantly lower civic and political participation among migrants indicate that there is clearly a need for policies to increase their political inclusion. As the first part of this research note showed, migrants tend to have lower levels of income, are more at risk of poverty and more likely to be materially deprived, which can make it more difficult to participate in political and other civic activities.

It is also important to bear in mind that the kinds of challenge faced by migrants can differ across migrant groups. Research has shown that language is an important factor explaining the lower participation of first generation migrants. Lack of language skills together with insufficient knowledge of the host country's political environment can make it more difficult not only to participate, but also to access information on how to do so. Establishing and ensuring funding for consultative bodies of foreign residents at the national, regional or local level could be one means of facilitating their socio-political integration. Voluntary organisations, including ethnic associations, also play an important role in helping integration into the host society. Accordingly, policies aimed at increasing migrants' involvement in such organisations that provide networks and information about the host country's political system and its institutions, could be particularly useful.

At the same time, it is equally important to combat discrimination against migrants which prevents them making the contribution to both the economy and society which their skills and attributes potentially enable them to do and, accordingly, reduces the return on the investment in integration, education and training programmes which has been made.

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Annex

Table A.1 Average share of income of native-born population and migrants aged 16-64 from self-employment, 2007 and 2013 (% total income)

	Native-born		Migrants		Change 2007-2013	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	Native-born	Migrants
BE	7.5	6.7	5.5	3.7	-0.8	-1.9
CZ	12.7	13.2	24.8	35.5	0.4	10.7
DK	4.9	3.8	5.4	2.6	-1.1	-2.9
IE	9.7	8.7	9.2	11.1	-1.0	1.8
EL	25.4	22.6	13.0	12.7	-2.8	-0.3
ES	10.4	8.2	5.7	6.6	-2.2	1.0
FR	4.1	5.5	3.7	3.5	1.4	-0.2
HR		9.7		9.2		
IT	19.2	18.8	17.6	17.5	-0.3	-0.1
CY	13.8	10.1	16.6	8.4	-3.7	-8.2
LT	8.9	8.0	5.9	8.7	-0.9	2.7
LU	4.1	3.8	1.8	1.3	-0.3	-0.5
HU	7.5	6.8	11.5	8.5	-0.7	-3.0
NL	6.5	8.1	6.6	6.5	1.6	-0.1
AT	9.3	9.3	5.3	3.9	0.0	-1.4
PL	10.6	12.0	15.1	8.2	1.4	-6.8
PT	11.4	5.8	7.9	5.8	-5.6	-2.0
FI	5.9	5.0	4.2	3.5	-1.0	-0.6
SE	3.5	2.8	3.6	2.6	-0.7	-1.0
UK	7.6	7.8	8.3	7.9	0.2	-0.4
EU	10.3	10.3	8.1	8.3	-0.1	0.2

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata

Table A.2 Proportion of native-born and migrants aged 16-64 receiving social benefits and the average amount received, 2007 and 2013

	% in receipt of social benefits				Average amount received (EUR)*			
	Native-born		Migrants		Native-born		Migrants	
	2007	2013	2007	2013	2007	2013	2007	2013
BE	77.8	78.5	86.0	84.6	4,044	4,758	4,301	4,994
CZ	73.9	57.2	51.4	32.8	1,298	1,466	793	630
DK	78.5	94.9	83.8	92.8	4,700	5,736	5,227	6,159
IE	86.4	86.6	86.7	83.8	6,090	6,375	5,061	5,192
EL	46.4	57.0	30.8	48.1	2,477	2,599	718	927
ES	49.0	64.1	36.0	63.1	2,349	3,676	716	1,982
FR	78.7	74.7	87.7	81.3	4,990	5,246	5,172	5,560
HR		64.8		70.0		1,289		1,322
IT	69.9	67.1	68.3	65.6	3,875	3,781	1,800	1,920
CY	78.5	75.0	69.6	64.8	2,819	5,355	2,092	3,909
LT	72.6	77.2	67.2	72.8	695	1,039	761	1,124
LU	77.8	77.1	78.1	79.7	7,441	9,424	5,319	6,426
NL	74.6	77.1	75.8	86.4	3,493	3,317	3,363	4,442
AT	78.2	79.4	86.5	83.2	4,637	5,616	3,886	4,899
PT	74.5	63.8	66.6	54.9	2,009	2,477	1,526	1,491
FI	82.0	81.2	89.5	86.0	3,992	5,020	4,696	6,460
SE	78.8	76.8	87.4	84.2	4,869	5,245	5,287	6,564
UK	70.5	63.8	66.8	62.2	3,486	4,240	3,520	3,406
EU	70.7	69.2	65.5	69.7	3,020	3,412	2,854	3,408

