

### miCROmod

## THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF LOCAL SOCIAL BENEFITS IN CROATIA

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### INTRODUCTION




Local social benefits (LB) in Croatia: > 3,000 LB Value: > 0,4% of GDP

#### **AIM**

Analyse the distributional impact of five types of local social benefits of the four major Croatian cities – Zagreb, Split, Rijeka and Osijek

- Comparison of benefits and their generosity
- Income redistribution effects
- Poverty reduction effects
- Compensation of childrearing costs and child poverty

### miCROmod



Tax-benefit microsimulation model for Croatia based on EUROMOD's structure

\*denotes Central Government



### LOCAL SOCIAL BENEFITS OF ZAGREB, SPLIT, RIJEKA AND OSIJEK

- Housing benefits means-tested benefit (GMB beneficiaries) for coverage of rent and utility bills; up to 50% of subsistence costs
- Old-age income supplements means-tested benefit for pensioners; monthly benefit and/or coupons for Christmas and Easter
- Grants for a newborn child universal benefit for residents; usually increases with the number of children pronatalist measure
- Kindergarten subsidies universal benefit for parents; subsidy of the economic price; various additional discounts available
- City transport subsidies subsidy of monthly/yearly fares for pupils, students, pensioners and low-income households

### **DATA, METHODS & ASSUMPTIONS**

| Data        | UDB and national SILC 2015 & 2016  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Policies    | Valid on 30 June 2017  |  |  |  |  |
| Assumptions | Full take up of benefits   |  |  |  |  |
|             | All surveyed individuals <i>reside in the same city</i> (due to lack of residence data) – capturing <i>only policy effects</i> |  |  |  |  |
| Methods     | Hypothetical households and real data  |  |  |  |  |
|             | FGT indices; poverty line at 60% median EHDI   |  |  |  |  |
|             | Modified OECD equivalence scale  |  |  |  |  |
|             | Compensation indices (Urban & Pezer, 2018; Verbist and Van Lancker, 2016)  |  |  |  |  |
|             | Child contingent payments (Corak et al., 2005; Figari et al., 2011); CHC (Urban & Pezer, 2018)                                 |  |  |  |  |
|             | Poverty threshold and child costs fixed at Central Government level  |  |  |  |  |

### **RESULTS**

### **Hypothetical households** - benefits by income level; monthly (HRK); **2 adults & 2 children**





■ Housing benefit ■ Kindergarten subsidy ■ Transport subsidy


Source: authors' calculations based on miCROmod output

Notes: x axis: households gross wage (average 8.055 HRK); y axis: amount of benefits



### **Hypothetical households** - benefits by pension level, monthly (HRK); **2 pensioners**





■ Housing benefit ■ Old-age supplement ■ Transport subsidy

Source: authors' calculations based on miCROmod output

Notes: x axis: households gross pension; y axis: amount of benefits




#### Distributional impact of the local benefits on EHDI

| Decile<br>group | CG benefit<br>system<br>EHDI | Change in mean EHDI relative to Central Government (CG) (in %) |       |        |        |
|-----------------|------------------------------|--|-------|--------|--------|
| 8.0 <b>u</b> p  | (HRK)                        | ZAGREB   | SPLIT | RIJEKA | OSIJEK |
| 1               | 811                          | 46.4   | 23.3  | 39.7   | 29.1   |
| 2               | 1,302                        | 24.9   | 14.9  | 23.6   | 15.5   |
| 3               | 1,565                        | 20.6   | 12.2  | 14.1   | 12.7   |
| 4               | 1,881                        | 16.0   | 9.7   | 9.1    | 9.8    |
| 5               | 2,169                        | 11.1   | 7.1   | 6.1    | 7.3    |
| 6               | 2,521                        | 7.8  | 5.7   | 4.9    | 5.9    |
| 7               | 2,892                        | 6.0  | 4.4   | 3.6    | 4.5    |
| 8               | 3,428                        | 5.0  | 4.1   | 3.4    | 4.0    |
| 9               | 4,109                        | 3.6  | 3.4   | 2.7    | 3.0    |
| 10              | 6,303                        | 1.4  | 2.3   | 1.4    | 1.7    |
| All             | 2,724                        | 8.5  | 5.9   | 6.1    | 5.9    |

Source: authors' calculations based on miCROmod output

Note: based on 2015 SILC data


### At-risk-of-poverty rate (%) before and after the introduction of local benefits



Source: authors' calculations based on miCROmod output

Note: based on 2015 SILC data

#### Child poverty headcount reduction




Source: authors' calculations based on miCROmod output

*Note:* Child poverty headcount at Central Government level is 19%; 2016 SILC data; Φ denotes income without complete family support of local government



#### **Compensation of child-rearing costs**



Source: authors

Note: 2016 SILC data, pre-fiscal income decile groups

### **CONCLUSION**

Local benefits have an important impact on disposable incomes of all decile groups, complementing CG benefits.

The **anti-poverty** effectiveness of local benefits and their contribution to **coverage of child-rearing costs** is unquestionable.

Microsimulation techniques can take account of the diversity in existing local benefit systems to assess the magnitude and anti-poverty effectiveness of policies with similar goals.

Analyses based on miCROmod can be **further extended** to provide useful estimates of budget expenditure, work incentives, as well as to assess the inequality reduction effects for other specific groups and for the population as a whole.

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This research emerges from the project "Application of Microsimulation Models in the Analysis of Taxes and Social Benefits in Croatia" (AMMATSBC), that is financed by the Croatian Science Foundation (UIP-2014-09-4096).

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