

CENTRUM VOOR SOCIAAL BELEID HERMAN DELEECK

# Redistribution in a joint income-wealth perspective: A cross-country comparison

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#### Outline

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Data & methods
- 3. Joint income-wealth living standards
- 4. Broader assessment of the redistributive effects of taxbenefit instruments
- 5. (Sensitivity analyses & decomposition by age)
- 6. Conclusion

#### **1. Introduction**

#### Introduction

- Abundance of evidence indicates increasing inequality, only partly offset by government redistribution (e.g. OECD, 2015)
- Inequality and redistribution usually defined in income terms
  - Ranking of individuals
  - Ability-to-pay taxes & benefit eligibility
- Living standards also depend on wealth (Kuypers & Marx, 2016; Brandolini et al., 2010)
  - Various functions: financial stability, socio-economic development, power
  - Increasing wealth/income ratios (Piketty, 2014)
  - Positive but imperfect correlation

#### Introduction

- Wealth taxation often proposed as way to reduce inequality and raise government revenues (Piketty, 2014; Bach et al., 2014)
- Increase in theoretical literature on (optimal) wealth taxation
- But large void in empirical research
  - Due to absence of data and analytical tools

#### Purpose of our research

- Evaluate redistributive efforts against joint measure of income and wealth
- Add analysis of wealth taxes
- Using HFCS data and EUROMOD
- Cross-country analysis

#### 2. Data & methods

Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS)

- 2 waves (±2010 / ±2014)
- 15/20 Euro Area member states
- Information on wealth, income, consumption, pensions, employment and demographics
- Net wealth = (real + financial assets) (mortgage + non-mortgage debt)
- Oversampling of wealthy

#### **HFCS in EUROMOD**

- HFCS only covers gross incomes
- Converted into disposable incomes using EUROMOD (Kuypers, Figari & Verbist, 2016)
- Joint observation of net wealth and disposable income
- Extension of scope of EUROMOD
  - Taxation of capital income, wealth and wealth transfers
  - Fiscal incentives for asset accumulation
  - Asset means-testing in benefit eligibility
- Simulation of budgetary and redistributive effects of current and hypothetical wealth related policies

#### **Cross-country comparison**

- 6 countries from 1<sup>st</sup> HFCS wave
- Different income & wealth distributions and correlation
- Broad range of tax-benefit systems & wealth taxation
- Largest sample sizes

	Referenc	e period	Sample size		
Country	Wealth	Income	Households	Individuals	
Belgium	Time of interview	2009	2,327	5,506	
Finland	31/12/2009	2009	10,989	27,009	
France	Time of interview	2009	15,006	35,729	
Germany	Time of interview	2009	3,565	8,134	
Italy	31/12/2010	2010	7,951	19,836	
Spain	Time of interview	2007	6,197	15,850	

#### 3. Joint income-wealth living standards

### Relationship between income and wealth



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#### **Cross-country differences**

#### Rank correlation coefficient income and net wealth



#### Joint measure of income and wealth

• Sum of income and wealth using annual annuities (e.g. Weisbrod & Hansen, 1968; Brandolini et al., 2010)

$$AY = Y + \left[\frac{\rho}{1 - (1 + \rho)^{-n}}\right] * NW$$

n = T for unmarried, $T_1 + (T - T_1)b for married$ 

Y: income from labour, pensions and transfersNW: net wealth (assets – liabilities)ρ: interest rate

*n*: length of the annuity (life expectancy)

#### Extension annuitization for redistributive analysis

- Event wealth taxes subtracted from wealth that is annuitized
- Recurrent wealth taxes captured by interest rate annuity
  - Gross interest rate annuity: 5% (long-term pre-tax interest rate found in Piketty (2014))
  - Net interest rate annuity: 5% minus recurrent wealth taxes Income framework