Note: Darker shaded figures denote cases where the figures are larger for migrants than for the native-born. Lighter shaded figures denote cases where there is little difference between the two.

** Average is calculated in relation to all migrants rather than only those in receipt of benefit. The number of people in both cases has been equivalised to allow for differences in household composition using the OECD-modified method.*

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata

Figure A.1 Proportion of native-born and migrants in employment working part-time, 2014 and 2008 (% total employed)

2014



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata

2008



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata No data available for HR, FI, SE and EL

Figure A.2 Proportion of native-born population aged 25-64 with tertiary level education attainment, 2007 and 2013 (% of each group)

2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2007



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Figure A.3 Proportion of native-born and migrants with income in the bottom quintile and in employment working part-time, 2014 and 2008 (%)

2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2007



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC No data available for HR, FI, SE

Figure A.4 Proportion of native-born and migrants aged 25-64 with tertiary education who spouses or partners also had tertiary education, 2013 and 2007

2013



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

2007



Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Table A.3 Proportion of migrants and native-born unemployed for two or more months in the year in receipt of unemployment and social exclusion benefits, 2013 (% unemployed in each group)

	2007								2013							
	Native-born				Migrants				Native-born				Migrants			
	None	Only un	Only se	Both	None	Only un	Only se	Both	None	Only un	Only se	Both	None	Only un	Only se	Both
BE	2.5	96.8	0.2	0.5	5.1	83.6	6.6	4.6	6.8	91.0	1.0	1.3				
DK	24.9	75.1	0.0	0.0	*29.3*	*70.7*	*0.0*	*0.0*	1.2	98.8	0.0	0.0	*8.2*	*91.8*	*0.0*	*0.0*
IE	24.8	61.2	4.3	9.8	*57.0*	*29.1*	*10.4*	*3.5*	27.1	62.7	3.2	7.0	41.3	33.8	13.1	11.9
EL	68.8	28.0	2.3	1.0	61.9	31.7	2.4	4.0	78.1	16.9	4.3	0.7	79.3	15.4	4.6	0.7
ES	48.3	50.8	0.5	0.4	56.9	43.1	0.0	0.0	33.4	61.1	2.6	2.9	37.8	50.5	7.6	4.1
FR	12.4	66.3	11.7	9.6	14.3	58.9	16.0	10.8	16.4	57.4	12.5	13.8	18.5	46.3	19.6	15.6
HR									80.0	13.2	6.2	0.6	77.8	10.4	11.8	0.0
IT	65.5	32.9	1.1	0.4	63.5	34.0	2.2	0.3	62.2	36.1	1.2	0.6	52.0	44.4	1.7	1.8
CY	42.8	57.1	0.2	0.0	67.9	32.1	0.0	0.0	48.0	46.3	4.2	1.5	64.8	29.7	5.2	0.2
LT	77.6	15.2	6.4	0.8	*80.9*	*16.2*	*0.0*	*2.9*	30.4	16.4	39.6	13.6	15.1	20.9	61.0	3.0
LU	52.2	28.8	16.0	2.9	33.4	28.5	32.7	5.4	24.0	48.1	21.6	6.3	35.1	27.6	21.8	15.4
NL	0.8	37.3	57.5	4.3	*0.0*	*11.2*	*73.1*	*15.6*	2.3	50.0	42.5	5.2	0.0	32.0	61.1	6.9
AT	11.1	78.1	1.6	9.3	17.0	71.9	2.4	8.6	6.0	82.3	1.0	10.7	14.4	60.3	6.3	19.0
PT	50.0	41.5	7.6	1.0	*52.0*	*38.8*	*9.2*	*0.0*	53.1	38.8	7.0	1.1	55.1	40.3	4.6	0.0
FI	5.8	67.0	3.7	23.5	16.2	44.1	0.2	39.5	5.3	66.7	3.3	24.6	2.0	44.6	11.4	42.0
SE	39.9	49.8	7.4	2.9	26.6	23.2	38.7	11.5	35.4	58.5	4.8	1.2	29.8	33.4	18.3	18.5
UK	50.6	21.2	22.9	5.3	*49.5*	*35.7*	*10.0*	*4.9*	47.5	35.5	15.2	1.8	54.3	22.6	18.2	5.0
EU	43.2	42.8	10.2	3.8	38.8	46.2	9.6	5.4	43.8	43.5	8.7	4.0	37.2	43.3	13.1	6.4

Note: No data for HR in 2007. Figures in italics indicate data of uncertain reliability because of small number of observations.

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC

Table A.4 Coefficients of the independent variables of the regression model for the difference in gross monthly earnings of full-time employees aged 16-64, 2013

	(Intercept)	Gender		Occupation									
		Women	Men (ref.)	ISCO-0	ISCO-2	ISCO-3	ISCO-4	ISCO-5	ISCO-6	ISCO-7	ISCO-8	ISCO-9	ISCO-1 (ref.)
BE	8.23***	-0.17***		-0.22***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.37***	-0.45***	-0.66***	-0.40***	-0.39***	-0.56***	
CZ	7.43***	-0.31***		-0.27***	-0.22***	-0.33***	-0.42***	-0.68***	-0.69***	-0.64***	-0.62***	-0.90***	
DK	8.58***	-0.21***		-0.31***	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.40***	-0.55***	-0.52***	-0.54***	-0.48***	-0.58***	
IE	8.12***	-0.21***			-0.01*	-0.12*	-0.35***	-0.42***	-0.56***	-0.59***	-0.47***	-0.52***	
EL	7.58***	-0.17***		-0.54***	-0.58***	-0.58***	-0.70***	-0.79***	-0.94***	-0.73***	-0.74***	-0.91***	
ES	7.79***	-0.24***		-0.40***	-0.20***	-0.42***	-0.48***	-0.73***	-0.85***	-0.65***	-0.55***	-0.86***	
FR	8.07***	-0.23***		-0.45***	-0.22***	-0.40***	-0.54***	-0.64***	-0.63***	-0.52***	-0.55***	-0.69***	
HR	7.12***	-0.24***		-0.29***	-0.22**	-0.32***	-0.51***	-0.59***	-0.67***	-0.63***	-0.54***	-0.67***	
IT	8.09***	-0.19***		-0.30***	-0.44***	-0.47***	-0.55***	-0.80***	-1.04***	-0.69***	-0.59***	-0.95***	
CY	7.79***	-0.19***		-0.18**	-0.24**	-0.51***	-0.74***	-0.82***	-0.70***	-0.77***	-0.74***	-1.11***	
LT	6.80***	-0.30***		0.06*	-0.20**	-0.32***	-0.35**	-0.55***	-0.62***	-0.48***	-0.37***	-0.63***	
LU	8.51***	-0.13***		-0.41***	-0.06*	-0.21***	-0.36***	-0.60***	-0.61***	-0.59***	-0.50***	-0.64***	
NL	8.21***	-0.16***		-0.13**	-0.14***	-0.23***	-0.40***	-0.41***	-0.49***	-0.42***	-0.44***	-0.43***	
AT	8.08***	-0.20***		-0.51**	-0.13**	-0.24***	-0.36***	-0.48***	-0.80***	-0.40***	-0.38***	-0.47***	
PT	7.35***	-0.29***		-0.07*	0.01*	-0.20***	-0.37***	-0.48***	-0.69***	-0.54***	-0.50***	-0.71***	
FI	8.64***	-0.20***		-0.41***	-0.39***	-0.61***	-0.75***	-0.80***	-1.05***	-0.74***	-0.72***	-0.93***	
SE	8.18***	-0.25***		-0.26**	-0.32***	-0.40***	-0.53***	-0.61***	-1.00***	-0.55***	-0.57***	-0.72***	
UK	8.19***	-0.27***		-0.06*	-0.02*	-0.23***	-0.45***	-0.60***	-0.33***	-0.38***	-0.43***	-0.72***	
EU	6.94***	-1.26***		-0.59***	-0.49***	-1.27***	-2.10***	-3.03***	-3.50***	-2.61***	-2.32***	-3.74***	