## 4. Broader assessment of the redistributive effects of tax-benefit systems

### Redistributive effect of tax-benefit system

Income framework								
	Gini MPI	Gini Cl	Abs. RE	Rel. RE (as % of Gini MPI)				
Belgium	0.469 <i>(0.012)</i>	0.353 <i>(0.011)</i>	0.116 <i>(0.006)</i>	24.73				
Finland	0.362 <i>(0.003)</i>	0.258 <i>(0.002)</i>	0.104 <i>(0.001)</i>	28.73				
France	0.421 <i>(0.003)</i>	0.304 <i>(0.002)</i>	0.117 <i>(0.002)</i>	27.79				
Germany	0.417 <i>(0.005)</i>	0.319 <i>(0.004)</i>	0.098 <i>(0.003)</i>	23.50				
Italy	0.374 <i>(0.003)</i>	0.315 <i>(0.003)</i>	0.059 <i>(0.001)</i>	15.78				
Spain	0.407 <i>(0.006)</i>	0.379 <i>(0.006)</i>	0.028 <i>(0.003)</i>	6.88				
Joint income-wealth framework								
	Gini MPI + GAW	Gini Cl + NAW	Abs. RE	Rel. RE (as % of Gini				
				MPI+GAW)				
Belgium	0.458 <i>(0.008)</i>	0.406 <i>(0.007)</i>	0.052 <i>(0.004)</i>	11.35				
Finland	0.363 <i>(0.002)</i>	0.300 <i>(0.002)</i>	0.063 <i>(0.001)</i>	17.36				
France	0.445 <i>(0.003)</i>	0.374 <i>(0.003)</i>	0.071 <i>(0.001)</i>	15.96				
Germany	0.453 <i>(0.007)</i>	0.416 <i>(0.008)</i>	0.037 <i>(0.004)</i>	8.17				
Italy	0.418 <i>(0.005)</i>	0.417 <i>(0.005)</i>	0.001 <i>(0.001)</i>	0.24				
Spain	0.412 <i>(0.005)</i>	0.407 <i>(0.005)</i>	0.005 <i>(0.001)</i>	1.21				

Notes: MPI=market & pension income, CI=consumable income, GAW=gross annuitized wealth, NAW=net annuitized wealth, standard errors are shown between parentheses

#### Decomposition redistributive effect



#### **Decomposition RE: size**



#### **Decomposition RE: progressivity**

Kakwani indices		Income framework	Joint income- wealth framework		Income framework	Joint income- wealth framework
Social benefits	Belgium	0.809	0.787	Germany	0.779	0.824
Personal income tax		0.102	0.059		0.219	0.114
Capital income tax		0.332	0.327		0.293	0.179
SIC		0.017	-0.047		-0.081	-0.152
Indirect taxes		-0.226	-0.241		-0.254	-0.303
Wealth taxes		-0.140	-0.004		0.001	0.160
Social benefits	Finland	0.703	0.719	Italy	0.620	0.499
Personal income tax		0.068	0.033		0.137	0.067
Capital income tax		0.146	0.225		0.243	0.281
SIC		0.050	-0.014		0.077	-0.045
Indirect taxes		-0.177	-0.196		-0.112	-0.184
Wealth taxes		-0.080	0.126		0.137	0.268
Social benefits	France	0.826	0.824	Spain	0.822	0.579
Personal income tax		0.147	0.089		0.316	0.249
Capital income tax					0.203	0.229
SIC		-0.043	-0.129		-0.092	-0.164
Indirect taxes		-0.271	-0.306		-0.245	-0.279
Wealth taxes		0.103	0.210		-0.098	0.165

Note: All Kakwani indices are statistically significant at the 1% level with the exception of the wealth taxes of Belgium in the joint income-wealth framework and the wealth taxes of Germany in the income framework.

#### 6. Conclusion

#### Conclusion

- Considerable reranking between income and wealth distribution, but cross-country differences
- Welfare states are less redistributive against joint income-net wealth
  - Personal income taxes, SIC less redistributive
  - Capital income & wealth taxes too small to have redistributive impact
  - Social benefits remain strongly pro-poor
- Tax-benefit system almost unilaterally focused on reducing income inequality, wealth considerations largely absent
- HFCS-EUROMOD combination enables research opportunities on policy reforms related to wealth

### Thank you!

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#### Extension annuitization: example

- Single-person HH with life expectancy = 40 years
- MI=€25,000, BEN=€5,000, INCTAX=€7,500
- NW=€150,000, RECWTAX=€800, INHERITTAX=€5,000
- Income framework:
  - MI = €25,000
  - CI = €25,000 + €5,000 €7,500 €800 €5,000 = €16,700
  - Wealth taxation = €5,800
  - Life-cycle effect = €37,000
- Joint income-wealth framework:
  - MI + GAW =  $\pounds$ 25,000 +  $\frac{0.05}{1 (1 + 0.05)^{-40}}$  \*  $\pounds$ 150,000 =  $\pounds$ 33,742
  - CI + NAW = ( $\pounds$ 25,000 +  $\pounds$ 5,000  $\pounds$ 7,500) +  $\frac{0.0447}{1-(1+0.0447)^{-40}}$  \* ( $\pounds$ 150,000  $\pounds$ 5,000) =  $\pounds$ 30,346
  - Wealth taxation = ( $\xi$ 5,000 \* 0.054) + ( $\xi$ 150,000 \* ( $\frac{0.05}{1-(1+0.05)^{-40}} \frac{0.0447}{1-(1+0.0447)^{-40}}$ )) =  $\xi$ 870
  - Life-cycle effect = €36,000