Table A.4 (Continued) Coefficients of the independent variables of the regression model for the difference in gross monthly earnings of full-time employees aged 16-64, 2013

	Highest education level			Year of migration		Country of birth			5-year age group
	Educ/Low	Medium	High (ref.)	In last 5 years	5+ years/Native (ref.)	EU	Non-EU	Native (ref.)	
BE	-0.31***	-0.20***		0.01*		0.07*	-0.11**		0.07***
CZ	-0.21***	-0.16***		0.03*		0.14**	0.27*		0.01***
DK	-0.22***	-0.07**		0.08*		0.05*	0.01*		0.05***
IE	-0.28***	-0.19***		-0.22**		-0.07**	-0.13**		0.07***
EL	-0.20***	-0.11***		0.16*		0.06*	-0.15***		0.08***
ES	-0.25***	-0.11***		0.22*		-0.24**	-0.15***		0.08***
FR	-0.22***	-0.15***		-0.32*		0.05*	-0.05**		0.06***
HR	-0.36***	-0.26***		-0.14**		-0.02*	0.00*		0.05***
IT	-0.24***	-0.13***		-0.09*		-0.30***	-0.21***		0.06***
CY	-0.25***	-0.13***		-0.23***		-0.10***	-0.34***		0.09***
LT	-0.36***	-0.28***		-1.64*		-0.09*	0.17**		0.03***
LU	-0.42***	-0.23***		-0.08**		-0.16***	-0.32***		0.09***
NL	-0.35***	-0.24***		0.01*		-0.01*	-0.02*		0.08***
AT	-0.61***	-0.18***		-0.06*		-0.05*	-0.11**		0.09***
PT	-0.44***	-0.25***		0.10*		0.01*	-0.03*		0.07***
FI	-0.14***	-0.09***		0.00*		-0.04*	-0.10*		0.03***
SE	-0.23***	-0.05*		-0.33*		-0.01*	-0.09**		0.08***
UK	-0.25***	-0.23***		0.11*		0.01*	0.01*		0.04***
EU	-1.41***	-0.88***		0.25*		-0.33***	-0.61***		0.27***

*Note: Dependent variable=Monthly gross earnings of full-time employees. ***:p<0.001, **:p<0.05, *:p<0.1*
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC microdata and own calculations

Table A.5 Coefficients of the independent variables of the regression model for monthly take home pay deciles of employees aged 15-64, 2013

	(Intercept)	Gender		Occupation									
		Women	Men (ref.)	ISCO-0	ISCO-2	ISCO-3	ISCO-4	ISCO-5	ISCO-6	ISCO-7	ISCO-8	ISCO-9	ISCO-1 (ref.)
BE	7.37***	-0.87***		-1.22***	-0.92***	-1.13***	-1.90***	-2.51***	-3.20***	-2.34***	-2.15***	-3.18***	
BG	9.17***	-1.41***		0.42*	-0.66***	-0.91***	-1.70***	-2.85***	-3.50***	-2.01***	-2.04***	-3.42***	
CZ	8.45***	-0.96***		-0.79**	-0.51***	-1.01***	-2.11***	-3.31***	-2.81***	-2.74***	-2.69***	-4.04***	
DK	7.14***	-0.80***		-2.19***	-1.12***	-1.71***	-2.81***	-3.25***	-3.45***	-3.18***	-3.24***	-3.70***	
DE	7.50***	-1.07***		0.04	-0.33***	-1.20***	-1.40***	-2.24***	-2.89***	-2.01***	-1.98***	-2.56***	
EE	9.33***	-1.82***		-0.67**	-0.32**	-0.90***	-1.47***	-2.53***	-2.09***	-1.54***	-1.84***	-3.08***	
IE	6.83***	-0.72***		-0.65***	-0.07	-0.80***	-1.42***	-1.96***	-2.12***	-1.23***	-1.44***	-1.99***	
EL	5.91***	-0.87***		-1.10***	-1.65***	-1.85***	-2.49***	-3.03***	-4.01***	-2.94***	-2.69***	-3.65***	
ES	7.67***	-0.73***		-1.53***	-0.49***	-1.59***	-2.26***	-3.00***	-3.52***	-2.44***	-2.56***	-3.50***	
FR	7.63***	-0.85***		-0.74***	-0.70***	-1.82***	-2.79***	-3.23***	-4.21***	-2.98***	-2.90***	-3.77***	
HR	7.91***	-1.02***		-0.47	-0.31	-1.48***	-2.65***	-3.87***	-4.22***	-3.60***	-3.91***	-4.71***	
IT	7.84***	-1.09***		-0.78***	-1.13***	-1.39***	-2.28***	-3.08***	-3.98***	-2.82***	-2.50***	-3.86***	
CY	6.72***	-1.01***		0.38***	-0.20**	-0.90***	-1.94***	-2.96***	-3.34***	-2.51***	-2.94***	-3.78***	
LV	9.03***	-1.18***		0.35	-0.71***	-1.17***	-1.60***	-2.81***	-3.33***	-2.30***	-1.87***	-3.33***	
LT	7.83***	-0.91***		1.23***	-0.21**	-0.90***	-1.49***	-2.48***	-2.64***	-1.65***	-1.40***	-3.29***	
LU	6.46***	-0.70***		-2.11**	-0.83***	-1.69***	-2.58***	-3.16***	-3.91***	-3.27***	-3.22***	-3.62***	
HU	9.12***	-1.35***		-1.33***	-0.62***	-1.27***	-1.93***	-2.76***	-4.17***	-2.20***	-2.53***	-3.88***	
MT	8.19***	-0.66***		-1.83***	-0.86***	-1.48***	-2.53***	-3.11***	-3.84***	-2.82***	-3.12***	-3.95***	
NL	7.23***	-0.66***		-1.13***	-0.61***	-1.04***	-1.89***	-2.21***	-2.58***	-1.92***	-1.96***	-2.86***	
AT	7.06***	-0.84***		-0.79***	-0.35***	-0.92***	-1.46***	-2.31***	-3.21***	-1.96***	-2.02***	-2.67***	
PL	8.81***	-1.32***		0.23***	-0.59***	-1.18***	-2.27***	-3.28***	-3.66***	-2.54***	-2.13***	-3.86***	
PT	8.01***	-1.25***		-0.54***	0.03	-0.78***	-1.89***	-2.57***	-3.72***	-2.76***	-2.57***	-3.52***	
RO	7.30***	-1.20***		0.03	0.01	-0.23**	-0.65***	-1.98***	-1.08***	-1.39***	-1.08***	-2.74***	
SI	6.72***	-0.93***		-0.24	-0.35***	-0.74***	-1.64***	-2.30***	-3.03***	-2.02***	-2.05***	-2.96***	
SK	9.21***	-1.44***		0.13	-1.51***	-1.72***	-2.45***	-3.41***	-3.78***	-2.73***	-2.85***	-3.99***	
FI	8.57***	-1.24***		-1.88***	-1.06***	-2.47***	-3.47***	-4.00***	-4.61***	-3.46***	-3.40***	-4.59***	
UK	7.43***	-0.79***		0.04	0.03	-1.03***	-1.90***	-2.34***	-2.65***	-1.52***	-1.85***	-2.65***	
EU	7.63***	-1.06***		-0.46***	-0.45***	-1.22***	-1.89***	-2.73***	-3.36***	-2.35***	-2.29***	-3.32***	

Table A.5 (Continued) Coefficients of the independent variables of the regression model for monthly take home pay deciles of employees aged 15-64, 2013

	Full-time/part-time		Highest educational level attained			Year of immigration		Country of birth			5-year age groups
	Part-time	Full-time (ref.)	Low	Medium	High (ref.)	In last 5 years	+5 years ago/Native (ref.)	EU	Non-EU	Native (ref.)	
BE	-2.74***		-1.67***	-1.19***		-0.12*		0.16***	-0.26***		0.34***
BG	-2.43***		-1.98***	-0.90***		-1.34**		-1.48***	1.25**		-0.03**
CZ	-2.74***		-1.26***	-0.88***		-0.73*		0.04	0.26		0.08***
DK	-2.01***		-0.76***	-0.30***		-0.27		-0.12	-0.22***		0.32***
DE	-2.43***		-2.28***	-1.08***		-0.46***		0.22***	0.23***		0.27***
EE	-2.61***		-1.41***	-0.93***		-0.84		0.20	-0.50***		-0.08***
IE	-2.60***		-1.03***	-0.68***		-0.09		-0.37***	-0.37***		0.13***
EL	-2.25***		-1.22***	-0.73***		0.45**		-0.37***	-0.56***		0.41***
ES	-3.25***		-0.98***	-0.43***		0.01		-0.46***	-0.55***		0.25***
FR	-2.56***		-1.30***	-0.75***		-0.42**		0.08	-0.44***		0.31***
HR	-1.56***		-1.26***	-0.59***		-4.37***		0.64**	0.21*		0.24***
IT	-2.59***		-1.06***	-0.57***		-0.33***		-0.50***	-0.50***		0.28***
CY	-2.94***		-0.98***	-0.47***		-0.51***		-0.56***	-1.21***		0.36***
LV	-2.54***		-1.48***	-0.92***		0.06		-0.09	-0.13		-0.10***
LT	-2.94***		-1.40***	-0.83***		-2.10***		1.26***	0.32**		0.05***
LU	-2.26***		-1.36***	-0.61***		-0.30**		-0.54***	-0.87***		0.44***
HU	-3.02***		-1.80***	-1.07***		-0.08		0.21**	0.43**		0.02***
MT	-2.83***		-1.53***	-0.98***		0.06		0.07			0.19***
NL	-2.27***		-1.26***	-0.77***		-0.36		-0.13	-0.10**		0.34***
AT	-2.94***		-1.82***	-0.69***		-0.12*		-0.41***	-0.44***		0.35***
PL	-2.99***		-1.75***	-0.99***		-0.43		0.64	-0.15		0.14***
PT	-2.79***		-1.83***	-1.00***		-0.54**		0.17**	0.24***		0.25***
RO	-0.57**		-1.81***	-0.93***		-1.00			1.61*		0.10***
SI	-2.58***		-2.03***	-1.42***		-0.51**		-0.35**	-0.35***		0.32***
SK	-2.56***		-1.63***	-0.91***		0.97**		0.29*	0.39*		0.03***
FI	-2.75***		-1.04***	-0.71***		-0.31		0.04	-0.71***		0.19***
UK	-2.85***		-1.11***	-0.77***		-0.06		-0.05	-0.21***		0.18***
EU	-2.43***		-1.35***	-0.80***		-0.19***		-0.06**	-0.26***		0.24***

*Note: No data for SE. Dependent variable=Monthly take-home pay deciles (net monthly earnings). ***:p<0.001, **:p<0.05, *:p<0.1*
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey, microdata and own calculations

Table A.6 Coverage of EU countries in the ESS (Number of observations)

	2004	2008	2012	2014
Belgium	1,697	1,682	1,790	1,686
Bulgaria		2,190	2,245	
Czech Republic	2,934	1,955	1,941	2,082
Denmark	1,429	1,550	1,582	1,435
Germany	2,742	2,691	2,832	2,938
Estonia	1,890	1,610	2,301	2,004
Ireland	2,236	1,723	2,581	2,343
Greece	2,363	2,019		
Spain	1,608	2,486	1,841	1,880
France	1,769	2,009	1,927	1,858
Croatia		1,470		
Italy	1,497		935	
Cyprus		1,168	1,087	
Latvia		1,922		
Lithuania			2,017	2,144
Luxembourg	1,545			
Hungary	1,430	1,506	1,962	1,663
Netherlands	1,839	1,740	1,812	1,866
Austria	2,164	2,221	1,822	1,762
Poland	1,614	1,547	2,117	1,569
Portugal	2,008	2,296		1,227
Romania		2,106		
Slovenia	1,359	1,242	1,212	1,188
Slovakia	1,432	1,796	1,830	
Finland	1,924	2,105	2,116	2,022
Sweden	1,861	1,745	1,780	1,736
United Kingdom	1,841	2,301	2,241	2,227
Total	39,182	45,080	39,971	33,630

Source: ESS Round 7 2014, ESS Round 6 2012, ESS Round 4 2008, ESS Round 2 2004
Note: Population aged 18 and over.

Table A.7 Number of observations by migrant group, 2014

	Native-born with both parents native-born	*Native-born with at least 1 parent EU-born*	*Native-born with at least 1 parent Non-EU-born*	*EU-born*	*Non-EU-born*
Belgium	1,276	126	63	112	109
Czech Republic	1,836	147	53	37	9
Denmark	1,246	34	38	52	65
Germany	2,371	156	113	139	159
Estonia	1,111	13	478	13	389
Ireland	1,927	83	20	229	84
Spain	1,678	14	27	43	118
France	1,377	125	136	52	168
Lithuania	1,872	30	167	7	68
Hungary	1,588	31	17	19	8
Netherlands	1,535	54	95	53	129
Austria	1,391	86	76	100	109
Poland	1,472	35	45	8	9
Portugal	1,095	9	30	20	73
Slovenia	976	56	56	28	72
Finland	1,891	14	23	43	51
Sweden	1,373	80	52	87	144
United Kingdom	1,718	69	129	66	245
Total	27,733	1,162	1,618	1,108	2,009

Source: ESS Round 7 2014
Note: Population aged 18 and over.

Table A.8: Institutional trust, 2014 (Average score)

	Trust in the legal system					Trust in the police					Trust in politicians				
	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born
	parents native	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*			*parents native*	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*			*parents native*	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*		
BE	4.8	4.3	5.6	5.4	6.3	5.9	5.5	5.8	6.2	6.5	4.1	3.3	4.0	3.9	5.1
CZ	4.6	4.8	4.6	4.6		5.7	5.6	5.2	5.4		3.3	3.4	3.5	2.8	
DK	7.5	7.1	6.6	7.5	7.2	7.7	7.2	7.3	8.2	7.2	4.9	4.2	4.0	5.3	5.0
DE	5.8	5.6	6.0	5.7	6.7	6.8	6.5	6.8	6.9	7.1	3.8	3.8	3.6	4.2	4.5
EE	5.5		4.8		4.7	6.3		5.9		5.7	3.6		3.2		3.4
IE	5.2	5.1		5.6	6.3	6.3	5.5	5.5	6.5	6.9	3.3	3.5		3.2	4.0
ES	3.9		3.5	5.0	5.4	6.3		6.2	6.5	6.5	2.1		1.9	2.8	3.1
FR	5.1	4.8	5.0	5.6	5.8	6.1	5.9	6.2	6.0	6.3	2.6	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.6
LT	4.5	4.9	4.2		4.1	5.7	5.9	5.7		5.0	3.2	3.5	2.8		2.5
HU	4.6	4.0				5.3	5.1				3.0	1.8			
NL	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.2	6.0	6.5	6.6	5.6	6.4	6.3	4.9	4.7	4.7	5.0	4.6
AT	5.6	5.5	5.8	6.0	6.2	6.5	5.8	6.4	6.5	7.3	3.4	3.6	3.9	3.5	4.2
PL	3.5	3.3	3.0			5.0	5.4	5.3			2.0	1.8	2.2		
PT	3.6		4.2		4.3	5.6		5.6	6.0	5.6	2.0		1.8	2.4	1.9
SI	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.8	4.2	5.4	4.8	5.1	5.6	6.3	1.9	1.7	1.5	2.1	1.8
FI	6.8		6.9	6.9	6.9	7.9		8.0	7.8	8.2	4.5		4.1	4.8	5.3
SE	6.4	6.1	5.9	6.3	6.2	6.9	6.7	6.5	6.7	7.1	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.9	5.0
UK	5.4	5.1	5.7	6.1	6.7	6.2	5.8	6.2	6.9	7.0	3.3	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.3

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported.

Table A.9: Human values, 2014 (%)

	Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities					Important to understand different people				
	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born
	Parents native	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*			*Parents native*	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*		
BE	75.2	77.0	79.4	85.7	82.4	63.3	63.5	74.6	74.1	77.1
CZ	53.3	54.6	41.0	55.4		41.9	48.1	51.3	51.7	
DK	70.1	78.8	79.0	81.3	86.9	66.8	66.7	73.7	75.5	73.3
DE	82.1	84.5	82.1	87.3	93.3	79.0	79.6	78.5	80.1	81.1
EE	63.1		66.1		70.8	63.6		65.6		67.2
IE	73.5	73.3	56.8	76.9	79.4	60.1	58.8	38.6	66.7	67.3
ES	88.8		96.3	83.7	91.5	73.6		70.4	81.4	82.8
FR	77.5	68.9	84.2	70.7	76.2	60.2	62.0	57.9	76.9	69.3
LT	55.2	58.1	53.5		52.3	28.3	31.9	29.2		23.8
HU	74.0	92.9				53.0	53.6			
NL	72.1	76.3	78.9	65.5	79.5	55.5	52.5	52.8	60.9	64.7
AT	74.7	83.9	78.1	81.1	76.3	63.1	72.0	66.0	69.8	59.7
PL	82.8	81.2	74.6			66.6	76.7	68.6		
PT	62.8		77.1	84.7	68.0	43.6		50.8	49.0	47.4
SI	91.1		90.4	92.9	95.7	77.5	80.0	73.6	88.9	73.9
FI	76.5	92.9	73.9	85.7	85.4	70.4		78.3	85.7	80.9
SE	84.3	93.7	88.5	82.1	83.9	69.1	72.2	69.2	73.5	77.9
UK	72.9	85.5	85.2	83.5	86.8	65.2	65.3	68.5	66.4	74.3

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported.

Table A.9 (Continued) Human values, 2014 (%)

	Important to help people and care for others well-being					Important to care for nature and environment				
	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born	Native-born			EU-born	Non-EU-born
	Parents native	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*			*Parents native*	*1 parent EU*	*1 parent Non-EU*		
BE	77.5	71.4	84.1	80.4	88.1	74.0	74.6	68.3	79.5	85.3
CZ	48.1	34.0	53.8	46.6		60.0	54.5	56.5	53.5	
DK	74.4	88.2	76.3	77.6	88.7	71.7	76.5	71.1	71.4	72.6
DE	78.6	84.0	70.8	86.0	81.9	77.3	80.0	74.8	83.4	79.0
EE	59.2		55.5		61.0	77.6		76.0		84.2
IE	75.0	64.2	50.0	65.9	73.9	68.0	66.8	77.3	67.8	68.3
ES	88.4		92.6	90.7	91.5	78.8		81.5	69.8	86.3
FR	58.8	61.3	57.6	60.1	73.8	62.2	68.8	58.3	61.9	68.9
LT	42.4	37.6	36.1		38.3	62.4	69.6	66.6		69.3
HU	62.4	75.0				78.6	85.7			
NL	64.0	50.5	59.8	52.9	66.5	65.2	68.1	66.4	73.5	71.9
AT	70.5	72.0	72.0	68.2	76.5	79.1	81.2	69.8	72.5	67.3
PL	67.5	83.0	68.8			78.8	86.3	77.3		
PT	62.9		75.4	60.9	71.4	62.3		58.9	44.6	62.5
SI	90.6	92.7	88.7	82.1	89.9	92.0	90.9	87.0	96.4	97.1
FI	70.8		78.3	78.6	81.3	76.7		56.5	73.8	79.2
SE	73.0	79.5	80.8	71.4	81.2	72.1	73.4	59.6	80.2	75.9
UK	76.1	80.7	82.1	65.6	79.0	68.6	69.4	75.9	77.3	78.9

Source: ESS7 2014 Edition 2.0
Notes: Results based on less than 20 observations are not reported.